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Abstract 
 
 The existing scholarship has typically explained the emergence of modern Japan as a 
territorial sovereign in the late-nineteenth century to be a result of its response to Western 
imperialism, which paved the way for it to build its own empire. Scholars have found Japan’s 
motivation for drawing territorial boundaries either in the pursuit of the maintenance of 
independence or its entry into the international society. However their narratives do not fully 
explain why the process led to the establishment of Japan’s sovereignty over border zones 
with ambiguous territorial status, such as the Kuril Islands and the Ryukyu Kingdom. 
Approaching the question by investigating local developments, this thesis presents a twofold 
explanation for the emergence of territorial boundaries around Japan: that the rise of 
sovereignty had origins in the long-term decline of the border zones’ political institutions; and 
that Japan’s expansion into these zones was enabled by a diplomatic equilibrium (which the 
thesis calls the balance of favour) among the Western powers. The rise of trans-Pacific 
commercial activities, the decline of tributary trade in East Asia, and Russia’s strategic shift 
to the Far East prompted fundamental changes in the political landscape for the border zones. 
The Western imperialists in the 1860s and the 1870s saw it as best that Japan control these 
areas, because one imperial power’s territorial gain would have unleashed a scramble that 
none of them saw as worth fighting.  
 The above argument provides an alternative to the conventional Japan-centred 
narratives of interactions between Western imperialism and the East Asians. It also adds to 
the historical study of the border zones by providing a comparative analysis and connecting 
them with a broader context. It thus bridges the historiographical gap between the diplomatic 
history of bakumatsu and Meiji Japan and the local histories around the archipelago. 
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Introduction  
 
On 7 April 2015, the headlines of the Japanese media were dominated by the latest 
outcome of textbook screening by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology, which convened for the first time in four years to approve or ask for 
modifications of various Japanese publishers’ textbooks to be used in public schools across 
the country. With regards to history textbooks, the observers’ attention was fixed on one 
conspicuous change - the increased reference to the ‘clearly stated’ governmental view on 
Japan’s territorial disputes with China and South Korea. The new textbooks, many of which 
‘nearly doubled’ the length of the relevant sections, came closely to follow the latest 
government guidelines adopted in January. The local English-language newspaper Japan 
Times reported that some versions of the approved textbooks gave ‘detailed information about 
the disputed islands, including their precise location, the history of Japan’s administration and 
what kinds of fish can be caught in waters nearby’.1 
Polemics on territorial disputes in East Asian waters have a long and complicated 
history. They have attracted attention from many historians and political scientists, while each 
contending government shows no signs of yielding its claims to its territorial sovereignty.2 
The debate is not limited to academia or officialdom. Journalists, amateur historians, and 
activists of all stripes have gone back to historical records in an attempt to vindicate their 
view that the piece of land in question has always been theirs (or, on rare occasions, someone 
else’s).3 Some scholars have gone into the minutest details of the wording of the relevant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 ‘History in Japan's textbooks gets government makeover’, Japan Times 7 April 2015. Accessed at 
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/07/national/history-in-japans-textbooks-gets-government-
makeover/ on 8 April 2015. 
2 Alexander Bukh has examined the ideologies behind Japan’s foreign policy through the study of the 
Russo-Japanese dispute over the southern Kuril Islands. Bukh, ‘Constructing Japan's “Northern 
Territories”: Domestic Actors, Interests, and the Symbolism of the Disputed Islands’, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12:3 (2012), 483-509. 
3 One example is a newspaper story reporting the discovery of a historical map that allegedly shows the 
status of an island. ‘Shimane confirms 1760s maps showing Takeshima as part of Japan,’ Japan Times, 
1 August 2013. Accessed at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/01/national/shimane-confirms-
1760s-maps-showing-takeshima-as-part-of-japan/ on 8 April 2015. 
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international treaty clauses in order to 'disentangle' the origins of the territorial disputes.4 
What is striking about the plethora of studies on the territorial disputes in East Asia is the 
degree to which the concept of territorial sovereignty has taken root in the discourse of the 
researchers and the readers alike. The principle that every piece of land has to belong to not 
more or less than one government that exercises sovereignty is entrenched in the people’s 
worldview today.  
This has led some observers to retrospectively apply the principle of territorial 
sovereignty to historical texts. They see territorial sovereignty as the norm from time 
immortal. This is far from the truth. Historians of modern Japan generally note that territorial 
sovereignty began to take root around the Japanese archipelago only in the late-nineteenth 
century.5 This was marked by a series of agreements and declarations made in the 1870s, such 
as the Treaty of St. Petersburg; Japan’s declaration of sovereignty over the Bonin Islands; and 
annexation of the Ryukyu kingdom, that clarified the territorial ownership of each borderland 
area.  
Prior to this period, the areas around Japan were places where the mode of political 
control was different from the modern state and its principle of territorial sovereignty. In the 
parlance of Ronald Toby, they were ‘border zones’, where no clear boundaries existed and 
‘Japan’ gradually faded away, while others’ rule became thicker.6 The border zones were not 
only distinct political entities in their own right, but also comprised indispensable elements 
within the complex regional political structure of the north-western Pacific and facilitated 
interactions between states, empires and kingdoms – for example, Tokugawa Japan kept in 
contact with Korea through Tsushima. The border zones were political, military, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Hiroshi Kimura, The Kurillian knot: A history of Japanese-Russian border negotiations. Stanford 
University Press, 2008. 
5 See, for instance, Kawashima Shin, ‘Higashi Ajia sekai no kindai’, in Wada Haruki et al (eds.), 
Higashi Ajia Kingendai Tsūshi vol.1 Higashi Ajia Sekai no Kindai 19 Seiki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2010), 36-7. 
6 Ronald Toby, ‘Henbō suru “sakoku” gainen’, in Nagatsumi Yōko (ed.), Sakoku Wo Minaosu (Tokyo: 
Kokusai Bunka Koryu Suisin Kyokai, 1999), 216.  
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intellectual buffers that prevented collision between the larger states by facilitating 
commercial and cultural interactions.7  
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the rise of the principle of territorial 
sovereignty in East Asia and the incorporation of these border zones into the state of Japan in 
the late-nineteenth century. It attempts to show how the conditions for this transformation 
were created by local developments in each border zone, and how these then influenced 
multilateral negotiations. In doing so, it highlights the role played by border station officers; 
provincial rulers trying to safeguard their polities; and non-state actors who traversed the area 
without minding who exercised territorial sovereignty. Ultimately it is concerned with the 
complex interaction between state-level diplomacy and local-level contingencies. 
 
Historiography 
 
In the late-nineteenth century the political structure around the Japanese archipelago 
underwent a drastic change. A typical explanation is that the expansion of the sovereign state 
system, originating in Western Europe, induced political change in the Japanese state.8 
Although there is no question that Tokugawa Japan faced domestic challenges, the argument 
made is that the particular way in which modern statehood emerged in the last third of the 
nineteenth century was contingent on the external threat. As Daniel Botsman has written, 
‘modernity in Japan was ultimately not homegrown and must be understood, at least in the 
first instance, as a product of the mid-nineteenth-century encounter with Western 
imperialism’.9 If we accept that the encounter with the West was vital for the birth of modern 
Japan, we can move on to the next, more specific question: how did the transition from a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Kawashima Shin and Hattori Ryūji (ed.), Higashi Ajia Kokusai Kankeishi (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2007), 6. 
8 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford  and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984); Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's encounter 
with European international society (London: Routledge, 2009). 
9 Daniel Botsman, Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 9. Original emphasis. 
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patchwork of border zones to a territorial sovereign state take place around the Japanese 
archipelago, and what was the role played by Western imperialism in that process?  
Even though many diplomatic historians – as will be seen below – have dealt with the 
various boundary negotiations around the Japanese archipelago or mentioned them in passing, 
few have taken up the question directly. One rare exception is Bruce Batten whose book 
covers the subject of Japan’s borders from antiquity to the present. He is concerned primarily 
with where the limit of Japanese power can be found over time, and does not develop any 
observations based on primary sources. He concludes that Japan had political and cultural 
boundaries that were divergent but evolved in tandem, but he does not fully explain why that 
was the case. Moreover, his discussion specifically on the territorial frontier dwells more on 
the pre-modern rather than modern borders. He acknowledges that he is more interested in 
what the border tells us about Japan than the border itself, and thus his study is 
‘unapologetically centered in Japan’.10 All that makes Batten’s work unique, but it does not 
directly address the issue of Japans’ border as a phenomenon in international history. Aside 
from Batten’s monograph, a book chapter by Fumoto Shinichi and an article by Nagashima 
Shunsuke, historians have not provided a comprehensive picture of the emergence of borders 
around Japan in the late-nineteenth century.11 
Thus we need to turn to a wider historiography on the beginning of the modern 
Japanese state. This can be categorised into two historiographical contexts: metropole and 
periphery. The discussion below presents the two contexts and their limitations. Then the 
contribution of this thesis is explained as bridging the gap between the two, thereby pushing 
the historiography one step further.  
 
Metropole historiography: Japan’s encounter with the West !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Bruce Batten, To the Ends of Japan: Premodern Frontiers, Boundaries, and Interactions (Honolulu, 
HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 11. 
11 See Fumoto, ‘Kakutei sareru kokkyō’. Nagashima Shunsuke has rightly argued that ‘contradictions 
of the boundaries of the island nation that is Japan have appeared above all as the question of islands’, 
but his following accounts go no further than the regurgitation of conventional historiography. See 
Nagashima Shunsuke, ‘Tōsho to kyōkai: Nihon kokkyō keiseishi shiron', Kokusai Seiji 162 (December 
2010), 114-129, here 114. 
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The orthodox narrative has focused on the contacts between the Western heads of 
states and the Tokugawa shogunate and later the Meiji government, and how the issue of 
boundary has been discussed in their diplomatic communication. Some say that the Russian 
approach from the early-nineteenth century paved the way, while others find the turning point 
in a more general context of Japan’s signing of treaty with Matthew Perry of the United States 
in 1854.12 Either way, the existing studies commonly note that the Japanese in the mid-
nineteenth century felt that the future of their country had been thrown into question, due to 
the fact that they were faced with imperialist powers far superior to Japan both in military and 
economic terms. One of the measures the Japanese leaders took in the 1860s and the 1870s to 
ensure the nation’s survival was to clarify the borders in the areas in which no single 
territorial sovereign was specified.  
Thus far their account seems straightforward. Yet their interpretations on the way in 
which the Japanese tried to set the borders need close scrutiny. Why did the Japanese set the 
boundary in such a way that included the border zones (barring Sakhalin, which it lost to 
Russia)? If establishing a boundary in itself was sufficient for ensuring independence, Japan 
could have simply defined its territory with what was under the Tokugawa’s authority with no 
ambiguity: the three islands of Honshū, Shikoku and Kyushu and adjoining islets. Why did it 
want to include Ezo, Tsushima, Ryukyu, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, eastern Taiwan, and the 
Bonins? How did a weaker state in the face of imperialist powers end up expanding its realm? 
Several explanations have been offered. Ishii Takashi, in his pioneering work on 
Japanese diplomacy from bakumatsu to the Meiji Restoration, argued that Japan’s fall into a 
semi-colonial status was aborted because of the British foreign policy of the time.13 Since 
then historians’ focus has moved on to analysis of Japan’s motivations. One recurring 
argument is that it adapted a preemptive defence policy. Kim Key-Hiuk argued that by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 For those emphasising the Russian advance, see George Lensen, The Russian Push toward Japan: 
Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959); Marius B 
Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2000); Katō Yūzō, Kurohune Zengo no Sekai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1985).  
13 Ishii Takashi, Meiji Ishin No Kokusaiteki Kankyō (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1957), 25-6. 
 14!
mid-nineteenth century Japan developed ‘nascent expansionism’ as a result of this fear of ‘an 
aggressive West’ in East Asia. With regards to Korea, Kim suggested that even before the 
Meiji Restoration the Japanese leading policymakers saw it imperative to ‘establish influence 
in or control over the [Korean] peninsula’ in order to prevent a Western power from seizing 
it.14 As for the 1879 annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Kim, Richard Sims, and others have 
likewise claimed that Tokyo feared foreign occupation unless they acted first.15 On Tsushima, 
Michael Auslin has noted that, although the British and the American negotiators in Japan in 
the 1850s had made clear that they had no territorial ambitions, Japan’s response to the 
Russians during the Tsushima Incident in 1861 was to ‘play foreigners off against each other 
wherever feasible’ and preserve the physical boundary that encompassed the border zones. 
His interpretation differs from the earlier scholarship such as Kim in that he acknowledges 
that Japan worked with Britain to face Russia, thereby complicating the West-Japan 
dichotomy.16  
Others have argued that it was a matter of Japan’s national pride. Peter Duus has 
claimed that Japanese expansion in this period was a manifestation of the Meiji government’s 
aspiration for the restoration of national honour.17 Akira Iriye similarly has pointed out that 
preserving control over the islands where they already had had some influence was necessary 
because the failure to do so ‘would imply a retreat and damage the new regime’s domestic 
and external prestige’.18 Arano Yasunori concurs by emphasising the slogan ‘facing up to the 
world (bankoku taiji)’ that appeared as an important goal of the new regime. 19  The 
implication was that the government needed to redress the inequality in the treaties to bring 
Japan back to its proper place in the world. This was a necessary rhetoric for the nascent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Kim, The Last Phase, 78, 97. 
15 Kim, The Last Phase, 280; Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ no Kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen: 
Shokuminchi Shihai kara Fukki Made (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1998), 20-27; Richard Sims, Japanese 
Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000 (London: Hurst and Company, 2001), 40; 
Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 154. 
16 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, 29-32, 81. 
17 Peter Duus, Modern Japan (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 134-6. 
18 Akira Iriye, ‘Japan’s drive to great-power status’, in Marius Jansen (ed.), Cambridge History of 
Japan vol. 5 the nineteenth-century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1989]), 740. 
19 See, for instance, Arano Yasunori, Ishii Masatoshi, Murai Shosuke (eds.), Nippon No Taigai Kankei 
vol.7 Kindaika Suru Nippon (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2012), 27. 
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imperial government to employ with a view to legitimising its rule.20 Overall these scholars 
have taken a realpolitik-based approach. Japan’s policy was driven primarily by the security 
imperative – the survival of the country – due to the increasing presence of the Western 
imperialists in the region (even though some room for cooperation existed). 
The other major cluster of research within the metropole historiography is inspired by 
theorists in the field of international relations who have pointed to the function of 
international society.21 Scholars in this school assume the prior existence of a ‘European 
International Society’ within which member nations share certain norms on their behaviour, 
and that this society expanded into East Asia in the nineteenth century. During that process, 
one of the justifications employed by the imperialists for the subjugation and exploitation of 
non-European peoples was the idea that they, the Western society, represented a higher form 
of living called ‘civilisation’ and that the others, the ‘backward’ societies, would only benefit 
from being placed under their rule and tutelage.22 In that way the latter would advance 
towards civilisation. Japanese contemporary political leaders, as they began interactions with 
imperialist powers, bought into this perspective.  
The tone of the narrative is one of learning and adaptation, rather than fear or 
competition. For instance, Suganami Hidemi has noted that Japan, although initially ‘an 
unwilling pupil’, quickly came to accept the precepts of Western diplomacy and that by the 
time the Iwakura Mission left Japan in 1871, it was ‘engaged in an earnest endeavour to adopt 
the behaviour appropriate to the western-dominated international society in order to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Mitani Hiroshi, ’19 seiki ni okeru higashi Ajia kokusai chitsujo no tenkan: jōyaku taiseiwo “hubyōdō” 
to kukurunowa tekisetsuka’, Higashi Ajia Kindaishi 13 (March 2010), 1-11. 
21 A representative work that explores the connection between this theory primarily concerned with 
Europe and the cases from the rest of the world is Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The 
Expansion of International Society (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
22 This rhetoric was later crystallised in the General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, which 
stated the participating sovereign states would ‘care for the improvement of the conditions of their [i.e. 
the Congolese peoples’] moral and material well-being’. Antony Anghie has noted that the attendants 
to the conference referred to the civilising mission as a justification of their imperial expansion and 
believed that establishing free trade would ensure the elimination of the slave trade. Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 90-7. Quoted from p.97. 
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accepted as one of its full members.’23 In a similar vein, Mark Ravina has argued that because 
the international system required Japan to be a polity similar to the others in the system, its 
interactions with the Europeans and the Americans led it to reform its institutions to replicate 
those of its counterparts.24   
This narrative works well in explaining the ideological continuation of the Japan-
centred worldview in the Tokugawa period and the hierarchical understanding of the nations 
according to their civilisational advance. Especially after the Meiji Restoration, Japanese 
political elites and the former samurai class arrived at a view that their role in the world was 
to turn Japan into a civilised nation and to lead other Asian nations in that direction. The way 
to do this was, as Shogo Suzuki has described, to behave towards the neighbouring polities as 
the European powers did towards Japan.25 In short, the self-image acquired as the result of the 
encounter with the concept of civilisation affected the Japanese attitude towards the 
neighbouring polities.  
 The resultant belief in a hierarchical relationship between the Westerners, the 
Japanese, and the Asian neighbours based on a scale of civilisation is presented today, in 
terms of the theory of international relations, as Japan’s entry into the international society.26 
As Tessa Morris-Suzuki has pointed out, the perception developed by Meiji Japan in regard to 
the regional political order mirrored the Tokugawa shogunate’s construction of a Japan-
centred worldview.27 In the early Meiji period, Japanese nationalists did not have to abandon 
their pre-Restoration view of the regional order in which Japan was the dominant centre. All 
they had to do was to adopt a set of new lexical embellishments such as ‘civilisation 
(bunmei)’, ‘opening (kaika)’, and ‘nurturing (buiku)’ and apply them to Japan’s approach to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Suganami, ‘Japan’s Entry into the International Society’, in Bull and Watson (eds.), The Expansion 
of International Society, 185-200. Here p.192. 
24 Mark Ravina, ‘State-Making in Global Context: Japan in a World of Nation-States’, in Joshua Fogel 
(ed.), The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2005), 87-104.  
25 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire. 
26 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire; Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International 
Society (Oxford  and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Suganami, ‘Japan’s Entry into the 
International Society’. 
27 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 
24-5.  
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the neighbouring polities. Morris-Suzuki has argued that Japan’s incorporation of the border 
zones took place through assimilation policies towards the Ainu and the Ryukyuans, in ‘an 
attempt to blend the societies of the periphery into the official image of a unified and 
centralized nation’.28 By arguing so, she places an emphasis on nation-building as a critical 
motivation for the Japanese incorporation of the border zones. 
Although there is a great deal to be learnt from these two main strands of existing 
scholarship, there is a shortcoming. Beneath most historical accounts on this subject lies the 
assumption of a clear Japan-West dichotomy. There has been some recognition of the 
differences in motivations held by Britain, the United States, and Russia, and on the fact that 
Japan occasionally worked with one or more Western powers to achieve its policy goal. Yet 
the way in which this multilateral structure affected diplomatic relations among the countries 
concerned remains obscure. For example, discussion of Anglo-Russian rivalry has appeared 
in considerations of Sakhalin and the Tsushima Incident, but has not become part of the larger 
narrative. Moreover, the majority of accounts regard the border zones as merely the victims of 
Japanese agency, without paying sufficient attention to the endogenous factors.  
Thus both the traditional diplomatic historians and the advocates of ‘Japan’s entry 
into the international society’ thesis fall into the same trap – namely, taking the existence of a 
distinct territorial state called Japan for granted. The reality is that it was in no way 
guaranteed that Japan would survive the nineteenth century as a single polity, let alone 
become a sovereign state consisting of the set of islands that it ended up possessing. The 
Japanese archipelago could have hosted more than one government – as it briefly did during 
the Restoration War of 1868-9. Offlying islands could have come under the colonial rule of a 
Western imperial power; or persisted as independent states on their own right. Again, in order 
to account for the way in which the territorial boundary around Japan emerged, it is not 
sufficient to look at metropole governments and their agents; the histories of the border zones 
and their failure to ‘enter the international society’ need to be studied at the local as well as 
the international level. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Ibid., 24. 
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Periphery historiography: the end of the border zones 
 
What, then, do we know about the histories of the border zones in this period? This 
thesis divides the border zones around Japan into three categories: the northern border zone, 
covering Ezo/Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands; the island of Tsushima; and the 
southern border zone, encompassing the Ryukyu Kingdom, Taiwan, and the Bonin Islands. A 
great deal of historical research exists on the histories of these areas in the late-nineteenth 
century if one includes those that do not explicitly frame their analysis as pertaining to 
borders.  
On the northern border, the primary object of historians’ concern has been the island 
of Sakhalin. Until it became part of the Russian empire through the signing of the Russo-
Japanese Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875, no clear political institutions had emerged on this 
island. Indigenous peoples, Manchu merchants, Russian settlers, and Japanese fishermen all 
interacted there. Because the island changed hands between the Russians and the Japanese in 
the first half of the twentieth century, the post-1945 scholarship first focused on the 
diplomatic history of the Russo-Japanese relations and especially Russia’s southward advance. 
Historians such as George Lensen, John Stephan, and Akizuki Toshiyuki have accordingly 
seen Russia in this period as an ambitious power wanting to expand its reach to the south 
towards Hokkaido, while the Japanese responded with an apprehension that, if mishandled, 
the situation could lead to a matter of national survival.29  
Another group of work has focused on relations between the Japanese settler 
population and the indigenous peoples, most notably the Ainu in Ezo (later to be renamed 
Hokkaido by the Meiji government). Inspired by the rise of postcolonial studies, historians 
have presented ‘a view from the frontier’ (Tessa Morris-Suzuki); they have challenged what 
they perceive as a nationalist discourse that portrays the history of Hokkaido through the eyes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Lensen, Russian Push Toward Japan; John Stephan, Sakhalin: A History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971); Akizuki Toshiyuki, Nichiro Kankei to Saharin Tō (Sapporo: Hokkaido Daigaku Shuppankai, 
1994). 
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of Japanese settlers and developers, trumpeting its advance towards a modern statehood. This 
generation of scholars have instead emphasised that Hokkaido was a Japanese colony, where 
Japan from the early Tokugawa period onwards took over the land and dispossessed the Ainu 
people, erasing their political, cultural and linguistic heritage. They see a direct link between 
the colonisation of Hokkaido and the expansion of the Japanese empire in the first half of the 
twentieth century.30 
Historians of imperial Russia have also worked on Sakhalin but it is only within the 
last two decades that primary sources became available for historical investigation. Andrew 
Gentes and Sharyl Corrado have both worked on Russia’s administration of the penal colony 
in Sakhalin in the nineteenth century.31 Their primary concern has been to revisit the concept 
and origins of modernity in Russia by looking at Sakhalin as one part of imperial Russia’s 
Great Reform process. Gentes links the genealogy of the penal colony in Sakhalin, known to 
Russian contemporaries as the most notorious in the world, with the overall Russian penal 
reforms of the mid-nineteenth century. Russia’s exile penal labour system known as katorga, 
under which the state sent its worst offenders to eastern Siberia, had ceased to function and 
that necessitated, in order for the empire to maintain its criminal justice system, the 
development of the island as an alternative destination for convict exiles.32 Corrado argues: 
‘Sakhalin became a place for the negotiation of a Russian modernity distinct from the 
enlightenment project in Europe’.33 Their studies derive from the recent trend in questioning 
Euro-centric understandings of modernity.  
As for the Kuril Islands, not a great deal of historical research exists, apart from those 
dealing with the Russo-Japanese diplomatic negotiations that resulted in the territorial swap !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Morris-Suzuki, Henkyō kara Nagameru (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 2000); Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing 
Japan; Michele Mason, Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning 
the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Also see David 
Howell, ‘Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modern Japanese State’, Past and Present 
142 (1994): 69-93; Richard Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996); Brett Walker, The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and culture in Japanese 
expansion, 1590-1800 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2001). 
31 Andrew Gentes, ‘The Institution of Russia's Sakhalin Policy, from 1868 to 1875’, Journal of Asian 
History 36, no.1 (2002), 1-31; Sharyl Corrado, The “end of the earth”: Sakhalin Island in the Russian 
imperial imagination, 1849-1906. (Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010). 
32 Gentes, ‘The Institution of Russia's Sakhalin Policy, from 1868 to 1875’.   
33 Corrado, “The end of the earth”, 8. 
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of 1875.34 Even these works treat the Kuriles only as a secondary factor in the equation. 
Scholars interested in the contemporary territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo over 
what the Japanese government calls ‘the northern territory’ have written at length on the 
claims of the respective governments and have traced back its origins to the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, when in August 1945 the Soviet troops occupied the 
islands, including Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai at the southern end of the group 
adjoining Hokkaido. The Japanese government regards the Russian presence on these four 
islands as the unlawful occupation of ‘inherently’ Japanese territory which is not included in 
the renunciation of ‘the Kurile Islands’ in the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, and 
continues to demand their return. The Russian government asserts that Japan renounced these 
four islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and continues to exercise effective rule there.35  
In regard to Tsushima, research on the ruling Sō family’s documents during the 
Tokugawa era has led to a pioneering work by Tashiro Kazui, which caused a major revision 
of the image of Tokugawa seclusion.36 The amount of research published on Tsushima and 
Korean-Japanese relations since then has been numerous, but the bakumatsu and early Meiji 
period still presents a relative gap.37 Historians studying the triangular relations among Korea, 
Tsushima and Japan in the early modern period tend to stop before the mid-nineteenth century. 
A large number of studies exist on the seikanron debate of 1873, but historians have mostly 
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34 The representative monographs that deal with the Kurils specifically are John Stephan, The Kuril 
Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), and Akizuki 
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Sōtokufu Chūsūin, 1940); Ishira Tōru, Kindai Ikōki no Nicchō Kankei (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 2013). In 
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focused on Meiji Japan’s leadership politics.38 Those interested in Japanese imperialism or the 
Japanese empire rush through this period, with the underlying assumption that it is a prelude 
to the annexation of Korea in 1910.39 Barring a few recent works, historians have not given 
enough attention to Tsushima’s transformation for its own sake.  
In the southern border zones, the standard narratives of the Ryukyu Kingdom have 
adopted a bilateral framework for Ryukyu-Japan relations and emphasised Meiji Japan’s 
assimilation policies in pursuit of building a Japanese nation.40 Recently, however, scholars 
have begun to utilise Chinese sources in order to place the kingdom in the trilateral context of 
Ryukyu, Japan, and the Qing Empire. This has drawn attention to Sino-Japanese relations 
regarding Ryukyu in the 1880s, as well as China’s view on this once avid participant in the 
tributary trade.41 Detailed studies of the domestic politics within Ryukyu after the annexation 
and a comparative analysis with the annexation of Korea have also appeared.42 Yet there 
persists a tendency to lump together the 1874 Taiwan expedition and the Ryukyu annexation 
without investigating the exact Japanese motives behind each action.43 The narrative remains 
one of Japan’s opportunistic expansion to the south, with the idea that this was deliberately 
framed as the act of a civilised power. 
On the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands, earlier scholarship has clustered around the issue 
of the legal justification for the territorial claim. In explaining what the Meiji government 
called the ‘recollection of the Ogasawara Islands (Ogasawara Tō kaishū)’, Japanese history 
works have tended to rely heavily on official sources whose purpose to begin with was to 
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demonstrate the legitimacy of Japan’s territorial claim.44 The basic line of argument has 
remained unaltered in the post-1945 historiography. While the most recent work by Fumoto 
Shinichi has pointed out that the Japanese territorial claim was weak, the question as to why 
the Japanese did not meet stronger resistance from other powers remains unexplored.45 In a 
rare exception Ishihara Shun has argued that rule by the Japanese Empire was only partially 
applied to the Bonins by local officials who often resorted to ad hoc measures.46 Ishihara has 
characterised the islands as ‘one of the first frontier spaces where Japan as a civilised power 
carried out colonisation under the name of sovereignty’.47 Yet he does not explain why this 
did not meet opposition from the foreign powers or how the Japanese decision to claim 
Ogasawara was affected by its experience of border negotiations elsewhere.  
Some English-language works on nineteenth-century Japanese diplomatic history 
touch upon the Bonins but only in passing. William Beasley noted that Britain never seriously 
entertained occupation of the Bonins because they could never be ‘a strategic centre of the 
same value as Aden, Ceylon or Singapore’.48 The Cambridge History of Japan simply follows 
Beasley’s argument in the relevant section.49 Some of the primary sources produced by the 
sailors who visited the Bonins have been edited and published, but they come without any 
substantial analysis.50 Maritime history, especially the history of whaling, has occasionally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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46 Ishihara Shun, Kindai Nihon to Ogasawara Shotō: idōmin no shimajima to Teikoku. (Tokyo: 
Heibonsha, 2007). 
47 Ibid, 201. 
48 William G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858 (Routledge, 1995 [1951]), 
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49  Marius Jansen (ed.), Cambridge History of Japan vol.5 The Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 125.  
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States Surveying Expedition to the North Pacific Ocean, 1853-1856 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
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mentioned the Bonins. Yet this literature focuses more on the 1850s and the earlier period 
when whaling gave some importance to these well-positioned islands.51 This leaves the 
beginning of the history of the Bonins in modern international relations dominated by the 
decades-old, Japan-centred narrative. 
   
 
Gap in the historiography 
 
In sum, the metropole-focused historiography described above has not paid enough 
attention to the complexity of the nineteenth-century world beyond the familiar framework of 
the sovereign states that we know have survived to the present. The periphery historiography, 
on the other hand, has been slow to adopt any comparative analysis across the border zones 
and has not done enough to contribute to a larger picture of the nineteenth-century history of 
the north-western Pacific. In order to explain the way in which territorial borders emerged 
around Japan in the late-nineteenth century, it is necessary to bridge this gap. This thesis 
attempts to do so by introducing a two-layered argument: that the necessity for sovereign rule 
around the Japanese archipelago often had local, as opposed to international, origins, and that 
there was a ‘balance of favour’ that prevented the treaty powers from obtaining territorial 
concessions in Japan’s border zones. Throughout the rest of the thesis, the term ‘balance of 
favour’ is defined as a multilateral diplomatic equilibrium among the imperialist powers in 
the nineteenth century in possession of most-favoured-nation status vis-a-vis the target 
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country (in this case Japan), under which no member wants to force a territorial secession 
from the latter for fear of starting a territorial scramble.52  
In order to explain the working of the balance of favour in more detail, a brief 
overview of the history of the treaty-port system and the MFN in the nineteenth-century East 
Asia is in order. 
 
 
Genealogy of the treaty-port system and the impact of the MFN 
 
The treaty-port system first emerged in China after its defeat to Britain in the Opium 
War and the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. The British gained access to five 
treaty ports – Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shanghai, Ningpo, and Fuzhou – to conduct trade, with a 
fixed tariff on both exports and imports and under the protection of extraterritoriality.53 With 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing in 1860, China 
conceded a more extensive list of privileges to foreign citizens in China, including the right to 
travel to the interior and to purchase property.54 In addition to Britain, France, the United 
States, China concluded new commercial treaties on similar terms with twelve states.55 The 
Qing also agreed on additional terms with the United States (Burlingame Treaty, 1868) and 
Britain (Alcock Convention, 1869). Furthermore, it signed treaties concerning migrants (with 
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Spain and Peru) and border demarcation (with Russia).56 The Tongzhi era (1861-1875) 
therefore saw China’s continuous and increasing participation in treaty relations. 
The resulting web of treaty relations across China proved to be one of the 
foundational features of diplomatic relations in East Asia in the coming decades. By the time 
the First World War broke out in Europe, there were forty-eight treaty ports in China.57 Treaty 
ports on similar terms opened up in Korea, but their commercial significance was no match 
for those in China and they disappeared into the Japanese empire in 1910.58  
Given that its main stage was China, how should we understand the significance of 
the treaty-port system for the history of modern Japan? It has been a standard view to find the 
origins of the system in Britain’s commercial policy, which in turn ‘reflected a shift from the 
eighteenth-century doctrines of mercantilism to those of laissez faire, linked with the coming 
of the Industrial Revolution’.59 In other words, from the viewpoint of the British and other 
Western merchants, the opening of treaty ports in China represented the expansion of their 
own trade scheme into extra-European terrain. Thus the opening of treaty ports in Japan was 
seen as merely an extension of that system.60 It was only natural that Western diplomats, 
naval officers and consuls went back and forth between the two countries as they climbed up 
the career ladder. In the Westerners’ mind, China was the target of the system, while Japan 
was a corollary. 
This may not be completely true, though, from an East Asian perspective. For one 
thing, some historians have opposed the view that the treaty ports comprised a coherent and 
coordinated system which the Western powers used to coerce the Qing.61 Moreover, at least !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in the first few decades of the treaty ports’ existence, the Qing understood the arrangement 
with the West to be an extension and modification of the hushi system that had stood in 
parallel with the tributary system since the late Ming period. Countries that belonged to this 
category of hushi, literally meaning ‘mutual trade’, were deemed as posing no military threat 
and therefore allowed to send merchants to conduct purely commercial interactions at 
designated ports.62 Importantly, Japan did not fit into either of the two categories. It was 
certainly not a tributary state, but Chinese merchants had long been trading in Nagasaki. As 
Kawashima Shin has noted, this ambiguity came up in the early 1860s when Tokugawa Japan 
probed into the possibility of starting official trade with China.63 When the two countries 
signed a covenant in 1871, they acknowledged each other as equals, granting MFN status to 
each other. Japan’s position in China came to match the Western states only in 1895, with the 
signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that was as ‘unequal’ as those that the Westerners had 
imposed on the Qing. Thus there is a good reason to be careful about looking at Japan’s treaty 
relations only from the Westerners’ perspective. 
This, of course, is not to understate the impact of the treaty-port system on Japan, as 
is amply shown by existing scholarship. In particular, the inclusion of MFN status turned out 
to be of great consequence. MFN clauses had originally developed in the treaties signed 
between the mercantilist states in Europe in the eighteenth century. In East Asia the first 
instance of MFN status appeared in the 1843 Treaty of the Bogue signed between Britain and 
China. Following the example of Britain, France and the United States soon afterwards 
gained the same right. Initially a vehicle for promotion of trade between equal trading 
partners within the Western world, MFN thus metamorphosed into a tool for free-trade 
imperialism in East Asia. The study of the history of MFN in East Asia has developed far less 
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compared to that of extraterritoriality.64 The existing studies tend only to point out the 
importance of MFN status in the Western expansion of trade in China in the mid-nineteenth 
century.65 However, MFN’s impact was at least comparable to that of extraterritoriality, as far 
as Japan was concerned. 
Japan gave unilateral MFN in its first ever treaty with the United States in 1854. This 
was because S. Wells Williams, who translated for Matthew Perry, had first-hand knowledge 
of the Treaty of Wanghia and recommended the United States insert the MFN clause in the 
treaty with Japan as well. Since the Tokugawa negotiators did not envisage the Japanese 
travelling to the United States, they declined to make the MFN mutual in spite of the 
American offer to do so.66 After the Ansei Treaties in 1858, six more states signed similar 
treaties with Tokugawa Japan. Four more countries followed after the Meiji Restoration in 
1868. By the time Austria-Hungary became the sixteenth country to sign a treaty with Japan 
on 18 October 1869, Western powers had managed to press for various measures to promote 
uninterrupted trade in the treaty ports.67 This stream of new treaties gave the Powers an 
opportunity to gain more privileges for the entire Western merchant community in Japanese 
ports. Because of MFN status, the imperialist powers had incentives to cooperate with each 
other. In this sense the dichotomy between the Japanese and the Westerners has some 
relevance.  
This Japan-West dichotomy based on treaty relations with unilateral MFN has the 
negative images of the clause among Japanese historians, who almost unanimously condemn 
it for blocking the path of treaty revision. Murase Shinya, for instance, wrote that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Tokugawa officers who negotiated with Harris in 1858 ‘surprisingly and regrettably’ declined 
to add the MFN treatment for the Japanese in the United States.68 Yet looking at Japan’s 
boundary negotiations provides grounds on which to revisit some of the negative images of 
the MFN. This is because, although the Westerners in Japan benefited enormously from the 
tax and administrative point of view, MFN status could not be used to extend one country’s 
territorial gains to all other signatories.  
Under the principles of the sovereign state system, territorial acquisition and MFN 
were ultimately irreconcilable – in the sense that no territorial benefits can be given equally to 
more than one country. It was Britain that obtained Hong Kong in 1842; no other countries, 
despite their MFN clauses vis-à-vis China, received the same territorial rights to the island. 
The same goes for the Russian possessions in north-eastern China after the Treaty of Beijing 
in 1860. Thus in so far as territorial secession was concerned, the Western powers found 
themselves in a zero-sum game, unlike the promotion of free trade. The imperialist powers 
worried that if one of them acquired an overseas territory around the Japanese archipelago, 
the only way for others to gain similar privileges and restore the power balance was to 
possess somewhere else. It would thus set a precedent and start a territorial scramble. The 
Western powers’ officers in Japan did not see any benefit in such an undertaking. Japan’s 
market was not big enough, and the strategic benefits from possessing territories around Japan, 
with the exception of Tsushima, were seen as minor. The least damaging fallback scenario for 
the imperialist powers, therefore, was to allow Japanese control of the border zones while 
ensuring free access to the major ports. 
 
 
Main arguments 
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In a recent reappraisal of the narrative of Japan’s ‘unequal treaties’ in the bakumatsu 
and the early Meiji period, Mitani Hiroshi has pointed out that the labelling of the treaties as 
‘unequal’ had much to do with the early Meiji government’s incentive to denigrate the legacy 
of the Tokugawa shogunate that it had just replaced. He has suggested that the treaty terms 
may have actually been more damaging to the Westerners than to the Japanese.69 In an 
another attempt at revising the evaluation of these treaties, Kokaze Hidemasa has argued that 
the nineteenth-century treaty system in fact prevented East Asian states from being colonised, 
as the signing entailed an underlying recognition of the signatories’ sovereignty.70 These 
observations provide an important angle for exploring the impact of the treaties on modern 
Japan’s emergence, because they resist an easy characterisation of modern Japan’s beginning 
as nothing more than a successful march towards modernisation. 
Yet Kokaze’s revisionist suggestion seems to overlook the obvious: the existence of a 
treaty did not guarantee territorial integrity and independence of a signing party. The Ryukyu 
Kingdom had concluded treaties with the United States, Netherlands and France in the 1840s 
before it was annexed by Meiji Japan in 1879. Nor did Korea’s treaties save it from being 
colonised by Japan a few decades later. Even in the case of Japan, its treaties did not prevent 
the Westerners from seeking to possess an island or a portion of land, as will be discussed 
later.  
Thus if the weaker party in the treaty system managed to survive as an independent 
state, the reason needs to be sought not in the existence of the treaty itself, but in the wider 
international relations of the time. In a similar vein, the emergence of Japan’s territorial 
boundary at any particular location also needs to be explained by factors beyond the treaty 
system or the MFN. It is appropriate here, therefore, to introduce a two-layered argument 
consisting of a periphery level, which looks into the local development of events, and a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Mitani, ‘19 seiki ni okeru higashi Ajia kokusai chitsujo no tenkan’. For orthodox views of the 
‘unequal’ treaty, see Perez, Japan Comes of Age; Kenneth Pyle, “Meiji Conservatism”, in Jansen, 
Marius (ed.) The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
688–9. 
70 Kokaze Hidemasa, ’19 seiki sekai shisutemu no sabushisutemu to shiteno hubyōdō jōyaku taisei’, 
Higashi Ajia Kindaishi 13 (March 2010), 122-142. 
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metropole level that encompasses the broader international relations but which by no means 
excludes the treaty-port system.  
 
Argument 1: the periphery level 
 
At the periphery level, or in the border zones around the Japanese archipelago, the 
political arrangements that maintained inter-state relations varied from one place to another. 
Tsushima and the Ryukyu Kingdom fit best into the framework of tributary relations, while 
the Ainu in Ezo faced de facto servitude imposed by Japanese merchants. The Bonin Islands 
had no political order to speak of until the 1830s.  
In these zones, people’s attitude towards the Japanese central government also varied, 
ranging from requests for support, to indifference, to resistance against the latter’s 
interference. What was common, though, was the fact that their survival as independent 
political entities had become increasingly untenable by the mid-nineteenth century, both 
politically and economically. The tributary trade no longer provided enough profits to support 
the local economies across the China Sea, reflecting the confusion in the Qing Empire;71 the 
rise of whaling and other commercial activities in the Pacific drew North Americans to the 
Japanese shore. Imperialism, including that of Japan, hastened their demise, but it is 
important to note that local factors played a decisive role in each case. 
The reason for the emergence of territorial boundaries around the Japanese 
archipelago, first of all, should be sought in the endogenous environment. As the existing 
political institutions crumbled, a new order based on the logic of territorial sovereignty began 
to emerge. The possibility for the treaty powers to expand into this power vacuum was 
deterred, at least up to the mid-1870s, by what this thesis calls the ‘balance of favour’ that 
emerged among Japan and the treaty powers.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Shiraishi Takashi has claimed that for the southeast Asian maritime states, the tributary trade with 
China ‘had long ceased to exist’ by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Shiraishi, Umi no Teikoku 
(Tokyo: Chuō Kōron Shinsha, 2000), 33. 
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Argument 2: the metropole level 
 
Among the treaty powers, Britain, the United States, and Russia played a significant 
role in the formation of Japan’s borders. The Anglo-American approach to its opening 
induced Japan to enter into the modern international relations based on the principle of 
territorial sovereignty and free trade. Russia possessed a different set of priorities. Having lost 
the Crimean War in the Near East, and having begun a strategic retreat from the North 
American continent by the beginning of the 1860s, its attention turned to East Asia. As 
Russia’s move into the region shows, the cooperative relationship among the treaty powers 
based on MFN status did not apply to territorial rule.  
The Tsushima Incident in 1861 made Britain realise that the real power to contend 
with around the Japanese archipelago was not Edo/Tokyo but St. Petersburg. Yet Britain did 
not go so far as to gain territory from Japan for the purpose of fighting this Far Eastern 
chapter of the Great Game. Britain’s preferred method was the neutralisation of strategically 
important locations by opening a treaty port. It was a measure that went against the exclusive 
possession of a certain territory, because it allowed access to multiple treaty signatories with 
the advantages of MFN status. 
 The emergence of territorial borders around the Japanese archipelago, therefore, took 
place with the immediate cause being the beginning of the treaty relationship between Japan 
and the Western powers, but the environment conducive to such a change had been created as 
the result of local contingencies in the border zones. During that process, while MFN 
curtailed Japan’s internal sovereignty, it did not lead to the treaty powers to engage in a 
territorial scramble because geopolitical calculations took precedence over the coordinated 
action based on MFN. The exact reason why it was difficult for the Meiji leaders to revise the 
treaty – the collective implication of the MFN – made it difficult for the treaty powers to 
obtain territory from Japan. That was the limitation of MFN. It was useful only so far as the 
Western powers sought to build an informal empire. As the competition escalated towards the 
 32!
end of the nineteenth century, the balance of favour gave way to a more aggressive use of 
force, manifested in such measures as the creation of spheres of influence or annexation.  
 
 
Notes on the primary sources 
 
 Diplomatic historians of Meiji Japan have relied primarily on Dai Nihon Gaikō 
Monjo (DNGM) and FO 46 from the National Archives of the United Kingdom to describe 
the emergence of the modern Japan. Yet having set the goal in the above-mentioned manner, 
it is necessary for this thesis to cast a wider net. DNGM, compiled and published by Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1936, cannot completely serve the purpose as it is an 
official publication on Japanese diplomacy. Although FO46 files are unpublished materials, 
they too have limitations in understanding Britain’s perceptions of and activities in the border 
zones. In order to overcome these limitations, the sources used in the following chapters 
include the private papers of bakumatsu and Meiji negotiators; letters sent from the border 
station officers; manuscripts from regional archives, especially Kaitakushi papers in 
Hokkaido; FO262 to explore the view from the British consulates in Japan’s treaty ports; and 
Admiralty documents for consulting reports from the Royal Navy’s China Station. Using 
these documents the thesis aims at deconstructing the familiar units of sovereign states 
employed by traditional diplomatic history. 
 
 
Geographical overview of the Japanese archipelago and the vicinities 
 
The following chapters make reference to many obscure places in East Asia that 
Japanese history usually leaves out. That is in part the point of the project – to bring into the 
narrative locations that have not hitherto been considered by historians of Japan and which 
have therefore been seen as irrelevant to the story of the emergence of the modern Japanese 
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state, with a view to finding a new place for Japan within the international relations of the 
late-nineteenth century. It is a necessary process to shake up the fixed image of Japan as 
consisting of four islands – Hokkaido, Honshū, Shikoku and Kyushu.  
 
 
Map 1: The Japanese archipelago 
 
In order to do so it will be expedient to introduce these places here.72 Starting from 
the Northeast, the farthest away island from the mainland is Shumushu, facing the southern 
tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Shumushu is the northernmost of the Kuril Islands, but 
geologically speaking it is part of the Kamchatka basin. The strait between Shumushu and 
Kamchatka is only a few kilometres wide, and the nearest major town on Kamchatka is 
Petropavlovsk, a Russian outpost for its Pacific Fleet and the fur-animal hunting business. 
This port suffered severely from the British and French navy’s attacks during the Crimean 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 The following description is based on the international territorial boundaries that existed at the end of 
1875. 
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War in 1853-56. Petropavlovsk is on the western side of the Bering Strait, and across these 
frosty waters used to be Russian America until 1867, after which it became the territory of 
Alaska belonging to the United States.  
Going southwest from Shumushu, the Kuril Island chain consists of about thirty 
volcanic islands and rocks that collectively look like a dotted line on a map between the 
northeastern edge of Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula. It spreads over about 1,200 
kilometers, approximately the same distance between Taiwan and the southern end of Kyushu. 
Although the land totals only one-seventh of Sakhalin, or just over 10,000 square kilometers, 
it is far from negligible. The largest island, Etorofu, is 2.6 times larger than Okinawa Island, 
the largest of the Ryukyu Islands.73 Climatically difficult for humans and barren in most parts, 
the Kuriles hosted a tiny local population and remained a backwater of human activity. The 
surrounding sea is rough. Seaborne access is marred by frequent thick fog in the summer and 
floating ice in the winter, coupled with the fact that in the nineteenth century few sites along 
the archipelago provided safe anchoring. For sailors, even with steamships, getting there was 
dangerous, especially in the winter months. 
West from the Kuriles at the opposite end of the Okhotsk Sea is Sakhalin, a dagger-
shaped island of 948 kilometers north to south. In 1875 the Russo-Japanese treaty signed in St. 
Petersburg confirmed that the entire island belonged to Russia, but it had seldom been a 
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73 There are three different views on where the southern end of the Kuril Islands lies. This question is a 
political one because of the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan over the four islands, namely 
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai, and Shikotan, that the Soviet troops occupied at the end of the World 
War II and have since remained in the Russian hands. The San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 stated 
that Japan renounced ‘all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and 
the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of 
Portsmouth of 5 Sept. 1905’ (Quoted in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (ed.), The Northern Territories Dispute 
and Russo-Japanese Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), vol.1, 93). Here the 
definition of ‘the Kurile Islands’ remained vague. The Japanese foreign ministry has taken the view 
that it means the islands beginning from Urup northwards; some experts on international law include 
Etorofu and Kunashiri but not Habomai and Shikotan, which they regard as part of Hokkaido; The 
Soviet and the following Russian government as well as some Japanese scholars such as Wada Haruki 
include all four islands into the definition. See Hiroshi Kimura, The Kurillian Knot: A History of 
Japanese-Russian Border Negotiations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 65-9. Kimura 
himself agrees with the Japanese foreign ministry. On the other hand, scholars on the history of the 
Kuril Islands tend to include all four islands in their accounts, not least because it makes no sense to 
exclude them when writing on the pre-1951 period. This thesis takes the same approach, though it 
should not be read as a statement on the author’s interpretation of the wording in the 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty. 
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serious area of dispute for political leaders anywhere until the mid-nineteenth century. 
Accurate knowledge of its geography had not been available partly because of the harsh 
weather conditions that again made access difficult. It was Mamiya Rinzō, the Tokugawa 
shogunate’s explorer, who in 1808 first completed a survey and confirmed that it was an 
island, not a peninsula.74 Nevertheless the Japanese activities in Sakhalin were largely limited 
to fishery and trade with the Ainu. A small number of indigenous peoples – Nivkh (Gilyak), 
Orok, and Ainu – were scattered around the island. From the thirteenth century the islanders 
were subject to tributary relations with the Chinese dynasties, but by the nineteenth century 
the Qing Empire had lost its grip on Sakhalin. Instead Russia increased its activity as part of 
its effort to develop its far eastern possessions along the Amur River. In 1853 a Russian 
expedition established a commune on the southern coast, naming it Korsakov. Although the 
Russians evacuated this place after the outbreak of the Crimean War, by 1875 several 
hundred people lived there (mostly exile convicts sent from various places of the Russian 
empire, accompanied by soldier guards). Standing in Korsakov facing south, one can see, on a 
fine day, the cape of Sōya – the northern tip of Hokkaido (called Ezo by the Japanese until 
1869).  
 The coast of Honshū, Japan’s mainland, has numerous off-lying islands. This thesis 
focuses on the island that sits in the middle of the strait between the Korean Peninsula and 
Kyushu: Tsushima. Tsushima, some 700 square kilometres in size, is an island just fifty 
kilometres away from Pusan on the south-eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula, and about 
twice that distance northeast from the northern coast of Kyūshū. From Nagasaki it took two 
days on a boat to get there, but one could get to Pusan from Tsushima within the same day. 
 Sailing south from Kyushu, the dotted line of islands that leads to Taiwan are called 
the Nansei Islands, at the centre of which lie the Ryukyu Islands. The largest in the Ryukyu 
Islands is Okinawa, around 1,200 square kilometres and the home to the Ryukyu Kingdom 
since 1429. At the south-western end of the Ryukyu Islands are the Sakishima Islands or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Brett Walker, ‘Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese exploration of Sakhalin Island: cartography and 
empire’, Journal of Historical Geography 33 (2007), 283-313. 
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Miyako-Yaeyama Group, consisting of Miyako, Ishigaki, Iriomote and several tiny islets. 
From here it is only 150 kilometres to the north-eastern coast of Taiwan.  
Lastly, some 1,200 kilometres east of the Okinawa Island and 1,000 kilometres south 
of Tokyo, one finds an isolated island group in the southern Pacific: The Bonin Islands. The 
largest island is called Chichijima, with its main port named Futami (also called Port Lloyd 
by Western sailors). Isolated from any large-scale human habitation, the territorial status of 
this island group was undetermined (and unimportant as well) until the nineteenth century. It 
was only in 1830 that people started settling here, after which its ownership became a 
diplomatic question. It took roughly four decades after that first settlement for the islands to 
be formally included in a territorial sovereign state - Japan, rather a newcomer to the whole 
system of territorial sovereign states.   
  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
The thesis discusses three border zones – the north, Tsushima, the south – in roughly 
chronological order. It starts with two chapters discussing Tsushima, starting from an incident 
in 1861 that drew close attention from the naval powers in the north-western Pacific. The six-
month-long intrusion of the Russian corvette the Posadnik signified the change that was about 
to happen around the Japanese archipelago: the border zones were no longer compatible with 
the Western international relations system that was increasingly defined by territorial 
sovereignty. Chapter 2 goes on to discuss Tsushima in the early 1870s, when the financial as 
well as political collapse of the Tsushima domain and the closure of the waegwan, Japan’s 
trading house in Pusan, marked the end of Tsushima as a border zone. The next three chapters 
deal with the northern border zone. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the transformation that 
occurred in Sakhalin between 1867 and 1875, placing it in the context of the North Pacific 
rather than simply the Russo-Japanese axis that the conventional narrative has tended to adopt. 
The two chapters are divided at the end of 1871, after which, the thesis argues, the best-
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informed Japanese political leaders gradually realised Russia’s threat to Hokkaido had been 
overstated. Thus in Chapter 4 the main course of Japan’s action was to use diplomatic 
channels to settle the conflict with Russia in southern Sakhalin and conclude a treaty that 
confirmed the Russo-Japanese border in Japan’s north. The story of the Kuril Islands is the 
subject of Chapter 5. Unlike in most existing studies, it forms a separate chapter from 
Sakhalin because the formation of territorial boundary around the Kuril Islands has a distinct 
feature that needs to be understood in terms of the movement of people between the United 
States and Japan. Lastly Chapter 6 discusses three cases from Japan’s southern border zone: 
Taiwan, the Bonin Islands, and the Ryukyu Kingdom. It argues that having recognised that 
the balance of favour maintained Japan’s security in the northern edge, Meiji leaders’ 
attention turned to dealing with domestic problems by taking up opportunistic projects in 
Taiwan and claiming sovereignty over the Bonin Islands. The situation for the Ryukyu 
Kingdom resembled Tsushima in that its financial destitution by the 1870s left it with little 
chance of maintaining independence or autonomy. The chapter also points out the common 
understanding about the Meiji government’s handling of the southern border zones, which led 
them to fill in the vacuum of sovereignty. 
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Chapter 1  The Tsushima Incident 
 
 
 
As developments in navigational techniques began to overcome the distance across 
the Pacific and its economic integration deepened by way of exploration, trade and migration, 
the lives of Pacific sailors and the inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago became more 
intertwined than ever. Most historians open the narrative of the beginnings of modern Japan 
with the 1853 visit by an American fleet led by Matthew Perry to Uraga, near Edo Bay, and 
the resulting signing of the Treaty of Amity.1 The problem with this is that it runs the risk of 
unconsciously limiting the perspective to state-to-state diplomacy, in particular the 
negotiations that took place in Edo (later Tokyo). A better place to start this thesis which 
addresses the question of modern Japan’s boundary making is not Uraga in 1853, but 
Tsushima in 1861. In this year a Russian naval corvette, the Posadnik, came to the island and 
stayed for six months while the ship’s captain, Nikolai Birilev, demanded an exclusive and 
permanent lease of the island’s main port, causing turmoil among the Tsushima domain 
officials and residents. Tsushima and the shogunate demanded the departure of the Posadnik, 
but the ship withdrew only after British intervention following upon a request from Edo. 
This incident is significant in regard to the question about modern Japan’s territorial 
boundary for the following reasons. To begin with, it was the first incident in the bakumatsu 
era in which the Western powers tried to obtain more substantial privileges than those they 
had gained in the treaty ports under the Ansei treaties signed in 1858. Just a few years after 
the opening of three ports, the future of the Tokugawa regime was anything but certain. If this 
                                                           
1 To Michael Auslin, the Perry visit sparked the shogunate’s transition towards increased interactions 
with the Western nations, leading it to be enrolled into the international treaty structure of the mid-
nineteenth century. Mitani Hiroshi, although denying the interpretation that Perry caught the shogunate 
by surprise, still focuses on 1853-4 as the pivotal moment that capped the Western nations’ overture to 
the Japanese since the opening of the century. Martha Chaiklin has emphasised the role of the Dutch as 
a mediator in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, 18; Mitani, Escape 
from Impasse, xiii; Martha Chaiklin, ‘Monopolists to Middlemen: Dutch Liberalism and American 
Imperialism in the Opening of Japan’, Journal of World History 21:2 (2010), 249-269. For a recent 
attempt to challenge this tendency, see David Howell, ‘Foreign Encounters and Informal Diplomacy in 
Early Modern Japan’, The Journal of Japanese Studies 40:2 (2014), 295-327. 
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attempt by the Russian navy had succeeded, it would have opened a path for other non-
Tokugawa domains to deal directly with foreign powers. They could have engaged in trade or 
given up part of their lands or ports.2 Without the power to regulate foreign affairs throughout 
the archipelago, the Tokugawa’s authority would have taken a serious blow.3 However, in 
reality, the Tokugawa shogunate staved off the Russian intrusion and as a result strengthened 
its control over Tsushima. During the Boshin War of 1868-9, despite the fluid political power 
balance in the archipelago, no territorial secession to a foreign power came to fruition.4 Then 
Meiji Japan too held the country together. Tsushima, in this sense, was the first domino block 
that just remained standing. 
 Another reason for the significance of the Posadnik incident is that the eventual 
success in repelling Russia increased Edo’s influence over the island domain and contributed 
to the general trend towards centralisation. It needs to be noted that, throughout the Tokugawa 
era, Tsushima’s status possessed a certain degree of ambivalence. After the Japanese 
invasions of Korea in the 1590s, the two countries restored diplomatic ties in 1607, with 
Tsushima as intermediary. They adopted mutually contradicting ideological frameworks and 
interpretations of the renewed relationship. From Edo’s perspective, Tsushima was one of the 
tozama domains, or ‘outside’ domains that had never been conquered by the Tokugawa but 
whose daimyō (feudal lord) had agreed to peace and had continued to rule the same territory 
with a significant degree of autonomy. At the same time Tsushima received designation as a 
vassal of Choson Korea.5 James Lewis has noted that from Korea’s point of view Tsushima 
                                                           
2  Britain for instance briefly entertained the idea of occupying Hikoshima, an island near the 
Shimonoseki Strait, in 1864. See Ishizuka Hiromichi, ‘Yokohama Ei-futsu chūton gun no 12 nenkan’, 
in Yokohama Taigai Kankei Kenkyūshi Kai and Yokohama Kaikō Shiryōkan (eds.), Yokohama Ei-
futsu chūton gun to gaikokujin kyoryūchi (Tokyo: Tokyodō shuppan, 1999). 
3 The argument that the bakumatsu Japan was facing the crisis of being colonised was once popular 
among Japanese Marxist historians. Shibahara Takuji, for instance, has noted that by 1868 economic 
confusion had stirred popular uprisings across the country and deepening reliance of the imperial forces 
and the Tokugawa shogunate on British and French capital during the Boshin War could have led 
Japan to a semi-colonial status effectively divided among several imperialist powers. Shibahara, 
Sekaishi No Nakano Meiji Ishin (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1977), 97-102. 
4 In 1875 the Meiji government gave up southern Sakhalin to Russia, but the Japanese claim there had 
not been fully established. See chapter 3 and 4 for more detailed discussion on Sakhalin. 
5 Hellyer, Defining Engagement, 39. 
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was a Korean land under Japanese occupation.6 This ambiguity in the exact status of 
Tsushima ultimately makes it futile to speak of a linear border between the two in this period. 
The Korean-Japanese diplomatic ties resumed as a result of a careful political manoeuvre, 
including the forgery of official letters between the Tokugawa shogunate and the Choson 
Court by Tsushima, with a view to satisfying the pride and worldview of both Seoul and Edo. 
Their views were ultimately impossible to reconcile, because both claimed itself to be 
superior to the other, yet diplomatic relations were restored between the two capitals on an 
essentially equal standing.7  
The communications across the Tsushima strait were maintained thanks to the double 
status that Tsushima adopted. It came with certain costs for all parties. On the Korean side, 
the existence of official trade with Tsushima as a tributary meant that it had to give a large 
amount of rice to Tsushima’s envoys and accompanying merchants every time they visited 
Pusan. This was an immense burden on Korea’s relatively small economy. Lewis has noted 
that Choson Korea allocated about thirty percent of Kyongsang province’s tax collection to be 
spent on trade with Tsushima.8 Although the exact amount is difficult to reconstruct, he notes 
that Korean literatis typically reckoned (and complained) that about half of Kyongsang 
province’s production went to Tsushima.9 
 This did not make Tsushima a rich domain, however. This island’s agricultural 
capacity was so small that the shipment of rice from Korea as well as from the Sō’s fief in 
Kyushu was indispensable for the survival of the domain. One could argue, therefore, that 
Korea and Japan from the seventeenth century onwards dealt with each other by creating a 
buffer called Tsushima in order to maintain peace without infringing either regime’s 
worldview. Tokugawa assumed Korea was a junior partner that sent envoys to the 
enthronement of the shogun, while Korea treated Tsushima as a vassal. Tsushima existed as 
an independent actor in between because of the need to facilitate the volatile relations across 
                                                           
6  James Lewis, Frontier Contact between Choson Korea and Tokugawa Japan (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 18-27. 
7 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, 31-42.  
8 Lewis, Frontier Contact, 119-20. 
9 Ibid., 137-45. 
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the strait. This trilateral framework went into decline from the early nineteenth century, and 
the arrival of the Posadnik served as a catalyst to place the island under a different 
geopolitical context.  
 The historiography of the Tsushima incident has evolved in line with the overall 
narratives of modern Japanese history. Since the early-twentieth century nationalist accounts 
of the Japanese struggle against Western imperialism have received much emphasis,10 while 
from the 1950s onwards the influence of Marxist history directed some scholars to portray the 
incident as the Tsushima people’s successful resistance against imperialism.11 Since the 1980s 
the re-examination of the sakoku thesis has led historians of the Tokugawa era to reframe 
Tsushima as a border zone between Korea and Japan, although in this narrative the Tsushima 
Incident itself has receded into the background.  
 Meanwhile specialists on the history of Russo-Japanese relations have tended to argue 
that Russia was a friendly nation to Japan in the early years of treaty relations. They have thus 
downplayed Russia’s imperialistic motives towards Tsushima and argued that the Tsushima 
Incident was merely an opportunistic move by naval officers that did not represent the will of 
the government.12 This, in turn, has been denied by Fumoto Shinichi and Itō Kazuya who 
have shown that the tsar gave his personal approval to the plan.13 However Fumoto and Itō 
still emphasise the fundamentally friendly, good-hearted nature of Russian diplomacy 
                                                           
10 Nezu Masashi, while emphasising the danger that the occupation of Tsushima could have led to the 
collapse of the Japanese economy and ultimately to colonisation, argued that Japan narrowly managed 
to maintain independence in the midst of an equilibrium among the capitalist countries. Hino 
Seizaburō’s monograph, based on his research notes from the late 1930s and published posthumously 
in 1979, emphasised this Anglo-Russian dimension but relied mostly on Japanese language sources in 
Tsushima. A recent monograph by Robert Hellyer follows Hino’s framework while benefitting from a 
wider range of English and Japanese sources. Nezu Masashi, “Bunkyū gannen rokan Posadonikku no 
senkyo ni tsuite,” in Yokoyama Yoshinori (ed.), Bakumatsu Ishin to Gaikō (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan, 2001 [1934]), 155. Hino Seizaburō, Bakumatsu ni Okeru Tsushima to Ei-Ro (Tokyo: Tokyo 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1979), 1; Hellyer, Defining Engagement.  
11 See, for instance, Inoue Kiyoshi, ‘Futatsuno aikokushugi to kokusaishugi: bakumatsu gaikō no kihon 
mondai’, Rekishigaku Kenkyū 137 (January 1949), 1-14.  
12 Hiroshi Kimura has noted that the Russian move towards Tsushima ‘has been treated as not only 
completely unrepresentative of any grand design on the tsarist government’s part, but also as merely 
the reckless and unauthorised action of some Russian naval forces’. Hiroshi Kimura, The Kurillian 
Knot: A History of Japanese-Russian Border Negotiations (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 30. 
13 Fumoto Shinichi, ‘Posadonikku go jiken ni tsuite’, Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensansho Kenkyū Kiyō 
15 (March 2005), 189-197; Itō Kazuya, Roshiajin No Mita Bakumatsu Nihon (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan, 2009).  
 42 
towards Japan in this period. Kim Key-Hiuk’s account emphasises the fear of aggression that 
the Tokugawa shogunate allegedly felt and stresses that this led Japan to pursue an 
expansionist policy.14 Michael Auslin has argued that the Japanese strategy in Tsushima was 
to ‘preserve its territorial boundaries’ and gives a positive assessment to the Japanese 
response as an example of its adapting itself to regional geopolitics.15 Yet he has not 
sufficiently addressed the structural shift that the incident represented. In this regard Robert 
Hellyer has given a detailed account of the local politics within the Tsushima domain and 
uses it as evidence to ultimately argue against the notion of sakoku as the defining ideology of 
Japan’s foreign relations in this period.16  
 As Korea’s significance receded into the background for the moment, Tsushima 
increasingly bore the appearance of a border zone connecting the Russian Far East and the 
East China Sea. At the macroscopic level the increased attention on the Tsushima strait 
reflected the post-Crimean War strategic consideration in St. Petersburg that Russian America 
would eventually have to be given up and that instead the focus of development in the Far 
East should rest on the Maritime Province and the Amur River region.17 Moreover, the 
conclusion of the Aigun Treaty in 1858 by the Governor-General of the eastern Siberia, 
Nikolay Muraviev, with the Qing had enabled Russian ships to sail down the Amur River to 
reach the Pacific. Then, in 1860, Nicolai Ignatieff, the director of the Asian department of the 
foreign ministry, arbitrated the Treaty of Beijing between the Qing and Britain and France 
that concluded the Arrow War. This led Russia to conclude its own Treaty of Beijing with the 
Qing in which it annexed the coastal region south of the Amur River down to the root of the 
Korean Peninsula. The opening of Vladivostok in 1860, close to the Russo-Korean border 
facing the Sea of Japan, was a case in point for this long-term vision.  
 The strategic shift away from the Pacific to the Far East put St. Petersburg in increasing 
competition with Britain, which maintained a dominant position in the China trade. 
                                                           
14 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 91. 
15 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, 77-82. 
16 Hellyer, Defining Engagement, 207-34.  
17 Fumoto, ‘Posadonikku go jiken ni tsuite’, 191-2. 
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Likhachev, the commander of Russia’s China Seas Fleet, discussed the importance of three 
‘choke points’ for his fleet—between Sakhalin and Ezo, Ezo and Honshū, and the Korean 
peninsula and Kyushu—and emphasised Tsushima’s vital importance in order to maintain 
access to the China Sea.  Likhachev worried that, if Britain occupied Tsushima, Russia’s navy 
would face the same containment strategy that it did in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. He 
also argued that the neutralization of Tsushima would not be faithfully observed by rival 
nations and therefore proposed to Admiral Constantine of the Russian imperial navy a 
decisive action by his fleet to avoid this possible predicament.18  
 The more immediate motivation for the Russians to attempt the occupation of 
Tsushima was British surveying activity, the first of its kind by a Western navy in the area. 
On 19 May 1859, HMS Actaeon entered a port on Tsushima. In the next seven months two 
British ships surveyed around the Tsushima strait, occasionally stopping at Tsushima and 
Pusan on the southern coast of the Korean Peninsula. The Tsushima officials complained that 
the Anglo-Japanese treaty forbade the landing of British persons at a closed port. John Ward, 
the captain of the Actaeon, asserted that the treaty only bound commercial ships.19  
 Britain’s enhanced understanding of the local geography and its war against Qing 
China led to a dispatch by the British minister to Japan, Rutherford Alcock, on 21 February 
1860 in which he observed to the foreign secretary, Lord John Russell, that the occupation of 
Tsushima was an option for Britain to consider. He noted that the possibility existed that 
Russia would take Ezo under the excuse of providing protection for the local feudal lord. He 
reckoned that other European countries would not find a compelling reason to fight a war 
with Russia over this issue. If this Russian takeover of Ezo came to fruition, it would mean 
that the port of Hakodate on the southern tip of Ezo would be ‘Russia’s Gibraltar’ and Britain 
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would therefore need Tsushima ‘as its Malta’.20 He argued that securing Tsushima as a naval 
base would enable Britain to contain Russia, protect its trade in China and could provide a 
deterrent to future problems with the Chinese court. 21  Alcock’s argument shows the 
understanding of imperialists at the beginning of the 1860s that foreign occupation of islands 
around Japan was a real possibility. It also hints at the potential chain reaction. The de-
centralised nature of the Tokugawa shogunate’s feudal system would have only accelerated 
that scramble once it started.  
 By 1860 the shogunate had become vaguely aware, through communication with 
foreign visitors to Nagasaki, of the increasing attention being paid to Tsushima by Western 
vessels. In August 1860 a group of Russian naval officers who arrived from Beijing informed 
the Nagasaki magistrate, Okabe Nagatsune, of the possible occupation of Tsushima by Britain 
or France as a naval station from which it could launch campaigns against China. Philipp 
Franz von Siebold, a doctor at the Dejima in Nagasaki who was acting as an unofficial 
adviser on foreign affairs, brought back the same information from Beijing and even made a 
recommendation that Japan cede one port and one district within Tsushima to Britain and 
France, telling Okabe that it would be a small price to pay for avoiding a full confrontation 
with these countries.22 This report was immediately forwarded to Edo, where it caused fear 
among the shogunate’s senior officials in charge of foreign relations.23 The shogunate held 
the same view as Alcock that a scramble against Japan was possible and rejected Siebold’s 
proposal as setting a dangerous precedent as well as strengthening the domestic opposition 
against the regime.24 
 On 14 February 1861 Likhachev ordered Nikolai Birilev, the captain of the Posadnik, 
to go to Tsushima and ask for permission to conduct a coastal survey and build a naval base 
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on the island.25 However his real intention was, as Constantine wrote privately to Likhachev 
in the previous summer, that the permanent lease of Tsushima’s port should be agreed 
between the navy and Tsushima’s ruler, or better yet that negotiation be avoided altogether 
and their presence made a simple fait accompli.26 Lacking any knowledge of Tsushima’s 
political institutions other than that it was a part of Japan’s feudal system, Constantine left 
open the details of the terms to be sought and entrusted Likhachev to carve out the best deal 
for Russia.27 Likhachev saw Tsushima as the future ‘bulwark of the development of our 
navy’, providing better access as a warm-water port in the Far East than recently opened 
Vladivostok.28  
 
 
Map 2: The Tsushima Strait 
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The Posadnik’s arrival in Tsushima 
  
 Around 4 p.m. on 13 March 1861, Birilev sailed the Posadnik into Asō Bay on the 
western coast of Tsushima. He declared to the island’s officials that his ship was in need of 
repair and would stay in the port until it was ready to sail again. He then made various 
requests to the local officials: provision of food and water; permission to build a hospital on 
the shore, so as to treat sick crew, and to conduct a survey of the coast; and a meeting with the 
lord of Tsushima.29 The domain permitted the repair of the ship, provided food and water, but 
denied the audience with the lord. On the 18th Hirata Mozaemon, the envoy of the Tsushima 
lord, Sō Yoshiyori, met with Birilev and told him that the shogunate’s law prohibited any 
private meetings between domain lords and foreigners. It took a while before Birilev 
understood Hirata’s explanation, but when he did, the former demanded a secret meeting with 
the high-ranking officials of the domain.30 Birilev’s initial strategy was that of a charm 
offensive: on the 25th he offered to provide cannon to the domain as a show of gratitude for 
allowing his ship to stay in Tsushima while repairing. Although the introduction of cannon 
with Russian help had already been seen in Hakodate and Nagasaki, the Tsushima officials 
declined.31  
 Soon after the initial contact the Russians learnt the flaw in their adoption of stealth 
tactics. Firstly they had overestimated the degree of autonomy possessed by Sō Yoshiyori. 
With the knowledge before them of Japan’s feudal political structure and the example of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom signing treaties with the United States, France and the Netherlands, they 
had assumed that the ‘semi-independent’ lord of Tsushima would be disposed to do the same 
with Russia.32 In reality, Sō showed no interest in handling the negotiations on his own. 
Secondly they were overly optimistic about the possibility of persuading the Tsushima 
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islanders of the British and French threat. The Tsushima domain saw the Russians as 
intruders threatening the domain’s survival in the same way that they had seen the previous 
visits by the British navy.  
 Tsushima reported the incident to Edo immediately after learning the Russian demands 
and requested the dispatch of a foreign affairs official. Edo’s initial response, especially that 
of the top policy-makers, is difficult to discern from the surviving sources. What is 
noticeable, however, is the shogunate’s attempt to conceal the incident from the other 
domains and the general public. Suzuki Hajime, who served in Mito domain’s residence in 
Edo, was writing regular reports to Mito and took a clear interest in the rumoured incident. 
But he was only partially successful in discerning what exactly was happening in Tsushima.33 
Shiga Kurōsuke, a wealthy merchant in Nagasaki who personally knew Birilev as well as 
Okabe, the Nagasaki Magistrate, wrote to his son in Hakodate that the shogunate’s officials 
told him not to speak of the incident.34  
 The fact that Edo’s response remained a mystery to many outside observers such as 
Suzuki for the next several months was partly due to the inevitably slow progress of the 
negotiations.35 It took about three months before Oguri Tadamasa, one of the foreign 
magistrates based in Edo, arrived at Tsushima. 36 Meanwhile the Russian crew availed 
themselves of local timber without permission from Tsushima authorities and started to build 
what appeared to be a permanent settlement in Imosaki, facing Asō Bay.37 Birilev wooed, 
coerced, and begged to meet Sō, but the latter made various excuses to deny him an 
audience.38 Five weeks after his arrival, feeling increasingly desperate, Birilev bluffed that he 
possessed an official letter from the tsar addressed to the local ruler that warned of the danger 
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of a British armed occupation of the island in the near future. He then offered to provide 
defence for the island in the mutual interest of Russia and Japan, if the domain would give a 
permanent lease of the port and adjacent areas to the Russian navy.39  
 No known evidence points to the existence of such a letter. In fact the correspondence 
between Constantine, Likhachev and Birilev suggests that such a letter could not have 
existed, as it would have contradicted the Russian government’s intention to keep the matter 
out of diplomatic channels. The Tsushima officials themselves thought it was implausible and 
in reality it was only Birilev’s tactical gambit for securing a meeting with Sō. Nii Magoichirō, 
retainer (karō) of the domain, announced to his colleagues that the request for the meeting 
would be rejected.40  
By any standard this was an existential crisis for the Tsushima domain that had been 
struggling to sustain its economy after trading relations with Korea had declined in the early 
nineteenth century. Almost every month after the arrival of the Posadnik one or two Russian 
ships visited Asō Bay to replenish supplies and check on the progress of the occupation.41 The 
hydrographical survey of the island by the Russians was also underway, which led to a clash 
between local residents and the death of at least one peasant.42 The incident aggravated the 
Tsushima samurai class and commoners alike. Sō Yoshiyori saw the risk of an escalation that 
could lead to a fatal clash with Russia. He wrote to his subjects later on the day of the 
skirmish:  
 
I understand the foreigners’ prolonged humiliation of us has been challenging our 
patience. But we have restrained ourselves to this day in order to avoid opening a 
conflict. Now yet another event that we cannot tolerate has occurred. Nevertheless, 
we cannot but first report the incident to the shogunate. [And we] have already 
communicated this. It is my hope that the whole domain comes together, throws in 
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their lives and lives up to the reputation of our domain.43  
 
On the same day when Sō’s statement was released a British ship, HMS Raven, coincidentally 
stopped at Tsushima to escape a storm. Consequently James Hope, the vice admiral of the 
China Station, reported the discovery of the Russian ship after reaching Nagasaki. Hope duly 
sent another ship, HMS Actaeon, led by John Ward, to Tsushima to inquire into Russia’s 
intentions. Ward met with Birilev on the Posadnik on 4 June.44 A Tsushima official who 
happened to be on board recorded a telling scene from their meeting. Ward and Birilev 
conversed amicably in Birilev’s room, but as soon as Ward excused himself to another room 
Birilev, apparently a short-tempered man, showed his frustration by kicking the hat that Ward 
had left in his room.45 Meanwhile Ward was convinced that Birilev had come to Tsushima 
with the intention of appropriating the island as a naval station by instigating a conflict with 
the local lord.46 
 When Birilev met Oguri on 17 June following the latter’s arrival three days before, his 
strategy had changed from seeking tacit approval for the stationing of Russian ships to direct 
negotiations based on the logic of power politics. He emphasized to Oguri that Russia had no 
interest in territorial gain. What he was asking, rather, was for a lease of a port on Tsushima 
so that the island would be safe from the British or French plots to take it over.  Oguri was in 
favour of opening Tsushima for trade, but could not agree to any territorial secession. Oguri 
suggested that Birilev travel to Edo and negotiate directly with the senior councillors, but 
Birilev refused.47 
 It was Oguri who then left for Edo, having spent just two weeks in Tsushima, with a 
view to obtaining the shogunate’s approval for opening Tsushima to trade with Westerners. 
According to a report written by Suzuki, the Mito samurai in Edo, upon his return Oguri 
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proposed direct control of the island by the shogunate and the opening of a treaty port.48 The 
senior councillors of the shogunate, however, disapproved of the plan, causing Oguri to 
resign.49  
 In Tsushima, Birilev finally managed to meet the lord of Tsushima, Sō Yoshiyori, on 3 
July. Five days later he escalated his demand to a permanent lease of the port and its adjacent 
area for the Russian navy, arguing that such measures would provide a defence against an 
allegedly imminent plot by Britain or France to occupy the island. But this did not change the 
domain’s position on rejecting any lease or even negotiating on the subject.50 
All the while the Russian crew developed an entrepôt around Imosaki, near their 
initial place of anchorage. In fact, the construction was not limited to hospital quarters as 
initially requested; by August it had expanded to:  
 
… a very complete establishment consisting of a Hospital, officer’s quarters, 
chartroom, cook-house, blacksmiths and carpenters’ shop and ward store - enclosure 
for live stock, a watering place with a Russian bath, and a pier, the whole connected 
by good paths and surrounded by the Russian Flag flying from a flag-staff erected on 
the hill above.51 
 
In Edo, Alcock, who had initially leaned towards advocating the British occupation of 
Tsushima, retracted the idea after a meeting in mid-August between the two senior officials of 
the Tokugawa shogunate, accompanied by vice admiral Hope.52 In the meeting the shogunate 
officials had suggested the opening of a treaty port in Tsushima.53 Although Alcock did not 
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agree with this on the spot, the willingness of the shogunate to take a liberalising measure to 
counter Russia resulted in British intervention in the affair. Hope agreed to go to Tsushima 
immediately, arriving on 28 August. From this point onwards, it was the Anglo-Russian 
negotiations that determined the fate of Tsushima and the Posadnik. Hope asked Birilev 
whether the latter’s ship was ready to leave upon any Japanese request and whether he had 
received an order to create a permanent base from the Russian government.54 Birilev dodged 
the questions by stating that he was merely following his orders from Likhachev and 
surveying the coast. Hope then decided to meet with Likhachev in Olga Bay in the Russian 
Maritime Province. Failing to find him on the spot, Hope left a note for Likhachev in which 
he asserted that Russia had no right to erect buildings or enter into non-treaty ports unless 
absolutely necessary, and asked if it was trying to retain a permanent establishment or, if not, 
when it would leave.55  
The next day after his meeting with Hope, Birilev made his last attempt to strike a 
deal with the Tsushima officials. He told them that Britain had demanded control over 
Tsushima as compensation for the attack against its legation in Edo in July 1861. He further 
claimed that Hope had suggested to him that Russia and Britain split Tsushima in half 
because ‘Russia came in first’.56 This was no doubt Birilev’s fabrication. Not only is any 
record to that effect absent in the British sources, but neither Hope nor Lawrence Oliphant, 
the secretary of the British legation who accompanied the admiral, was in favour of the 
British occupation of Tsushima.57 The Tsushima officials refused to respond to Birilev’s 
desperate blackmail and said that they would not believe it unless there was written 
evidence.58 Meanwhile Likhachev received the letter that Hope had left at Olga Bay on 23 
September. In his reply, Likhachev justified the Posadnik’s action by referring to the survey 
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conducted by the Actaeon around Tsushima in 1859, but he nonetheless agreed to direct the 
Posadnik to leave.59 Once its mission had been discovered and faced British intervention, it 
was impossible for the Russian navy to keep the matter off the diplomatic table. Likhachev 
had no choice but to step back. 
 
 
Searching for a balance  
 
 The new political landscape for Tsushima required a new modus operandi in the 
language of modern international relations, not the ‘neighbourly friendship’ on which the 
Korean-Tsushima-Japanese relationship was built. The arrangements brought up by the 
Japanese, Russians, and British between 1861 and 1862 can be categorised into three groups. 
One is permanent lease or occupation, proposed by Alcock for Britain and tried by Birilev for 
Russia. The obvious disadvantage of this was the high risk of triggering countermeasures by 
rival powers, not to mention local resistance. That was why Constantine stressed that his navy 
should act outside the diplomatic channel in Edo. The whole idea was based on the hopeful 
assumption that Tsushima might deal with the Russians on its own.  
 The second option was neutralisation. When in the fall of 1861 Francis Napier, the 
British ambassador to St. Petersburg, asked Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister, about 
Tsushima, the latter denied having any territorial aspiration towards the island (‘we want no 
occupation, no possession; do not speak of it so; the affair is settled’). He then suggested 
neutralisation of the island.60 In December Gorchakov further demanded that Napier declare 
that Britain would not occupy Tsushima. Napier rejected this demand and pointed out that 
Britain had made an offer to sign a neutralisation pact regarding Tsushima among the treaty 
powers but that Russia had declined.61 But at the same time he made a similar proposal, 
suggesting to London that ‘officers of all nations desiring to make sovereign of the islands 
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should solicit permission from the central govt of Japan[,] a course which is I believe 
followed under similar circumstances in regard to other governments’. 62  Signing a 
multilateral neutralistion pact over Tsushima was a cheap option requiring no military or 
financial commitment, but just because of that, its credibility had limitations. Yet it was not 
until a decade later that European states learnt of the weakness of neutralisation arrangements, 
when Gorchakov declared Russia was no longer bound by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 in 
which the Black Sea had been declared neutral. 
 The third option was to open a treaty port in Tsushima. This would prevent occupation 
by any one country. However on the treaty signatories’ part, they had to station a consul, 
build a warehouse, and potentially station troops or at lease a keep a vessel in the harbour in 
order to protect national interests and property. Given the scale of Tsushima’s economy, the 
cost was deemed too high. On the Japanese side, opening a port meant that the shogunate 
would take over the rule of the port, if not the entire island, for the shogunate’s policy was to 
maintain a monopoly over trade with the Western countries. Under the leadership of Andō 
Nobumasa the shogunate briefly pursued this option, and the local politics of Tsushima 
worked in its favour. Exacerbated by the burden of policing activities and the building of a 
cannon platform after the arrival of the Posadnik, the domain was destitute.63 Facing this 
crisis, a group of domain officials led by Sasu Iori, who represented the domain in Edo, 
convinced the leadership that the only viable solution for their economic predicament was the 
domain’s transfer out of the island into another fiefdom in mainland Japan.  
The transfer of a feudal lord from one place to another in itself was a common 
practice for the ruling Tokugawa’s affiliates. It was a method by which the shogunate 
promoted or demoted its officers. But it was rare for this to apply to tozama daimyō. The Sō 
family was tozama and had ruled Tsushima for over six centuries. Therefore asking for a 
transfer was not an easy decision for them and shows the degree of desperation they felt. The 
official plea by the lord of Tsushima to the shogunate was sent on 20 July and formally 
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received on 5 September.64 The request was denied, but the domain’s increasing dependence 
on Edo for financial support had a long-lasting impact on the course of local politics and its 
relationship with Korea. The issue of a transfer was linked with the domain’s factional 
politics and led to a series of coup attempts in the mid-1860s, claiming the lives of hundreds 
of the samurai class.65 
Another reason that the shogunate sought to open Tsushima was international. 
Having signed the Ansei treaties in 1858, the shogunate opened Nagasaki, Yokohama, and 
Hakodate to Western trade. The treaty also stipulated that the two cities (Edo and Osaka) and 
two ports (Niigata and Hyōgo) would be open from 1 January 1863. Yet the introduction of 
foreign trade had caused prices to escalate especially in the cities. An immense amount of 
gold drained out of the country due to foreign speculators who exploited the difference 
between the gold-silver conversion rate in and outside Japan. This inflation induced Japanese 
hostility against foreigners, as well as the shogunate, which people saw as incapable of 
resisting foreign pressure. Fearing that further exposure to trade would drive the public 
opinion out of its control, the shogunate called for the slower introduction of foreign 
commerce.66 On 2 May 1861 the shogun Tokugawa Iemochi officially wrote to the ministers 
of the five treaty powers and requested that the opening of the two cities and the two ports be 
postponed.  
This request irked the foreigners in Japan who were frustrated by the constant 
neglect, obstruction and sometimes overt attacks against their business. They did not see why 
they had to compromise first. Japanese xenophobic sentiment had been most brutally 
expressed by the armed assault against the British Legation in Edo on 7 July 1861. Laurence 
Oliphant, secretary at the Legation, was wounded in this attack and several Japanese guards 
were killed. The attack infuriated Alcock, who held the view that the attacks against 
foreigners were orchestrated by the shogunate. Moreover the shogunate’s response to his 
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demand for reparations and the arrest of the perpetrators was sluggish at best.67 Alcock 
furiously wrote on 2 August in his dispatch to London that he was in favour of occupying 
Tsushima either as reparation for the legation attack or as a guarantee for uninterrupted trade 
in the future. With the knowledge of the Posadnik’s prolonged stay in Tsushima, he further 
justified his proposal by noting that a Russian seizure of Tsushima, if it materialised, would 
pose a serious threat to Japanese independence.68   
This was the situation at the time when the Sō transfer request arrived in Edo. The 
shogunate therefore had an incredibly difficult task before it. It had to sooth Alcock’s anger 
by promising to answer his demand, but at the same time still pushed for postponement, 
which meant the suspension of Britain’s treaty rights. The only card they could potentially 
play to meet these both goals was to open a treaty port in Tsushima. In normal circumstances, 
the remoteness of and lack of commercial opportunity on the island would have prohibited 
any possibility that the treaty powers would accept it as a substitute for the major ports and 
the cities. However, the Russian intrusion added a strategic dimension to the opening of 
Tsushima. Opening a port for access by any country’s vessels could serve to secure it under 
shogunal rule. Yet the shogunate had to solve one question before playing the Tsushima card, 
and that was the issue of the shogunate’s trade monopoly. All the treaty ports opened so far 
were under the shogunate’s direct control, therefore it had a monopoly over trade with the 
Western (and Chinese, in the case of Nagasaki) merchants. But Tsushima was in the hands of 
the Sō family. If the shogunate allowed Tsushima to trade, that would undoubtedly invite 
other non-Tokugawa lords to demand permission for similar rights. Senior councillor Kuze 
Hirochika expressed his concern about the opening of Tsushima for this reason in the 
following spring.69 Nevertheless, conveniently enough for the shogunate, the Sō family had 
just requested a transfer to another fiefdom. Thus if the shogunate wanted, it could put the 
island under its direct control and start trade there. Andō thus proposed opening a port in 
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Tsushima to Alcock in August 1861, with a view to killing two birds in one stone. The 
shogunate then dispatched another magistrate, Nonoyama Kanehiro, to Tsushima in order to 
investigate the general situation of the island and assess the feasibility of the transfer. 
  Upon his return to Edo in early 1862 after studying the island’s situation for three 
months, Nonoyama suggested a plan that fell between neutralisation and opening of a treaty 
port. Instead of the transfer or the opening of a treaty port, Nonoyama proposed the 
establishment of a naval station where foreign battleships could stay and replenish essential 
supplies but not occupy any land. He reckoned that this could be done without the 
shogunate’s direct control of the whole island, but by putting a few villages adjacent to the 
port under the administration of the Nagasaki Magistrate, whose office was only a few days’ 
sail from the island.70 In essence, it was an attempt to neutralise the island and to reduce the 
risk of a foreign takeover or an international conflict over Tsushima without incurring large 
spending by the shogunate. Nonoyama said this new plan should be overall ‘along the lines of 
the [Russo-Japanese] Shimoda Treaty’ of 1855.71 The Shimoda Treaty was an agreement that 
allowed Russian ships in distress on the Japanese coast to receive humane treatment and to 
buy food, water and coal only to the extent that it was absolutely necessary. The choice of the 
reference to this treaty over the 1858 commercial treaties was an indication that the new 
arrangement would be a continuation of the policy of limited modification of the shogunate’s 
monopoly of foreign trade. At the same time it aimed at removing the risk of a similar 
incident in the future.  
This plan would have made sense to all the parties concerned. The shogunate could 
minimise its financial burden because it did not need to transfer the Tsushima domain and 
take over the entire island, while reducing the risk of a foreign occupation. It could also save 
the trouble of reconfiguring diplomatic relations with Korea, which the Tsushima domain had 
taken charge of for centuries. For the treaty powers, it would ensure the neutral status of this 
strategically important island. That the treaty powers did not have to occupy it or open it for 
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trade and station consuls meant much less military and financial commitment on their part. 
The Tsushima domain would spare itself from the need to build heavy fortifications that 
would be necessary were it to provide for its own defence and would stay on the island. In 
short, the plan aimed at creating a balance in the region at a minimal cost, instead of fighting 
to preserve the boundary and keeping foreigners away.  
Nonoyama’s return to Edo was five days after Alcock’s departure, however. With the 
shogunate’s mission and Alcock on their way to London for negotiating a condition for the 
postponement, nothing could be decided in Edo. As the foreign magistrates in Edo waited for 
the envoys’ return, a discussion on Nonoyama’s report began on 28 April 1862, and within 
two months they endorsed the plan for a naval station.72 By then, however, Andō and Kuze, 
the two top officials who had conducted the negotiations with Alcock about Tsushima’s 
opening, had resigned from the post of senior councillor. The political will to change the 
status quo in Tsushima to strike a delicate balance had waned at the top.73 
 
 
Consequence 
 
 The power balance around Tsushima saw no obvious changes after the departure of the 
Posadnik. The British pushback against Russia maintained the status quo for the time being. 
Yet it left a lasting impact on the strategic thinking of those watching Russia’s moves in this 
region. Specifically, the incident convinced the British diplomats in Japan of Russia’s 
intention to expand its territory southwards. Russians in Hakodate provocatively told James 
Enslie, the British consul, that ‘the fruit must be allowed to ripen’.74 These words did not 
necessarily match the actual capacity of the Russian navy or reflect the majority view in St. 
Petersburg, but were sufficient to inculcate in the British mind that the Great Game had been 
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extended to the Far East. Moreover, rumours spread about Russia’s designs on Hokkaido, 
convincing the concerned Japanese as well as the British that Russia would aim to take the 
island when the opportunity arose. Enslie was probably the most alarmed among the British 
diplomats in Japan, since he had the opportunity to speak to the only Russian representative in 
Japan, Iosif Goshkevich, and witnessed the movements of Russian ships in and out of 
Hakodate. Enslie reported to Neale, British Charge d’Affaires, in September 1862 that 
Russia’s choice of Hakodate as its base in Japan was ‘wise and prudent’, because it matched 
their aim of developing the Maritime Region.75  
 
Corea, Tsoosima, Hakodate, a port in the north of Niphon[sic; Honshū], and another in 
the north-west of that island, this is what the Russians require in Japan. Yedo, Osaka, 
and Kanagawa are not only useless to them, but Russia and its agents own that they 
wish to bring the centre of commerce nearer to their possessions, and they therefore 
regret to see the increasing importance of the South.76 
 
In order to achieve this, Russia, which did not have enough merchants in the region, needed a 
partnership with the Japanese. Therefore, Enslie asserted, Goshkevich’s strategy was to make 
the Japanese believe that Russia was their ‘protector’ against Britain and France: 
 
Russia saved China from the ambitious plans of the English and French, and is willing 
to act in the same friendly manner towards you, if… You will know," continues the 
Russian representative, "that we never come to force you to conclude treaties; we 
merely followed in the rear to keep a watchful eye upon the actions of others.77 
 
This rhetoric of Goshkevich as personified by Enslie shows the emerging British perception 
of Russia in the region. Russia could potentially challenge not only the British China 
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squadron, but also British trade with China. It was surely aiming at the possession of 
Hokkaido, Tsushima, and even Korea. In view of this policy Goshkevich seized ‘every 
opportunity to show the Japanese that the interests of his country are diametrically opposed to 
those of England and France’.78 This pattern resurfaced at the end of the 1860s with regards to 
Sakhalin, as will be seen in chapter 3. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The uninvited six-month stay of the Posadnik signified a change in Tsushima’s 
political landscape, though certainly the condition for change had already been developing 
beforehand. Until the early-nineteenth century its role was limited to being an intermediary 
between Korea and Japan. The decline of the Korean-Japanese trade was apparent by 1861, 
and the Tsushima economy was suffering to the extent that there was a fear of famine and the 
report of widespread infanticide.79 Meanwhile, Russia’s acquisition of the Maritime Province 
from the Qing and the opening of Vladivostok right next to the Korean Peninsula, and the 
increased access by British merchants to China under the Treaty of Beijing drew the attention 
of the two governments and merchants to the status of Tsushima.  
 Russia considered the Tsushima Strait to be one of the most important strategic ‘choke 
points’ in East Asian waters. Assuming that the Tsushima domain could cut a deal with its 
navy independent of the shogunate, it sent the Posadnik to seek the establishment of a naval 
station for its exclusive use. However the Tsushima lord was not interested in cutting a deal 
with Birilev by himself, and the British discovered the Posadnik before any Russo-Japanese 
agreement was reached, thus creating the need to devise a balance among the parties 
concerned. Tsushima shunned the tactic of playing the Westerners against each other, because 
it had limited its role in the international arena to the traditional Korean-Japanese relations. 
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 Under the new circumstances, the ruling Sō family found it difficult to bear the 
financial burden of negotiating with the Westerners and providing coastal defence. The 
domain decided to ask the shogunate for their transfer into a different fief in mainland Japan, 
leaving the island they ruled for centuries in the hands of Tokugawa. This controversial 
decision was a fatal blow to the integrity of domain’s ruling class and brought about bloody 
infighting in the mid-1860s which killed ten percent of the island’s samurai-class men.80  
 For the Tokugawa shogunate, the Russian attempt to occupy Tsushima was a 
formidable challenge to its claim to be a sovereign ruler over the Japanese archipelago 
including Tsushima. Yet on the other hand, the presence of Russia in Tsushima gave the 
shogunate a diplomatic card that they could play against the British. Realising this, Andō tried 
to get the British to agree to the postponement of the opening of the two ports and the two 
cities previously agreed in the Ansei treaties.  
 Between 1861 and 1862 several proposals were brought up in Tsushima, Edo, London, 
and St. Petersburg as to the foreign powers’ access to Tsushima. The first possibility was a 
permanent lease to a single naval power, aimed at by Russia, which could have created a 
dangerous prelude to territorial scramble agaisnt Tokugawa Japan. However the Russian navy 
failed to understand that it had to negotiate with Edo, not Tsushima, which would inevitably 
create diplomatic repercussions. Another option was to open Tsushima as a treaty port. Oguri, 
the foreign magistrate who negotiated with Birilev, put forward the idea combined with 
Tsushima domain’s transfer. Alcock had a similar idea, as he was leaning towards accepting 
the Japanese request for delaying the opening of the previously agreed sites. Hence the 
London Protocol recommended the opening of Tsushima. The problem for this option was 
that there was no equal exchange to be found between Tsushima and what the Western treaty 
signatories were about to give up. Tsushima carried no commercial value and the costs of 
stationing consuls and developing the port facilities such as warehouses, custom office, 
residence for merchants and visitors and so forth, were deemed to be far less than the benefits, 
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even if including the strategic benefit of denying any other naval power exclusive control. 
 The most astute idea came from Nonoyama, the foreign magistrate who investigated 
the island after the departure of the Posadnik. His idea was to place part of Tsushima under 
the shogunate’s control and to open it to access to naval vessels from any country, while the 
rest of the island would remain in the Sō’s hands. But in order for the three governments to 
agree on this, it required a global communication network among the three capitals and 
Tsushima. In practice, communications between Edo and London or St. Petersburg in 1862 
took around two months each way. The multilateral diplomatic mechanism needed a modern 
infrastructure. It was not yet available to the negotiators. 
 Therefore the balance of favour which the negotiators contemplated – and their ideas 
sometimes concurred – was never put into practice. The Posadnik retreated, and no Russian 
attempt at Tsushima ensued (until the Russo-Japanese War). Nevertheless, the experience of 
living side-by-side with the Russian naval officers for six months brought to the Tsushima 
islanders an acute sense that their geostrategic situation had been altered. As the activities of 
the Westerners cast a shadow on the minds of the Tsushima islanders, their domain’s 
financial conundrum lingered on. Now that the Western takeover of the island had been 
aborted, there were two paths that it could take. One was to go back to the old way – the 
revival of relations with the Koreans. The other was to give up its diplomatic prerogative with 
regards to the Korea trade and let the shogunate take the wheel. The domain’s transfer request 
and the ensuing plea for financial aid indicated the tentative triumph of the latter course, but 
this was arrived at only after bloody internal strife. The need to reform the domain’s economy 
continued to play a vital role in the island’s politics and the relations with Korea. Ultimately 
this came to an end with the termination of trade ties with Korea, signified by the closure of 
the waegwan, Tsushima’s trading house in Pusan, in the autumn of 1872. That is the topic of 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2 Tsushima’s struggle for survival 
 
 
 
 
 The opening of the era in which Tsushima’s geographical location bore a military 
significance to Britain and Russia, meant that the ambiguous status of the previously held 
Korean-Japanese relations had to go through fundamental change. The most decisive 
watershed for the emergence of the boundary in this area came therefore with the demise of 
the Tsushima domain in the summer of 1871 when Sō Shigemasa, who changed his name 
from Yoshiakira after the Meiji Restoration, applied for the liquidation of his han and the 
Meiji government took it over along with all the other domains. There was a brief epilogue to 
this last phase, in which the remaining Tsushima officers in the waegwan, the walled-up 
premise for temporary residence offered to the Tsushima officials and merchants by the 
Korean court, tried to block the Meiji government's direct approach to Korea bypassing them, 
but that came to an end with the dispatch of Hanabusa Yoshimoto from the foreign ministry 
in September 1872. The task of the present chapter is to account for the death of Tsushima as 
the border zone between Korea and Japan up to 1872.  
 How did Tsushima, a broker between the Korean and the Japanese authorities with 
centuries of experience, cope with the challenge of the arrival of the new international 
system? As was discussed in chapter 1, the Posadnik incident marked a fundamental shift in 
the island's position in the international politics of East Asia, with the more prominent role 
being played by the Western naval powers, attaching to Tsushima a geopolitical meaning that 
the Japanese and Korean maritime activities had not. This was a culmination of the increasing 
attention they paid to the island, following their surveying activities. However, with the 
withdrawal of the Russians, it became clear to outside observers that one country’s attempt to 
carve out a concession would inevitably face opposition from the others, in addition to the 
cost of antagonising the Japanese authorities. As a result, there emerged a subtle diplomatic 
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equilibrium around Tsushima. Thus Tsushima’s economic struggle for survival throughout 
the reminder of the 1860s and the early 1870s involved no intervention from Western 
governments. Its officials were accordingly able to turn to reviving its relations with Korea as 
a possible way out of their dilemma. Although historians have acknowledged the role of 
Tsushima’s economic concerns as one factor in Korean-Japanese relations, they have only 
just begun to examine the impact of Tsushima’s local politics to the wider region. Overall the 
conventional historiography needs to pay more attention to where Tsushima’s motivations for 
reform came from, and fully take into account the variety of views presented within Tsushima 
itself, as well as the Meiji government. Rather than any long-held Japanese appetite to invade 
Korea, it was ultimately the economic unsustainability of and the schism within Tsushima, 
which predated the well-known diplomatic stalemate with Korea in the early 1870s, that 
brought about the demise of the island’s special position within the regional order. 
 
 
Economic problems and Tsushima’s effort for reform 
 
 The fundamental problem for Tsushima’s finances was that the domain was never 
deemed to be self-sufficient without performing the intermediary role between Korea and 
Japan. With mostly hilly terrain and far from fertile soil, it was never going to possess a 
successful agricultural economy. From 1776 to 1862, Tsushima was the only domain that 
received an annual cash subsidy from the shogunate amounting to 12,000 ryō. In 1790 this 
accounted for thirty-three per cent of the domain’s revenue, while the Korea trade provided 
thirty-six per cent and rice and barley from the domain's fief comprised thirty-one per cent. 
Historians generally agree that the trade with Korea was on decline from the mid-eighteenth 
century, and this pushed Tsushima into a structural debt problem.1 According to the domain’s 
petition for aid to the Meiji government in 1869, food production in the domain (including its 
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fief in Kyushu) was just over 18,000 koku (of which just one-fifth was produced on the 
island), while the demand of the domain’s samurai class exceeded 47,000 koku.2 Since the 
domestic production fell far short of the demand, as Tashiro Kazui has noted, ‘any 
fluctuations in the Korean trade were of crucial importance, for they meant the prosperity or 
decline of the domain itself’.3 Consequently by the mid-nineteenth century Tsushima had 
piled up debts to a series of agents, ranging from local wealthy merchants (mostly in fishery), 
the Korean court in Pusan (as they kept failing to honour the agreement on annual exchanges), 
and Osaka-based merchants. By 1862 the debt had reached 800,000 ryō.4 The economic 
stagnation of the domain was so desperate that at the end of the Tokugawa period all of the 
domain’s rice, produced in its fief in Kyushu, went to service the debt.5 This economic 
predicament was one of the main reasons why the transfer request was made in the wake of 
the Posadnik incident.  
 The reason why the Posadnik incident proved to be a catalyst for change in Tsushima is 
that it accelerated the existing tensions between the different political factions. The transfer 
request exacerbated the political chaos that already existed in Tsushima prior to the arrival of 
the Russians (or for that matter, the British two years before).6 The factional feud that started 
as a race for domain leadership intensified as the result of the transfer request, for the 
shogunate’s denial was seen by many as damaging their honour. The factions increasingly 
gave the appearance of being pro-Chōshū on the one hand and pro-shogunate on the other. On 
29 September 1861 the members of the pro-Chōshū faction travelled to Edo and killed Sasu 
Iori, the domain’s representative in Edo, who had authored the transfer request. One month 
later the Tsushima and Chōshū domains secretly signed an alliance pact. This meant that the 
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Tsushima domain would follow Chōshū’s lead in carrying out anti-foreigner attacks.7 
 The denial of the transfer request meant that Tsushima had to find an alternative way of 
ameliorating its food shortage. It thus began to lobby for support from the shogunate for 
compensation to make up for the loss of profits from the Korea trade. It helped Tsushima that 
the relations between the shogunate and Chōshū in the early 1860s were not as bad as they 
would later become in the middle of the decade. Tsushima could be allied with Chōshū and 
seek support from Edo for the time being.   
 Between late 1862 and 1864, Tsushima submitted a series of requests to the shogunate 
for financial and military aid. At first Tsushima asked for military support based on the 
assertion that the recently adopted policy of jōi would expose the island as the first target of 
retaliation by the Western countries. Given the recent memory of the Tsushima Incident this 
was not farfetched. Its demand was emboldened when on 20 February 1863 Tsushima, as the 
result of its lobbying with the support from Chōshū, received the emperor’s direct order to 
carry out attacks on foreigners.8 In the letter submitted to Edo on 14 March Tsushima argued 
that its economic reliance on Korea in this precarious moment posed a threat to its survival 
and it was essential that it be replaced with domestic sources. Now Tsushima was able to 
claim that the domain’s security and economic issues had national significance. On 7 May 
Chōshū demanded, on Tsushima’s behalf, that the shogunate give the island domain an 
annual aid of 100,000 koku, along with the lease of military vessels and cannons. At this point 
Korea did not factor into the demand for support; instead the letters mentioned Korea as a 
substantial source of income for Tsushima that needed to be replaced by domestic sources.9  
 But this changed after an instruction was given to Tsushima from Itakura Katsukiyo, 
the retainer and the effective head of the Tokugawa regime at the time, to investigate the 
situation in the Korean peninsula, and the following meeting between Ōshima Tomonojō, 
who administered Tsushima’s office in Osaka, and the shogunate officials, Katsu Kaishū and 
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Yamada Hōkoku. Katsu was in charge of the shogunate’s naval affairs and Yamada was a 
Confucian scholar from Chōshū who advised Itakura. Tsushima’s letter to the shogunate 
submitted two weeks after Ōshima’s meeting with Katsu and Yamada, in turn, emphasised 
that Western troops could use Korea as a base from which to attack Tsushima. It 
recommended altering the policy of ‘retreat and defence’ to ‘taking measures before foreign 
barbarians (gaii) intrude into Korea’.10 Thus Tsushima’s demand came to adopt the logic that 
its security, and by extension Japan’s national security, was linked with the situation in 
Korea. Itakura, in spite of opposition from within the shogunate leadership, decided to give 
the Tsushima domain an annual aid worth 30,000 koku. This was roughly the same amount as 
the annual rice production of the Sō’s lands in Kyushu, and covered most of the domain’s 
needs for the stipend to be distributed among the samurai class. 
 Some historians have portrayed Tsushima’s demand for aid and its linkage with the 
situation in Korea as a harbinger of seikanron in Tsushima, based on the jingoistic language 
used in these letters. Kimura Naoya and others have pointed out that Ōshima’s letter in 1864 
received a word-by-word editing by Yamada. In this letter Ōshima called for drastic reform of 
Korean-Japanese relations which he saw as obstructed by anachronistic customs. He 
recommended the commencement of the exchange of envoys between Seoul and Edo, without 
the unnecessary grandeur of the current Korean envoy; to approach Korean commoners to 
garner support for renewed Korean-Japanese relations; arms exports in order to gain the 
confidence of the Korean court; the provision of technical support in various industries; the 
subjugation of Koreans by force if necessary; the opening of trade with Beijing via Korea; 
and the strengthening of Japan’s navy.11 Indeed the statement shows an aggressive attitude 
towards Korea, if backed with little evidence of viability. Yet to indict Ōshima as a 
forerunner of Japanese imperialism convinced of the desirability of invading Korea based on 
the contents of this letter alone, as suspected by Kim Key-Hiuk and others, is an overstretch.12 
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After the departure of the Posadnik, even though foreign vessels kept appearing on the shores 
of Tsushima, no records suggest that the island domain conducted any attacks against them in 
the same manner that Chōshū attacked Western vessels in the straits of Shimonoseki. When, 
on 4 July 1864, one foreign ship anchored at a bay in Tsushima, the domain’s response was to 
send officers on board to inquire into the situation – the same manner in which it approached 
the Posadnik.13 Furthermore, as will be discussed later, Ōshima himself proposed a much 
more measured approach to Korea after the Meiji Restoration. Nor did he support the 
proposal to send thirty battalions to Korea, which was drafted by a foreign ministry official 
named Sada Hakubō following his investigation into the situation in waegwan in the spring of 
1870.14 It is possible that Ōshima changed his position after the regime change in the capital. 
It is equally possible, however, that Ōshima was merely adjusting his rhetoric to the liking of 
the shogunate leadership in order to ensure full financial support for his domain. Hyun 
Myong Cheol’s view that Ōshima accepted the shogunate’s view and altered the arguments 
looks more convincing than the assertion by Kim.15 
 With 30,000 koku promised to arrive every year, it looked as though the domain’s 
finances were finally secure. However Tsushima was put in an increasingly awkward position 
as the schism grew between the shogunate and Chōshū, the trend that became decisive after 
the Shimonoseki war in 1864 and the negotiations for indemnity which fell upon the 
shogunate. The shogunate terminated the aid to Tsushima in 1864, after providing the much-
wanted 30,000 koku of rice for just two years. 
 Tsushima’s effort to draw support from Edo by emphasising its strategic importance 
failed to address the core problem. Little earnest effort to increase the island’s food 
production seems to have taken place in the 1860s. The statistics submitted to the Meiji 
government in 1868 and 1869 show Tsushima’s crop production within the island (which was 
all barley) as 2,324 koku and 3,793 koku respectively, still falling far short of supporting 
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itself. 16  Instead the domain leadership’s strategy in the early 1860s was to focus on 
developing relations with the Tokugawa shogunate by presenting itself as a focal point for 
national security. When animosity against foreigners was at its peak across the country, this 
rhetoric garnered much sympathy from the shogunate as well as in Chōshū. But as soon as the 
shogunate’s stance diverged from Chōshū’s, this ceased to be a viable survival strategy. 
 It was clear that after 1865 the shogunate became reticent about supporting Tsushima. 
The domain asked to resume the support of 30,000 koku twice in 1865,17 but the shogunate 
gave less than ten percent of that amount in 1865 and 1866.18 The growing difficulty in 
Tsushima is apparent in that in the summer of 1866 the domain encouraged its samurai class 
to engage in farming. 19  The challenge for supplying rice to the samurai class was 
compounded by the sheer number of the latter. As the domain economy struggled, Tsushima 
had increasingly relied on donations from wealthy merchants who had typically had success 
in fishery and whaling. Having nothing else to offer in return, the domain promoted these 
merchants to the samurai class. By the time of the domain’s liquidation in 1871, almost half 
of the all households in Tsushima were categorised as ‘samurai’.20  
 Once the rice provision from the shogunate was dramatically reduced, Tsushima 
looked to the other side of the straits for support. Nowhere was the need to reform the 
relations with the Korean counterparts felt more strongly than at the waegwan. On 24 
February 1867, some ninety Tsushima islanders residing in the waegwan breached the rule 
about not leaving the premises and travelled to the prefect’s office in Donglae, the province 
that included Pusan and which oversaw interactions with the Japanese at the waegwan, in 
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order to complain about the delayed provision of rice and cotton.21 The waegwan residents 
were in an especially precarious position because all of their daily provisions were supplied 
by the Koreans. The biggest fear for the residents was to be deprived of these supplies, to 
which the Koreans sometimes resorted in order to force the waegwan residents to behave as 
they wanted.  
 In order to break away from the ever-accumulating debt to the Koreans, and apparently 
without consulting Edo, in early 1867 Tsushima sent Nii Magoichirō, who had negotiated 
with Nikolai Birilev, the captain of the Posadnik, as an envoy to Pusan. This was in part a 
response to the news of heightening diplomatic tensions in Korea. The year 1866 saw two 
major incidents involving Westerners in Korea. In February nine French missionaries were 
killed. Later that year an American merchant ship, the General Sherman, was burnt in 
Pyongyang, with all twenty-four crew killed after landing for the purpose of procurement.22 
The language in the letter carried by Nii suggests that Tsushima feared that French or 
American retaliation might jeopardise Korea’s independence. In this unprecedented move for 
a domain whose primary function was to liaise between the Korean court and the Tokugawa 
shogunate, Nii called for reform in Korea-Tsushima trade relations. He proposed to establish 
direct communications between Tsushima and Donglae. One of the key measures proposed 
was arms exports from Tsushima.23 The letter referred to the ‘uncertain situation of the world 
in which countries focus on defence’ and called for the need of Korea and Tsushima to assist 
each other.24 It seems that the idea of the arms trade had been on the domain’s agenda for 
some time before Nii’s proposal, as it had appeared in Ōshima’s letter to the shogunate in 
1864.25  
 This was no minor issue to bring up for Nii. Arms trade had been absend from Korean 
Japanese interaction for close to 300 years, since the Japanese invasion via Tsushima in the 
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1590s.26  In fact, arms exports by any domain were prohibited by the shogunate. Yet 
Tsushima’s economy was so bad by 1867 that some extraordinary measure was inevitable. 
Since Tsushima did not produce surplus agricultural products for export, arms seem to have 
been one of the few items it could offer. It is also possible that the domain saw a benefit in 
strengthening the defence capability of the Koreans. Ōshima in 1864 argued to the shogunate 
that there was ‘no question’ that Japan should supply arms to Korea, while it would be a great 
source of concern if other countries gave weapons to the latter.27 Ōshima’s proposal indicates 
that this was meant to be a preemptive measure in the interests of Japan’s national security. It 
is unclear, though, where Tsushima would have procured arms for export.  
 As Ishida Tōru has shown, this proposal for arms trade backfired and had a lingering 
negative effect on Korean-Japanese relations, as it raised concerns among the Koreans who 
oversaw the Japanese relations. Most importantly it led to countermeasures from the 
Taewongun, including the appointment of his close aides to Donglae. Jeong Hyeon-deok 
became the provincial prefect, and Ahn Dong-jun took direct charge of waegwan affairs in 
Pusan. James Lewis has noted that their unusually long tenure may well point to the 
Taewongun’s personal confidence in them.28 The Taewongun instructed Jeong and Ahn to 
reject any communications diverging from the old custom. Ishida has argued that this was the 
reason why the Korean officials year after year refused to receive Japanese communications 
on the grounds that the format was not right.29 The diplomatic conundrum around the 
Tsushima strait needs to be seen in this light – Korea had a problem with the format as well as 
the messenger who was trying to redefine its role in the trilateral relations.  
 Without Tsushima’s attempt to reform the trade scheme with Korea and the 
Taewongun’s personal instruction against it, the ensuing issue over the letter format in itself 
could not have produced such a prolonged conundrum. Irregularity in the letter format in 
itself was not new in Korean-Japanese communication. Lee Hun has shown that there had 
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been close to 200 such cases between 1614 and 1840, and that the Korean response had not 
amounted to outright refusal to receive them in all of these years.30 At least on one occasion 
Korea received an irregular letter from Japan. Ishida notes that in 1860 Korea received 
Japan’s notification of the signing of the commercial treaties with the Western countries in 
1858, even though it did not match the form of previous examples.31 It is thus highly probable 
that Taewongun’s countermeasures in response to the Nii mission of 1867 began to adversely 
affect relations between the Korean court and Tsushima, thus preventing the former from 
accommodating the Japanese approach later on. 
 Therefore the strained relations between the Meiji government and the Korean court 
after 1868 had their origin in communications that predated the installment of the emperor in 
Tokyo. It is also necessary to bear in mind that Tsushima’s policy regarding Korea was to a 
large extent based on its economic predicament. It is possible that its jingoistic rhetoric was 
the result of its effort to please Chōshū men like Yamada who had an influence on the 
shogunate’s policy-making until Itakura’s demise in 1866. 
 
 
After the Restoration 
 
 The immediate aftermath of the fall of the shogunate was necessarily a confused period 
and there was no clear line within the newly emerging government as to who should take the 
lead in negotiating with Korea. On 14 May 1868 the new government, still busy consolidating 
its power in the capital that it had captured a month before, noted to the Tsushima domain that 
it should take charge of diplomacy with Korea and inform Pusan of the enthronement of the 
emperor. Sō Shigemasa, the domain leader who had accompanied the imperial force to Osaka 
during the Boshin War, did not lose this opportunity to make another demand for assistance 
from the new government, arguing that acknowledging his men’s role in communications 
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with Korea was inseparable from financially supporting his domain.32 In other words he 
claimed that Tsushima could not handle relations with Korea on its own, since it could not 
prepare the gifts that would have to accompany the mission. Indeed in the summer of 1868 
the domain asked the Meiji government twice to give it copper to be shipped to Korea, as well 
as provide financial aid for commerce. The Meiji government denied both requests.33  
 Sō’s overture to the Meiji government was essentially a repetition of the request for 
support to the shogunate that Ōshima had made a few years previously. Tabohashi Kiyoshi 
has rightly argued that Tsushima’s real motivation in taking charge of Korean relations was 
its economic concerns, and that the diplomatic reconfiguration was ‘a superficial reason’.34 
What is also worth noting in Sō’s letter is his reference to the fiefdom in Kyushu, not 
Tsushima Island, as the real home for his family. He noted that the Sō family had lost their 
base in northern Kyushu during the warring period in the fourteenth century and, ‘having no 
alternative’, ended up in Tsushima.35 This statement makes a clear contrast to the emotional 
attachment to Tsushima Island felt by some of his subordinates, who regarded Tsushima to be 
their fatherland. At the very top of the domain, Sō understood that his family had been forced 
to move to this remote island with little productive capacity and little chance for prosperity 
outside of relying on external support. This emotional detachment from the island made it 
easier for Sō after the Meiji Restoration to take up a position within the foreign ministry, 
residing in Tokyo, while some of his officers attempted to stick with the status quo.  
 At the end of 1868 Tsushima sent a mission to Korea in order to notify it of the Meiji 
Restoration. By then, however, the Korean suspicion of Japan was mounting and the Koreans 
found an excuse to stall the negotiations due to the irregular nature of the Japanese 
communication. As is well known, Ahn Dong-jun complained about the use of the character 
‘emperor’ to refer to the Japanese head of state. Higuchi Tetsushirō, Tsushima’s envoy, was 
thus stuck in the waegwan without being able to deliver the letter from the Meiji emperor – a 
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disgrace on the mission’s part.36  
 As Higuchi’s mission became stymied the Meiji government began taking firmer action 
by itself. On 7 April 1869, the Meiji government ordered Sō Shigemasa, back in Tsushima by 
then, to come to Tokyo.37 Having just managed to finance participation in the Boshin War, 
Tsushima struggled to pay for its lord’s visit to the capital. A government report on 
Tsushima’s debt written a few years later notes that following Sō’s travel to Tokyo in 1869 
the domain’s payment of stipend to the samurai class began to be delayed, while ‘across the 
domain it was almost on the verge of a famine; the situation was beyond description’.38 Sō 
Shigemasa in Tokyo again begged the Meiji government for financial aid, telling its leaders 
that he could not go home empty-handed. This time the Meiji government responded by 
granting Sō a fiefdom in Kyushu, worth 30,000 koku, to match the aid previously given by the 
shogunate.39 However, the Meiji government did not accept the other request made by Sō, 
namely to compensate it for the future loss of trade which would result from the separation of 
the Korea trade from the domain’s finances. Rather, Tokyo told Tsushima to continue trading 
with Korea.40 This was not what Tsushima wanted to hear, and given that the Koreans’ 
suspicions precluded any possibility of the swift resumption of trade in the near future, 
Tsushima’s economy was barely solvent even with Tokyo’s new commitment. What was 
worse, the crop yield in 1869 was particularly bad, producing less than half of the average 
year.41 Something had to be done to save the domain from total disintegration. 
 The Meiji government began to recognise the scale of the trouble in Tsushima and took 
the initiative. In October 1869 it told Tsushima that it foresaw no role being played by the Sō 
family in Korean-Japanese relations. The new relations would be based on modern 
international relations, the government reckoned, ‘because Korea is a foreign country too, it 
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does not bode well if our relations were not based on international law’.42 Tsushima naturally 
resisted the Meiji government’s attempt to remove it from the equation and the foreign 
ministry for the moment backtracked and acknowledged Tsushima’s role as a temporary 
measure.43 Tsushima duly proposed to send Sō Shigemasa to Pusan in order to negotiate the 
re-opening of communications, but the foreign ministry dismissed the idea.44 
 Despite the emerging tension with Tokyo, Tsushima had to do something to persuade 
Korea to talk to the new government. In the spring of 1870 Tsushima saw a narrow window 
of opportunity opening up for a new relationship between the Korean court and the Meiji 
government thanks to a suggestion made by Ōshima Tomonojō. Ōshima proposed that 
official letters between them should be addressed to their respective governments as an 
institution, rather than an emperor or king as an individual, thereby circumventing the issue of 
which character should be used to describe the Japanese emperor. Ōshima also suggested that 
the Tsushima envoy keep using the old seal given by the Korean court, not the one made by 
the Meiji government, which had been another reason for Ahn’s rejection. Ahn approved the 
idea, and if all had gone well, this might have allowed Sō Shigemasa to visit Korea as the 
Meiji government’s representative.45 However, Seoul’s position hardened as the result of a 
few incidents that purportedly showed Japan’s hostile intentions towards Korea. A boastful 
comment by a lone samurai in Shanghai had begun to spread a rumour that Japan was 
planning an invasion of Korea.46 Then there was a visit to Seoul by a German ship, the Hertha, 
which carried a Japanese interpreter – a confirmation, from the Taewongun’s perspective, that 
Japan was collaborating with the Westerners to the detriment of Korea’s interests. These 
incidents made it impossible for Ahn to proceed with Ōshima’s scheme. Meanwhile in Tokyo, 
the hard-liners in the foreign ministry opposed the idea of dispatching Sō and instead 
appointed Yoshioka Kōki, an official who had no prior connection to Tsushima, as envoy. 
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Yoshioka was the first non-Tsushima official in centuries to deliver a Japanese message to 
Korea, although the Tsushima islanders knew this would fail. The opportunity had been lost 
before Yoshioka landed on Pusan.47   
 Having borrowed heavily from local and Osaka-based merchants throughout the 1860s, 
Tsushima had all but exhausted its possible source of lenders. As a last resort, Tsushima’s 
officers in Osaka turned to Western merchants in the treaty ports without consulting the home 
domain. This reliance on foreign capital is an ironic turn of events for a domain previously 
known for its association with pro-emperor, anti-foreign, sonnō jōi ideology. Yet this was not 
the time for an ideological policy. In the winter of 1870, British, American, German, and 
Portuguese merchants in Osaka, Hyōgo, and Nagasaki provided cash as well as sugar and 
textiles at a monthly interest rate of 2.5 percent.48 Having been unable to resume the Korea 
trade, however, Tsushima could not pay it back. The news of the unexpected debt to 
foreigners stunned the domain leadership as they realised they had sunk into an even deeper 
abyss. Unable to pay back any of the foreign creditors, the latter filed a lawsuit.49 Prior to that, 
James Enslie, British consul in Hyōgo, tried to liquidate Tsushima’s debt, having received 
complaints from one of the British creditors named Lucas Waters, but in vain.50 Giving up the 
negotiations in Osaka, Lucas travelled to Yokohama to sue the Meiji government and make 
them enforce payment, leaving with Enslie copies of the six contracts that he had signed but 
which now proved to be worthless.51 The island’s administration had all but collapsed. 
 As pressure was mounting from Japanese as well as foreign lenders, Tsushima once 
again reinvigorated the effort to move forward the negotiations with Korea. On 23 June 1871, 
Sō Shigemasa met with Hirotsu Hironobu, a Korea specialist in the foreign ministry. Hirotsu 
proposed the dispatch of Sō as a foreign ministry official, together with the removal of 
Tsushima from the Korea trade and compensation for the domain. Three weeks later Sawa 
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Nobuyoshi, the foreign minister, approved the plan. The success of the motion to dispatch Sō 
indicates the resurgence of moderate opinion on the Korea question within the foreign 
ministry. But the momentum was soon swept away by the political earthquake caused by the 
abolition of domains, announced officially on 29 August.52 
 In the first half of 1871, as Tsushima was approaching the foreign ministry via Hirotsu 
to make a breakthrough by sending Sō to Pusan, it was doing everything to raise cash to 
service its debts. In March 1871 Sō Shigemasa wrote to the officers in Donglae, going over 
the head of Pusan-based officials, and begged them to meet with the foreign ministry officials 
who were there.53 Around the same time the domain declared an emergency measure of 
taking over the private trade with Korea conducted by its merchants. This meant that all the 
profits from trade with Korea conducted by merchants would go directly into the domain’s 
pocket, effectively forcing the merchants to make sacrifices for the domain’s short-term 
financing. However, the domain rescinded the order after half a year, having met with 
opposition from the merchants as well as some of the waegwan-based officials.54  
 Not long after this Sō Shigemasa began to make up his mind to give up the domain, for 
on 18 August, eleven days before the abolition of domains was officially promulgated, he 
asked Tokyo to take control of his fiefdom, citing excessive debt as the reason.55 Tsushima’s 
total debt to foreigners was ¥357,503. This was the third largest of all the domains at the 
time.56 Unlike most of the other domains that accumulated foreign debt either as the result of 
botched trade projects or defeat in the Boshin War, Tsushima’s economic difficulty stemmed 
from the long-term structural shift in the domain’s diplomatic and economic situation. Adding 
to this its borrowing from the domestic sources, Tsushima’s total debt exceeded ¥1 million.57 
Plagued with political infighting, and having exhausted every possible means of obtaining 
cash, the Tsushima domain in the summer of 1871 had lost all avenues for possible reform. If 
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the abolition of the domains had not taken place, some enforcement measures would have 
been imposed by the debtors. This would very likely have included the seizure of its Kyushu 
fiefdom by the Western merchants, since Tsushima had offered rice from there as security.58 
The abolition of the domains thus salvaged Tsushima, along with many other domains 
struggling with debt. The loans were taken up by the Meiji government, which paid 
Tsushima’s lenders back by February next year.59 
After the domain was no more, Sō Shigemasa was willing to work under the foreign 
ministry to achieve the reforms that he had intended to implement vis-à-vis Korea. He was 
soon appointed director of foreign affairs, and the foreign ministry gave him an order to go to 
Korea on 18 September 1871.60 However opinions within the foreign ministry were still 
divided on reliance on former Tsushima individuals to persuade the Korean court. Some 
officials, including Hirotsu, argued that dispatching Sō himself was the only way that the 
Koreans would respond, because they had made clear they would only talk to Tsushima 
people. He argued, having accompanied the Yoshioka mission and seen the stagnation 
firsthand, that it was no use just sending envoys if the Koreans would not agree to the new 
character of Japanese diplomacy. He was also dismissive of taking a tough stance and 
insisting on establishing direct communication between the two governments. This was 
because the Korean officials in Pusan, if unconvinced, always had the option of withdrawing 
provisions from the waegwan and virtually taking its residents, some 300 of them from 
Tsushima, as hostages. Because the sea was difficult to cross in the winter months, Korea’s 
suspension of provisions would bring the waegwan residents to their knees. Hirotsu, who was 
then staying at the waegwan, therefore could not believe that the foreign ministry was still 
balking at sending Sō, as the Tsushima islanders struggled to survive: ‘These days we are all 
exhausted, completely disoriented, not knowing what to say, and absent-minded’.61  
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Nevertheless others in the foreign ministry, such as Sada Hakubō and Yanagihara 
Sakimitsu, took a firmer stance against Korea and were more sceptical of the former 
Tsushima officials’ allegiance to Tokyo. Seeing less reason to cater to what seemed to be the 
unreasonable intransigence of the Koreans, they preferred sending a foreign ministry official 
and to take a decisive step to revamp the Korean-Japanese relations with a demonstration of 
military force if necessary.62 Their hawkish stance was due partly to concern over what might 
happen if Korea was invaded by a Western country. Drawing on from information in the 
English-language newspapers, Yanagihara claimed that the Western nations were ‘drooling 
over Korea increasingly year after year’.63 In his view, the forerunner among the Westerners 
was Russia. Urase Mosuke, a foreign ministry official originally from Tsushima who 
accompanied the Yoshioka mission in March 1870 and had stayed in the waegwan ever since, 
reported a rumour that hundreds of Koreans had crossed the Heilongjiang River and fled to 
Russia’s Maritime Region following a large-scale famine.64 There was some truth in the 
rumour he heard. Steward Lone and Gavan McCormack have noted that in 1869 alone, some 
7,000 entered Russian territory.65 In addition, the foreign ministry kept receiving worrying 
reports about Russian moves in the northern border region of Korea, including the 
observation that the Russians in the Maritime Region ‘seem to be secretly cultivating the 
Korean poor, persuade the Koreans at the first instance and make them a defence against our 
country’.66 In the end the hawks in the foreign ministry prevailed, and at the end of 1871 the 
foreign ministry appointed Sagara Masaki, another non-Tsushima official but of higher rank 
than Yoshioka, to head the mission. The purpose was not to negotiate a new trade scheme, but 
simply to inform Korea of the abolition of the domains.67 
 One month after the appointment, Sagara’s mission arrived at Pusan. He ordered the 
return of Higuchi, the first post-Restoration envoy from Tsushima who had stayed in the 
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waegwan for over three years trying in vain to deliver the emperor’s letter about the Meiji 
Restoration. Sagara’s mission did not carry high hopes nor was it ready to make easy 
compromise. The foreign ministry did not expect the Koreans to receive the letter that Sagara 
carried, but it reckoned that they could respond by withdrawing most of the Japanese from the 
waegwan, leaving ten to twenty merchants behind, in case the Koreans stopped supplies.68  
 By this point the foreign ministry had become suspicious of what the Tsushima 
officials were up to in the waegwan. A few days after their arrival, the MOFA officials told 
the waegwan residents that no one except them was allowed to speak to the Koreans about 
diplomatic matters. ‘Whether a samurai or merchant, it is strictly prohibited to inquire about 
the feelings [of the Koreans] or to make fallacious comments’, the envoys told the head of the 
waegwan, Fukami Rokurō.69 The negotiations soon reached the by now familiar stalemate. 
The Korean officials refused to receive the letter from Sagara and repeatedly declined to even 
meet him. Fukami, who was sympathetic to the foreign ministry despite his coming from 
Tsushima, was aggravated: ‘this situation of the repeated delay of the conduct is extremely 
suspicious’, he claimed. ‘On the part of our envoy and myself, this [failure to deliver the 
emperor’s message] is an utter disservice’. After much wrangling, Sagara finally managed to 
deliver his letter to Go Jae-Geon, who served in place of Ahn Dong-jun while he was away.70 
A reply, though, never came and the stalemate continued. Infuriated by what they perceived 
as the repeated disingenuity exercised by the Korean officials, the Sagara mission stormed out 
of the waegwan on 1 June 1872 and went to Donglae magistrate office on foot, which took 
them five days.71 The record of the Donglae magistrate shows that fifty-six ‘waegwan 
Japanese and others’ arrived at the gate, which suggests that not only the MOFA officials and 
the Korean officials – who presumably were forced to lead the way – but Tsushima men also 
took part.72 But the guards at the gate denied their entrance or the demand to see Jeong. The 
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party returned to Pusan ten days after the departure, empty-handed.73  
   
 
Hanabusa’s mission to Pusan, the autumn of 1872 
 
After this headlong approach to try to make Korea accept the letter from the Meiji 
government had failed to produce any result, the MOFA attempted a different way to 
accomplish the goal of establishing diplomatic ties. The key themes they identified were the 
repatriation of Korean castaways and the clearance of Tsushima’s debt with the Korean court 
left over from the tributary relations. On 20 September 1872, the MOFA appointed Hanabusa 
Yoshimoto, director of MOFA, as an envoy to Pusan. Hanabusa was a diplomat with 
experience of participating in negotiations overseas, although this was his first visit to Korea. 
He had been on a mission to the United States as well as the one to Qing China, when he and 
Yanagihara had had preparatory negotiations for the first Sino-Japanese treaty, in 1870. Two 
years after this mission to Pusan, Hanabusa would be made the first secretary of the Japanese 
legation in St. Petersburg and took charge of the negotiations with the Russian government 
over the Maria Luz incident. He was thus one of the main frontline diplomats in the early 
Meiji diplomacy. This time the instructions given to Hanabusa were to repatriate former 
Tsushima officials and other Japanese not immediately needed in Pusan; deliver the overdue 
goods to Korea on behalf of Tsushima; and hand over the Korean castaways who had been 
held in Tsushima due to the cutting off of communications between the two countries.74 In 
other words, Hanabusa’s mission moved away from the theoretical debate of how the 
emperors in Korea, Japan, and China stood in relation to one another and concentrated on 
practical issues, while taking a decisive step to remove Tsushima from the scene. 
The Meiji government decided to send Hanabusa’s mission on two Western-style 
navy vessels, Kasuga and Yugōmaru. This was perhaps meant to be a show of force, but the 
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fact was that it had to carry a large quantity of goods, including copper belts, which precluded 
the use of small Japanese ships. Prior to the departure the foreign ministry impressed upon the 
delegation that no crew should land at Pusan and they should refrain from any aggressive 
response if there was provocation from the Korean side.75 As he departed Yokohama, 
Hanabusa believed that he would not be able to trust the former Tsushima men in Pusan as 
colleagues or subordinates. He therefore ordered Oku Gisei, a MOFA official originally from 
Tsushima who took part in the mission, to report on the relations between the two groups and 
report secretly to him. Hanabusa’s suspicion, and the series of previous reports on Korea-
Tsushima collaboration, proved to be well placed.76  
Hanabusa left Yokohama on 30 September and first loaded some twenty-four 
tonnes of copper belt and other overdue items listed by Sō in Osaka.77 Hanabusa’s Kasuga 
then went directly to Tsushima, but Yugōmaru stopped at Nagasaki and boarded soldiers.78 
The two ships met again in Tsushima and headed for Pusan together with a Japanese-style 
boat that carried thirteen Korean castaways, in much the same manner as the Americans in 
1837 had brought Japanese castaways in an attempt to open a communication route with the 
Japanese.79 The three ships arrived at Pusan at 4pm on 17 October. Hanabusa lost no time in 
speaking to the former Tsushima officials who had remained in the waegwan. He 
interrogated the Tsushima men one by one throughout that night and by dawn next day, he 
concluded that there was indeed collaboration between them and the Korean officials, and 
ordered the repatriation of Umitsu Motarō, Nakayama Kihei and others, who had been in 
charge of trade with Korea. Hanabusa then rebranded the waegwan as the Japanese official 
residence (Nippon kōkan); appointed its new head and his two deputies and interpreters, 
mostly from the foreign ministry, though some of them, such as Oku, had served the 
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Tsushima domain in its Edo residence.80 Hanabusa requested a meeting with the deputy of 
Ahn, Hyeon Ji-sun, but Hyeon refused to meet him because of illness. Choe Joe-su, an 
interpreter, instead received Hanabusa’s letter. 81  Hyeon took issue with the fact that 
Hanabusa was not from Tsushima and, as the foreign ministry predicted, suspended the 
visits of Korean merchants to the waegwan. Hanabusa’s report stated that the gate of the 
waegwan remained open as usual and the interpreters went back and forth, though no 
merchants were in sight.82 
In spite of the tension, the contact with the Koreans continued even on the Japanese 
gunboat. Ahn and Hyeon made their point by repeatedly refusing to meet the MOFA 
officials, but the lower-rank officers turned out to be more liberal and curious. The 
interpreters and the neighbouring residents, who had seen few Western-style ships before, 
wanted to see the Kasuga. On the morning of 18 October, Hanabusa permitted them on 
board and treated them with liquor.83 With this invitation Hanabusa probably hoped that the 
Korean attitude would soften, but that was not the case. The next day Hanabusa informed 
Hyeon of the appointment of the new representatives, and requested the Korean court’s 
certificate for the vessels.84 But Hyeon reprimanded in writing the unilateral withdrawal of 
the Tsushima officials. One of the Japanese officials replied to this letter by demanding a 
receipt for the products that the mission had brought.85 The next day Hyeon gave the 
Japanese the list of items overdue from the former trade with Tsushima.86 
During Hanabusa’s stay, the Pusan officials conducted double-track negotiations. 
On the one hand Ahn and Hyeon refused to negotiate with the MOFA officials and 
castigated their attempt to enforce a unilateral change to the way things had been; on the 
other hand the interpreters, Choe Gun-seon, Son Yol and others, visited the private 
residence of the Japanese interpreters and repeatedly requested a meeting with the former 
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Tsushima officials. The Japanese interpreters refused.87 Hanabusa took another occasion for 
food diplomacy on 24 October, when on board the Kasuga the Japanese celebrated the 
birthday of the Meiji emperor with meals and drinks. The Korean officials accepted the 
invitation and came on board, though Hanabusa’s diary does not specify who participated.88 
In contrast to the conventional understanding of the existing scholarship, the communication 
between the Koreans and the Japanese was therefore not totally severed by Hanabusa’s 
expulsion of the former Tsushima officers.   
Ultimately, however, Hanabusa failed to persuade the Koreans to receive the goods 
overdue from the Korea-Tsushima trade. In other words the Koreans stuck with the principle 
of trilateral relationship via Tsushima. On 26 October, Hanabusa left matters in the hands of 
Fukami and retreated to Tsushima, where he stayed for another month. During his stay he 
received information from Pusan that Ahn, who had been absent, was now on his way back 
to his office. Hanabusa thus asked Tokyo if he should return to Pusan and try to contact 
Ahn, but he did not cross the Tsushima strait again until 1878 when another mission brought 
him there.89 He returned to Tokyo on 16 December 1872.90  
Hanabusa’s report from Tsushima in November reveals his perspective on the 
relationship with Korea, not all of which is correct based on what is known today. He 
reckoned that the main obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic communications between 
Tokyo and Seoul was not the Koreans, but Tsushima. He pointed out that if Korea and Japan 
could agree on the language that signified their equal standing, Ahn might have been 
amenable. In other words, he acknowledged that Ōshima’s approach in the spring of 1870 
could have worked, although he saw the reason for its failure in Tsushima’s obstruction, 
rather than Korea’s hardened attitude. From what he understood, it was Urase’s comment in 
1871 hinting at a Japanese expedition to Korea that had put the Koreans on the defensive 
and cut off the trade. Hanabusa may be correct in saying that some of the Tsushima men’s 
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advice against meeting the foreign ministry officials hampered the talks, but as was 
discussed earlier the Taewongun had decided on the policy of non-negotiation in 1867.  
Hanabusa went as far as to suggest that if there had been no double agent within the 
waegwan and the negotiations by Sagara had continued from the spring of 1872, he would 
have been able to meet Ahn.91 His distrust of Tsushima is conspicuous, and probably 
reflected the voice of the majority in the foreign ministry. 
Immediately after Hanabusa’s departure, the Koreans’ attitude softened. The next 
morning the merchants were back in the waegwan. They told the remaining MOFA officials 
that permission to resume trade would be given that morning and they had not had time to 
procure food for sale, but would be back tomorrow.92 On 30 October, chief interpreter Choe 
came to the waegwan and told the Japanese that Jeong and Ahn were both back in their 
positions, and that Ahn would be arriving at Pusan in five to six days.93 Even though Ahn 
was still unwilling to visit the waegwan by himself, the pace of exchange of messages and 
the frequency of meetings between Choe and the Japanese officers slightly increased.  
With the Tsushima men out of sight, it seems that some of the lower-rank Korean 
officials began to seek a new modus operandi with the foreign ministry officials. For the 
next month and a half, Choe went back and forth between the waegwan and Donglae, 
sometimes within a few days, to relay communications between Ahn and the MOFA 
officials. Ahn stuck with the argument that now that the Tsushima officials had left, no one 
in the waegwan was qualified to handle the tributary trade products. Thus the talks did not 
lead the negotiations to any new ground. There was one crucial change, however. As the 
Tsushima men disappeared from his sight, so did the border zone that had once connected 
the two sides of the Tsushima Strait. Ahn now faced Japan. 
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Conclusion: Tsushima becomes Japan 
 
 In the early 1870s, the foreign ministry and Tsushima shared the overall goal of doing 
away with the tributary relations with Korea previously maintained by the latter domain. 
Beyond that, however, the two parties had diverging and ultimately conflicting interests. The 
foreign ministry aspired for Japan to be the first country to establish treaty relations with 
Seoul, which, the government hoped, would put it in a position to be consulted by the 
Western countries when they approached Korea – a tremendous boost to the prestige of the 
newly born government.94 Another reason for the foreign ministry to push for its opening of 
relations with Korea was related to its sense of vulnerability. The foreign ministry officials 
saw a power vacuum and firmly believed that Korea was ‘up for grabs’ by the militarily 
superior Western countries; and if it indeed became a protectorate or a colony of one Western 
country, it was certain that others would seek to counter the power balance by acquiring 
neighbouring lands, including islands in Japan. In the minds of the foreign ministry hard-
liners, the conclusion of a treaty with Korea before anyone else was a measure that would 
prevent any territorial scramble in Korea and Japan from gaining traction. This is not to say 
that they read the situation correctly. The foreign ministry tried to understand the international 
relations around the Korean Peninsula with imperfect information; it failed to understand 
what had brought about the refusal by the Korean officials to negotiate. Instead of 
investigating why the Koreans were far more stringent than they used to be, the foreign 
ministry officials identified Tsushima as the main obstacle. 
 On the other hand, throughout the 1860s and the early 1870s Tsushima’s fundamental 
goal in approaching Korea for a new relationship was the domain’s financial survival. The 
long-term effect of the declining trade with Korea had pushed the domain into the heavy debt 
that ultimately crushed it. It needed to reform relations with Korea in order to resume the 
import of rice, as well as to receive aid from the Meiji government. Whatever worked best in 
the minds of the potential donor in the capital, Tsushima was ready to implement. Ōshima 
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adopted the seikanron type of discourse in 1863-4, but he took a more moderate course in 
1870 in an attempt to open dialogue. After the domain’s liquidation, Sō Shigemasa, who 
tended to approach the domain’s problem more by appealing to Edo than carrying out reform 
at home, was willing to work under the auspices of the foreign ministry. For them, the 
opening of Korea was necessary not for its own sake but primarily because it would provide 
the way out of the domain’s debt. 
How did Tsushima cope with the structural shift of inter-state relations around it, and 
why did it cease to exist as a border zone? The fundamental limitation in its approach was 
that it tried to find solutions outside the domain rather than improving economic production at 
home. Tsushima counted on favour from the shogunate, Chōshū, Korea and the Meiji 
government at different times. Unlike Japan itself, which found a balance among the Western 
countries that upheld its independence, Tsushima found itself with increasingly limited 
options primarily due to its weak economic foundation. As a domain that had built its whole 
existence upon its role as intermediary between Korea and Japan, the long-term decline of 
trade between the two had a slow but steady damage on its revenue. Debts piled up and the 
effort to control the situation led the islanders to try various measures: first a transfer, 
proposed by Sasu; and then a reform of the Korea trade, garnished with the jingoistic rhetoric 
catering to the taste of those in power at the time. The corollary of that, however, was that it 
heightened alarm on the Koreans’ side, which, a few years later, made it impossible for the 
Meiji government to effectively negotiate any new form of communication. Tsushima sought 
a favour from all its neighbours, but eventually failed to get decisive support from any. 
The weak economic base of the island domain created the political turmoil that 
rendered policy-making even more difficult. The lack of leadership from Sō Yoshiakira in the 
mid-1860s and his failure to restore order among the rivalling factions cost him dearly. The 
mismanagement inhibited economic reform, forcing him to rely on private merchants for 
quick cash, only to place him deeper in debt. The lack of stable income at home meant that Sō 
was in no position to make a decisive departure from the dependence on Korea. If this had not 
been the case, Tsushima’s approach to Korea on the eve of the Meiji Restoration might have 
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been less provocative, leaving some room for manoeuvre for the Meiji government officials 
when they tried to notify the Korean government about the regime change and the abolition of 
the domains, neither of which succeeded. Moreover the resistance to the foreign ministry 
enacted by waegwan residents would surely have been less intense. Thus it is not enough to 
see the origins of the Korean-Japanese diplomatic stalemate in Japan’s fear of Western 
aggression and its domestic political concern; it needs to incorporate the financial dilemmas 
of Tsushima.95 
The triumph of the hard-liners against Korea within the foreign ministry in the 
autumn of 1870, which reversed the decision to dispatch Sō as the ministry’s envoy, certainly 
limited Tsushima’s options. Yet the adoption of such policies was not preordained; in 
September 1871 the foreign ministry appointed Sō again as envoy to Korea, though this was 
to be reversed once again. The foreign ministry’s willingness to delegate the negotiations to 
Sō, limited though it may have been, demonstrates that it is too simplistic to describe Japan’s 
attitude towards Korea through reference to the seikanron discourse observed in the words of 
a vocal few throughout this period. 
Ultimately the demise of Tsushima came from outside the equation of Korea-
Tsushima-Japan triangle. The abolition of the domains on 29 August 1871 is typically 
explained through the Meiji government’s need to seek a broader base for political support.96 
Yet seen from the perspective of marginal domains such as Tsushima, it was also concerned 
with financial salvation. With no prospect of paying back its debt, Tsushima petitioned for its 
liquidation before the official announcement from Tokyo. In this sense Tsushima’s battle had 
ended long before the waegwan was emptied by Hanabusa. Still, the latter’s visit was the 
indispensable last step to seal the history of Tsushima as a border zone. As the result of his 
mission, Tsushima lost all of the special political character that placed it equidistant between 
Japan and Korea. Now it was just another island belonging to Nagasaki prefecture, which 
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might be a port of stoppage for the Japanese going to Korea or vice versa, but carried no 
authority to handle the transactions across the strait.  
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Chapter 3  The balance buckles in the north 
 
 
 
On 30 March 1867, two international agreements were signed that had a significant 
impact on the trajectory of the North Pacific region. One was concluded in Washington and 
stated that Russia and the United States agreed to the former’s sale of its territory in North 
America to the latter for $7.2 million. The other was sealed in St. Petersburg between the 
Russian foreign ministry’s Asia division chief, Pëtr Stremoukhov, and an envoy sent by 
Japan’s Tokugawa shogunate, Koide Hidemi, confirming that Sakhalin Island was in the 
common possession of both countries. These signings on the same day, albeit by pure 
coincidence, nevertheless signify the undercurrent of the history of the North Pacific and the 
possibility of investigating the history of Sakhalin in that light. 
Sakhalin went through a peculiar state of dual possession by Russia and Japan from 
1867 to 1875, until the treaty of St. Petersburg created the Russo-Japanese border in the La 
Perouse Strait between Sakhalin and Hokkaido.1 The conventional approach to this subject 
unsurprisingly has been to describe it as one phase of the Russo-Japanese relationship and as 
part of the growing tension between the two governments’ imperial ambitions, leading up to 
the war of 1904-5.2 As will be seen below, a closer look at the diplomatic developments at the 
turn of the 1870s demonstrates that this approach does not fully account for Japan’s response. 
With regards to the involvement of Britain, it has simply been noted that Sir Harry Parkes, 
British minister, recommended that Japan abandon Sakhalin and focus on the development of 
Hokkaido.3 Little mention is made of the activities of the British navy even though they took 
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the primary role in gathering information about the Russian Far East. To date, Akizuki 
Toshiyuki’s monograph offers the most comprehensive account of the question of borders and 
the Russo-Japanese negotiations in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and is based on a wide 
range of Japanese and Russian primary sources.4 As Akizuki acknowledged, however, the 
Russian diplomatic documents were not available to him, and so he relied on published 
sources such as memoirs on the Russian side. It is only in the last decade or so that historians 
have begun to produce research using Russian archival materials.5  
Some challenges remain. In the first place, the diplomatic history of nineteenth-
century Sakhalin has largely been written with the primary purpose of understanding the 
origins of Russo-Japanese territorial bickering in the following decades and which lingers to 
the present day, and has therefore focused on the territorial claims made by Russia and Japan 
and the shift of the borderline around the island. This tendency has sidelined the treatment of 
non-territorial factors such as commercial interests. Also precluded has been the involvement 
of other parties such as Britain and the United States, except for a brief acknowledgement of 
their role either as advisers or mediators for the Japanese.6 Most importantly, the existing 
literature has paid meagre attention to the role Sakhalin played in Russo-American relations. 
In particular, the link between the 1867 sale of Russian America and the Russian 
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establishment of a penal colony in, and resulting exclusive possession of, Sakhalin has been 
generally neglected.7  
 This chapter aims at revisiting the diplomatic negotiations on Sakhalin’s border 
issues from a multilateral perspective, bearing in mind the context of the transformation of the 
North Pacific region, especially the emergence of the balance of favour. It focuses on the 
period between 1867 and 1871 the years in which the diplomatic balance in Japan’s northern 
border buckled – but never fell apart. It suggests that the fixation on Russo-Japanese relations 
may have limited the scope of our understanding of why and how Russia sought to possess 
the entire island of Sakhalin and how other countries in the region coped with it. In this 
respect, attention needs to be paid to the British naval activities in the surrounding waters as 
well as American merchants’ commercial interests in the region. This web of multilateral 
relations needs to be understood as a whole, so as to arrive at a fuller picture of the 
international relations of the North Pacific in the late nineteenth century. Britain and Japan 
initially perceived Russia’s attempt to keep other Western powers away from Sakhalin as a 
sign of its desire to thrust into Hokkaido. 1871 was the year when the Anglo-Japanese 
cooperation was at its highest under this assumption; but as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the best informed among the Meiji elites began to realise Russia’s attention was no 
longer pointed towards Hokkaido. The competition between them and the Russians was a 
long-term one, fought primarily in the Russian Far East and Korea.  
 
 
The historical image of Russia as a northern neighbour 
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century, see Clare Anderson, Carrie Crockett, Christian G. De Vito, Takashi Miyamoto, Kellie Moss, 
Katherine Roscoe, and Minako Sakata, ‘Locating penal transportation: punishment, space and place c. 
1750-1900’, in Karen Morin and Dominique Moran (eds.), Historical geographies of prisons: 
Unlocking the usable carceral past (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2015), 147-67. They emphasise 
the collective construction of the penal regime in which not only the state government but also local 
officers and even convicts themselves and their families took part in the operation of transporting 
convicts to a specific location with in the respective empires. 
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The Japanese have held for over two centuries the image of Russia threatening 
Japan’s north. The image is so strong that it often completely eclipses the other major 
northern neighbour, the United States. For historians, Japan’s relations with Russia in the 
north have been obfuscated by the incompleteness of the documentary record, but 
nevertheless the recurring image in the historiography places Russia as the initiator of the 
interaction, as is observed in the title of Lensen’s classical work written in 1959.  
The Japanese fear of Russian aggression began to build up after the clash on Etorofu 
Island in 1806-7.8 Russian naval officers Svokhtov and Davidov carried out the attack as 
retaliation for the Tokugawa shogunate’s harsh treatment of their envoy, Nikolai Petrovich 
Rezanov, who had visited Nagasaki in a vain attempt to open Japan to trade in 1804. This 
attack prompted the Tokugawa shogunate’s reinforcement of the islands, and the incident was 
told and retold in popular writings about Japan’s northern frontier until the menacing image 
of Russians coveting a southern advance was ingrained into the Japanese psyche.9  
It is true that Russia was the only country that actively approached Japan from the 
north and tried to settle the border with the shogunate. Indigenous peoples in Sakhalin had 
maintained loose tributary relations with the Qing, but by the mid-nineteenth century 
Beijing’s control over the island had become so tenuous that it never factored into the border 
settlement talks between Russia and Japan. In the late summer of 1853 Russian officers led by 
Nikolai Busse established a military post on Sakhalin’s southern coast facing Aniwa Bay, 
naming it Korsakov post, and told the Japanese and the Ainu inhabitants there that they were 
defending the place against the Americans. In the following spring, however, the Russian 
soldiers temporarily retreated in order to avoid a British and French attack following the 
outbreak of the Crimean War. Russia and Japan tried to settle the question over the ownership 
of Sakhalin during the talks that led to the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda. The shogunate’s 
representative proposed the division of the island at the 50th parallel, but Russia refused to 
                                                           
8 See Lensen, Russian Push toward Japan, 158-76. 
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meet halfway.10 In the following decade the officers from both countries stationed in Sakhalin 
increasingly saw each other’s presence as an obstacle. But this does not mean that the two 
countries were simply in competition with each other. For Russia, Sakhalin’s value lay in the 
fact that it guarded the mouth of the Amur River, the control of which was vital for the 
administration of Manchuria. The competitors Russia had in mind were not the Japanese, but 
the other Western powers.  
 
Map 3: Sakhalin, Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands11  
                                                           
10 Akizuki, Nichiro Kankei to Saharin Tō, 62-95; Stephan, Sakhalin, 19-29, 42-56. 
11  The map was retrieved from <http://d-maps.com/m/europa/russia/sakhalin/sakhalin02.gif> and 
adapted by the author [accessed 8 September, 2014]. 
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The Temporary Regulations 
 
The presence of the two countries’ officers in Sakhalin led to a clash in the spring of 
1866, when ten Japanese officers on patrol around Komoshiraraoro, on the western coast of 
Sakhalin just above the 48th parallel, collided with sixty to seventy Russian soldiers at the 
back of a Russian barrack and were taken in captivity to the nearby settlement of Kushunnai. 
The Japanese asserted that the Russian soldiers were intruding into their territory, as they 
upheld the 50th parallel as the border between the Japanese and Russian parts of the island. 
Russia claimed that the Japanese had assaulted them first and they had merely defended 
themselves. The Russians bound eight of ten Japanese officers and took them away on a 
sledge. They were held for one and a half months while the Japanese and Russian officials 
discussed the matter in Kushunnai.12 The news shocked the shogunate as evidence of Russia’s 
renewed effort to drive the Japanese out of the island, and caused them to take prompt action.  
Shortly after the release of the eight officers, foreign magistrate Koide Hidemi, who 
also served as governor of Hakodate, left for Edo to report the incident. There he argued that 
‘it is urgently necessary for the Court to decide on the issue of the border’.13 Koide argued 
that, while the Japanese claim was not backed by incontrovertible evidence, neither was 
Russia’s. He thus reckoned ‘there is a one or two in ten chance’ that Russia would agree on 
drawing a border on the island.14 The Tokugawa shogunate soon appointed him as an envoy 
to St. Petersburg. Koide left Yokohama on 18 November 1866.15 This was the second Russo-
Japanese negotiation on the border question to be held in St. Petersburg, following the 
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 95 
Takenouchi mission in 1862, but the first one whose primary purpose was to speak to St. 
Petersburg about the issue of Sakhalin.16 
Koide and Pëtr Stremoukhov, the head of the Russian foreign ministry’s Asian 
division, started negotiations on 4 February 1867 which lasted for two months.17 Koide 
asserted that Japan had a legitimate claim and it was only fair that it got the southern portion 
of the island, with a border on the 50th parallel. Koide did not repeat the argument employed 
by his predecessors based on economic relations with the indigenous Ainu as a way of 
asserting territorial rights.18 Even though he was not fully convinced by his own argument, he 
stuck to other ways of legitimising the Japanese claim: accounts from Japanese explorers as 
evidence of Japan’s control before Russia’s, and a map produced in Europe that painted the 
northern and southern portion of the island in different colours.19 Stremoukhov first reminded 
the Japanese that it was them who had halted the talks on the borders. He pointed out that the 
Takenouchi mission had agreed in 1862 to send a plenipotentiary to Nikolaevsk, a Russian 
port on the mouth of the Amur River facing the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, but in the end 
had failed to do so. On the other hand Russia had appointed Pëtr Kazakevich, who was then 
about to start his assignment as military governor at Nikolaevsk, as a plenipotentiary. He had 
waited in vain for four years, and therefore the government had not given the same power to 
his successor. Stremoukhov acknowledged that Japan had some claim on the southern part of 
the island, but because the possession of the whole island was vital to Russia’s security, he 
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vol.11, Koide Hidemi and Oda Ichizō to foreign magistrates, the sixth month of Keio 2 (1866).  
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asked Japan to give up its claim and receive two kinds of compensation. The first was 
freedom to fish on the coast of Sakhalin, as this was the main Japanese economic activity 
there. The second was Urup Island, the southernmost of the Russian territory in the Kuril 
Islands, with the neighbouring three tiny islets called Chirpoy (consisting of two islets) and 
Broutona.20  
Throughout the negotiations Stremoukhov went out of his way to justify Russia’s 
approach to the issue. He explained to Koide the reason for proposing mixed inhabitancy in 
case they failed to agree on the border as following:  
 
Pardon me saying this, but if Japan goes to war [with a Western country] it will be 
unable to prevent foreigners from stationing in this island, which will be a 
tremendous blow to both of our countries. Yet if the border had been drawn, my 
country could not do anything [in the Japanese territory], and so either way we both 
benefit from not separating the island.21 
 
This remark shows that Stremoukhov perceived Sakhalin within multilateral relations. 
Because the island sat at the mouth of the Amur River, control of which was vital for the 
holding of the Maritime Region that Russia had recently acquired from the Qing government, 
the tsarist government felt that it had to make absolutely sure that no foreign power would 
establish a stronghold on Sakhalin.22 In effect this was the same tactic that had been employed 
by Birilev in Tsushima several years before. They both asserted that Russia and Japan had a 
shared interest in denying Western (which, for Stremoukhov, excluded Russian) vessels 
access to the strategic chokepoints in the region. Koide argued that Japan would never allow 
any third-party to occupy Sakhalin, but Stremoukhov replied that some country could always 
pick a fight and force Japan to grant such a privilege. Stremoukhov persuaded Koide by 
saying that leaving the territorial status vague and extending Russian influence was a security 
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22 DAJP, KCKJ vol.1, the second meeting of Koide and Stremoukhov, 6 February 1867.  
 97 
guarantee that Russia could offer to Japan: ‘For instance, Hong Kong would not have been a 
British territory if there was mixed inhabitancy with the Russians’. Koide was not impressed. 
‘So you are planning on taking Karafuto [Sakhalin] just like Hong Kong for the British, and 
then proceeding to Ezo later on’. Stremoukhov said he was ‘truly surprised’ to hear that and 
denied any such intention.23  
According to the account that Koide submitted to the Meiji government in 1869, 
during the negotiations Stremoukhov named Britain and France as the countries potentially 
interested in interfering in Sakhalin.24 Stremoukhov repeated the same argument four years 
later to Andrew Buchanan, the British ambassador to Russia, except this time he avoided 
naming Britain. He said ‘American or any other foreign’ establishments in Sakhalin facing 
the mouth of the Amur would be ‘a serious political evil and a source of embarrassment, if 
not danger, in time of war’.25 One could observe here the painful lesson that Russia had learnt 
from the Crimean War that Petropavlovsk and its other possessions in the Pacific were 
indefensible against hostile Western fleets.26 Also apparent is the parallel between Sakhalin 
and the aborted attempt at occupying Tsushima in 1861, when Birilev made the same 
argument about British or French designs on the island. The two-month-long negotiations 
showed that the two parties saw the border question in Sakhalin completely differently. 
Russia’s reasons for insisting on owning the entire island originated in geopolitical 
calculations in which Japan was not its main source of concern. Instead his priority was to 
prevent Western states from acquiring territory in Sakhalin. 
At the broader level Russia’s apprehension of Britain getting in the way reflected its 
strategic refocusing on the Far East instead of the North Pacific. St. Petersburg no longer saw 
much commercial value in the possession of its Pacific territory, having decimated the 
animals whose skins had once provided lucrative business. This loss of interest in the Pacific 
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ultimately led them to the sale of Russian America.27 Although by this time the Russian 
policymakers understood that the Amur River was not easily navigable due to its shallowness 
and the cold climate that froze the river for around six months, Sakhalin remained 
strategically vital as long as the Maritime Region and potentially Manchuria and Korea were 
within the scope of their imperial aspirations.28 Stremoukhov’s line of argument was based on 
these economic and strategic merits, and the offer of Urup and other privileges was a 
demonstration of his willingness to make a deal with Japan. It also shows that Stremoukhov 
did not regard the presence of the Japanese people in Sakhalin in itself as threatening to 
Russia’s interests. 
Koide saw none of this large picture. Here his approach was less liberal than the 
shogunate officials who dealt with the Posadnik six years previously. Instead of seeking a 
balance of favour, Koide focused on keeping the Russians as far away as possible from the 
mainland – precisely in line with the image of the Tokugawa diplomacy presented by Auslin. 
It was only natural for him to assume that any Russian action in Sakhalin signalled its design 
towards Japan. At this point there is no indication that Parkes in Edo had discussed the 
Sakhalin question in detail with the Japanese, which might have given the Japanese a fuller 
picture. Koide’s goal therefore was to keep the Russians as far away as possible from the 
Japanese community in the southern part of Sakhalin, so as to avoid conflicts that might 
escalate into a full war between the two nations. Having received the instruction to draw a 
border at the 50th parallel, Stremoukhov’s offer of a territorial swap and granting of fishing 
rights did not meet his needs. Back in Japan, the anti-Tokugawa factions had been criticising 
the shogunate for its inability to face up to the pressure from the Western powers. If these 
people learnt that the Tokugawa had cut a deal with Russia to retreat from Sakhalin, they 
would be aggravated even further and intensify their offensive against the shogunate. Thus 
Koide explained:  
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[Had he given up the entire island to Russia] it would be as though Japan had no 
power to defend itself from other countries’ invasion because it was so weak…. If I 
had to report this [failure to draw a border on the island] it would raise the anger of 
the nation and it is hard to see what will follow. This is an enormous difficulty for the 
country.29 
 
Therefore Koide was faced with the impossible task of persuading Stremoukhov to set a 
border on the island without offering anything in return. This forced him to rely on moral 
arguments, as he proclaimed that ‘drawing a border is not about discussing merits and 
demerits, it is about drawing the border at the place where it should be drawn’.30 He asserted 
that Russia’s refusal to draw a border at the 50th parallel was ‘not amicable’.31 According to 
what he perceived as right, Russia should show its magnanimity by agreeing to Japan’s 
proposal. That, Koide argued, was the way to show courteous feelings towards a friendly 
nation. Unsurprisingly, this did not work for Stremoukhov. He asserted that Russia was 
showing its friendship by offering compensation for Japan’s claim to southern Sakhalin, for if 
Russia had not wanted good relations it would have rejected any Japanese claim on the island 
from the beginning.32 Being far removed from the tensions and antagonism against foreigners 
in Japan, Stremoukhov did not fully understand Koide’s precarious position, nor probably 
would it have mattered to him had he known.  
The two sides talked and talked past each other. As Stremoukhov hinted he would 
end the negotiations, Koide’s statements grew more desperate. He said it was unfriendly of 
the Russians not to agree on drawing a border on the island despite the fact that his delegation 
had travelled all the way to Russia.33 As the negotiations increasingly appeared to be heading 
towards failure, on 16 March 1867, during the tenth round of talks, Stremoukhov presented a 
draft of the temporary regulations documenting the Russian proposal of seceding Urup Island 
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and three adjacent islets as compensation for the Japanese claim on southern Sakhalin. As the 
two parties failed to reach an agreement, the draft went on, ‘the island of Sakhalin is left as 
before in common possession’. The agreement allowed both countries to settle in and use any 
unoccupied part of the island, and employ the indigenous people, even as indentured 
labourers if they were willing.34 On 30 March, Koide had no choice but to sign the document 
that registered his failure. He regretted two years later the course of action that he had had to 
take as he explained the details of the negotiations to the Meiji government.35 The signing of 
the temporary regulations revealed that Russia was trying to squeeze Japan out not because 
the Japanese presence itself was a threat, but due to the possibility that the weakness of Japan 
might be exploited by a third party. The Tokugawa officials did not seem to have fully 
understood this, and even if they had, the shogunate’s approach of keeping away Russian 
encroachment by drawing a border on Sakhalin precluded the possibility of accepting the 
latter’s proposed compensation. As the shogunate lost its political grip in mainland Japan in 
the mid-1860s, its ability to carry out liberal measures in regard to boundary negotiations also 
dwindled.  
For those who had already held the belief that Russia had every intention to invade 
Ezo (Hokkaido), which was most of the Japanese at the time, the temporary regulations were 
a disgrace for Japan; the result only reinforced the historically held image that Russia and 
Japan were competing headlong over territorial delimitation unless Japan took decisive action 
there. Such a view of Russia partly contributed to the attention paid to the northern border 
immediately after the Meiji government’s inauguration, but also invited Russia’s action in 
Sakhalin beyond the establishment of its military post.  
 
 
The Japanese feelers for selling Hokkaido 
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Even though it was widely talked about, Russia never got close to occupying 
Hokkaido, and no evidence suggests that it was the government’s official intention. Instead it 
was Prussia that came closer to possessing territory in Hokkaido, through the work of two 
men: Max von Brandt, the Prussian consul general and later minister to Japan; and Reinhold 
Gaertner, an agriculturalist. During the Boshin War of 1868-9, the fluid status of Ezo 
presented opportunities for these Prussians to seek possession of part of the island through 
diplomatic as well as commercial means.  
In 1860 von Brandt first came to Japan as part of the Prussian state mission that 
concluded the country’s first treaty with Japan and opened diplomatic relations. Two years 
later von Brandt returned to Edo to serve as the first consul general for Prussia. Reinhold 
Gaertner and his two younger brothers, Conrad and Otto, all came to Hakodate between 1864 
and 1870. Reinhold worked on a farm on land leased from the shogunate in Hakodate. Conrad 
served as a Prussian consul in Hakodate, while Otto joined Reinhold’s farm in 1870.  
The first contact between the Gaertners and von Brandt seems to have been in 1865 
when the latter visited the island. He came back in the summer of 1867 and travelled around 
the island on horseback with Reinhold. Ezo struck von Brandt as a good place for German 
agricultural immigrants with its climate similar to northern Europe, the land suitable for 
agriculture and raising livestock, and the local population of the Ainu and the Japanese 
presenting hardly any problem for potential newcomers from Europe. 36  When he was 
temporarily back in Berlin in February 1867 he proposed to the Prussian government that it 
should colonise Ezo, which he claimed was possible with ‘eight corvettes, several men of war, 
and 5,000 marines’. However the Naval Ministry rebuffed the idea on the grounds that it 
could not risk antagonising Russia, an important ally in European diplomacy at the time. Here 
again one can observe multilateral relations at play in Japan’s border zones.    
Von Brandt resumed the lobbying for his project when the Tokugawa shogunate fell 
in Edo and a civil war ensued in northeastern Japan. On 31 July 1868 he proposed to Otto van 
                                                           
36 Andreas Baumann, ‘Nihon kokudo ga nerawareru (dai ichi bu): Chūnichi ryoji Buranto no Ezochi 
(Hokkado) shokuminchika no gairyaku to soreni kakawatta Gerutona kyodai no shutsuji’, Kokusai 
Kankei Kenkyū 32:1 (2011), 83. 
 102 
Bismarck, the chancellor, that Prussia should purchase territory in Ezo from two Japanese 
domains that had contacted him. According to his claim, the Aizu and Shōnai domains, which 
were fighting against the emperor’s forces led by Satsuma and Chōshū, had come to von 
Brandt with an offer to sell the share of territory in Ezo that the shogunate had entrusted to 
them in exchange for cash and ammunition. The two domains were in desperate need of quick 
cash, and the territory in Ezo was the easiest asset with which to part. For these domains, 
possessing a fiefdom in Ezo was a liability rather than an asset, because they had to station 
troops for its defence while no immediate financial gains were expected. Already in the 
previous summer Shōnai had requested to the shogunate that it be discharged from the 
defence of Ezo, citing ‘exhaustion within the domain’.37  
With this renewed prospect for colonising Ezo coming from the Japanese side, von 
Brandt pushed the Prussian government to accept the offer. One month after his first message 
on the subject he prodded the home government with a report that Thomas Glover, a Scottish 
merchant in Nagasaki, had sold his interests in the Ryukyu Islands to the British government 
(which was false). He also claimed that the Americans were on their way to purchase land for 
a naval base in Nagasaki (another false statement). It is highly probable that von Brandt 
exaggerated the rumours he heard in order to sway Berlin’s opinion to his favour. He made it 
look as though the principle of neutrality to which the foreign powers had agreed at the 
outbreak of the civil war in Japan – i.e. the balance of favour that halted Western intrusion 
into Japan – no longer existed. If a scramble for Japan was indeed taking place, then one 
should be acting before others. In Berlin, Bismarck dismissed the first proposal by von Brandt 
on the ground of neutrality, but he changed his mind upon receiving the second letter 
describing the British and American moves around Japan. On 29 October Bismarck thus 
authorised von Brandt to negotiate with the Aizu and Shōnai domains about purchasing their 
territory in Ezo. However just a week later, on 6 November, Aizu surrendered to the 
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emperor’s troops and Shōnai fell the next day.38 Their demise was reported to the foreign 
representatives in Yokohama by the new imperial government on 16 November. Ernest Satow, 
the secretary for the British legation who attended that meeting, noticed that upon hearing the 
news ‘some of the faces of foreign representatives went pale’.39 There is little doubt that these 
pale faces included von Brandt, considering that at this point he had been waiting for Berlin’s 
reply to his proposal. By the time Bismarck’s green light reached von Brandt at the end of 
1868 or the beginning of 1869, there was no Aizu or Shōnai with which to negotiate. 
Meanwhile in Hakodate, Reinhold Gaertner had been building up his farm under the 
permission of the shogunate’s authority. In the spring of 1867 he rented forty acres of farm 
and became the shogunate’s agricultural adviser. However, the volatile political balance of 
the time meant that in the next two years Reinhold had to re-negotiate the land lease three 
times, keeping pace with the changes of government in Hakodate. When the Boshin War 
began and the imperial forces took over Hakodate in June 1868, he managed to continue his 
job under the imperial government. Inoue Iwami, who hired Reinhold, was noted in Ernest 
Satow’s memoirs as being ‘full of schemes for its [Ezo’s] colonisation for Japan, and for the 
introduction of the European system of farming under the supervision of a German named 
Gaertner’.40 In the winter of that year, however, Hakodate was again taken over by the pro-
Tokugawa forces led by Enomoto Takeaki which had fled the losing battle in the mainland. 
Reinhold demanded Enomoto’s government implement the contract he had concluded several 
months ago. With its empty purse Enomoto’s government signed on 31 March 1869 a ninety-
nine-year lease of land of about ten square kilometres – a massive expansion from Gaertner’s 
previous land lease. 
It should be noted that the overture to von Brandt and Gaertner’s ninety-nine-year 
lease does not mean that the Japanese attitude towards the northern border had changed; it 
simply indicated that because of domestic politics some people opted to seek short-term 
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gains. It does imply, however, that the Japanese around the time of the Meiji Restoration did 
not regard territorial possession as sacrosanct or inherently unchangeable. It was an asset just 
like mineral resources or commercial privileges which, if they so wished, could be bartered 
for non-territorial advantages. 
How did Russia, observing from Hakodate and in the Russian Far East, respond to the 
outbreak of the civil war? If indeed Russia was trying to impress upon the Japanese that its 
interests were opposed to that of Britain, the civil war in Japan should have presented Eugene 
Butzow, the Russian consul in Hakodate, with a good opportunity to make the pro-Tokugawa 
elements rely on Russian support. Furthermore, the proclamation by Enomoto in late 1868 to 
establish an alternative government in Hakodate could have been a perfect puppet 
government that Russia could use in competing against British influence in Japan and East 
Asia.  
 The records during this tumultuous period are not best preserved and it is difficult to 
reconstruct the actions of pro-shogunate domains such as Aizu and Shōnai. There is some 
indication that Butzow supported the pro-Tokugawa domains. On 31 May 1868, Butzow 
invited Sugiura Baitan, the shogunate’s Hakodate magistrate, to the Russian consulate. 
Butzow asked if there was any way not to give up Hakodate to the imperial forces, but 
Sugiura told that the shogun already had declared he would obey the emperor.41 Sugiura later 
noted that Butzow offered to provide Russian soldiers for the shogunate but he declined.42 On 
another occasion Butzow worked with Reinhold on a legal case concerned with the sale of a 
vessel owned by Shōnai to a Prussian merchant in Niigata, a port whose control was in 
dispute. Eusden suspected that Butzow was assisting Gaertner in drafting letters to the 
imperial government’s court in Hakodate,43 since he was ‘most bitter against the Southern 
Party, and laughs at the idea of the importance of their being in possession of Neegata.’44  
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Butzow, however, never went out of his way to defy neutrality and support the 
continuation of the civil war. As far as the surviving sources go, there is no evidence of close 
cooperation between the rebel government of Enomoto and Butzow. All that Butzow did to 
support Eonmoto was to visit his fleet in Hakodate on 18 December 1868 together with his 
American and Prussian colleagues.45 The lack of overt support for the shogunate raises 
questions as to Russia’s intentions in Hokkaido. At the very least it could be argued that 
Russia’s policy in Hokkaido was to strike a balance between advancing its interests and 
aligning itself with the other foreign representatives.  
 
 
The Meiji government’s fear 
 
Enomoto’s rebel government in Hakodate was short-lived. Having united Kyushu, 
Shikoku, and Honshū by November 1868, the troops of the new government mounted a 
decisive attack on Hakodate in May 1869 and defeated Enomoto, who surrendered himself. 
Reinhold Gaertner yet again signed a new lease with the arriving Meiji authorities on 24 July 
which gave him the right to develop the previously held land free of tax for ten years. The end 
date for the contract was not specified.46 When the dust settled, the foreign ministry saw 
Gaertner’s concession as ‘extremely inconvenient’ and tried to cancel the deal. The biggest 
concern was whether the Gaertner contract could tip the balance and invite other countries to 
demand similar privileges. The foreign ministry therefore wrote to the Kaitakushi, the newly 
created department of the government in charge of developing Hokkaido:47 
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In the treaties with various countries it is written that if a privilege is given to one 
country it should be given to the other countries as well; could we refuse if each 
country asks for a lease of such an extensive land as previously referred to? We have 
a not minor concern for a country like Russia and therefore want to know if we can 
refuse this [contract with Gaertner].48  
 
Kaitakushi contacted Reinhold in order to cancel the deal. The government officials 
explained: ‘if we lend your country a piece of land we cannot help but lending to other 
countries when they ask for it’.49 They claimed that they could terminate the contract, 
referring to one of the articles in the contract stating that ‘Should the Japanese government 
require to have the above mentioned ground back again, the government must pay all the 
expenses caused on the original ground’.50 Reinhold was not amused by this request. He told 
the government officials that inviting foreigners to develop and farm in Ezo would only serve 
the Japanese, considering the massive amount of land available. He had already invested in 
seeds and equipment and was getting some results. He had also hired several Prussian 
families, including his youngest brother Otto, to work on his farm and they were on their way 
to Hakodate when the Meiji government contacted him about cancellation. The issue was 
raised with von Brandt in Tokyo as well. Understandably, von Brandt refused to mediate 
between Reinhold and Kaitakushi by emphasising the merits of Western agriculture in 
Hokkaido.51 After some squabbling Reinhold demanded 75,000 dollars as compensation, 
while the Meiji government had reckoned 20,000 at most.52 The two sides eventually settled 
on 62,500 dollars and the Gaertner brothers went back to Germany.53 
 Two observations can be made here. Firstly, despite the lack of Butzow’s overt 
support for an alternative government in Hokkaido, the Meiji government still believed that 
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Russia was a source of concern for Japan’s security in the north. Secondly, the officials of the 
imperial government took the view that the MFN clause in the treaties that they had inherited 
from the shogunate could bring about a disastrous outcome. Just like Tsushima in 1861, 
Gaertner’s farm in 1869 was perceived as the first domino bloc that could affect the survival 
of the state. They were particularly concerned about what Russia might do. As seen below, at 
least until 1871 the Meiji government maintained the assumption that Russia would thrust 
into Hokkaido if it saw a chance.  
 
 
Anglo-Japanese response in Hokkaido 
 
The British in the Far East perceived Russia’s increasing activity in Sakhalin and the 
Maritime Region with suspicion, as it seemed to vindicate the rumoured Russian desire to 
possess Ezo, which had persisted in observers’ minds since the Tsushima incident. At the 
beginning of 1868, when the Japanese archipelago was engulfed in revolutionary war, Parkes 
feared Russia might exploit this opportunity in the north of Japan. Although he had received 
information on the Russian settlements in the Maritime Region and Sakhalin from the navy 
officers who had visited these places most recently in 1865 and 1866, he had no up-to-date 
knowledge of the Russian military presence there and what it was intended for.54  
 The fear of Russian encroachment was shared by the new Japanese rulers, who began 
reinvigorating their rule on Sakhalin as soon as they took over the country. In the summer of 
1868, Okamoto Kansuke, who had first drawn his government’s attention to Sakhalin, led 
some eighty officers and 200 migrants and replaced the shogunate’s officials in Sakhalin. 
Okamoto initially refused to recognise the 1867 temporary regulations in his conversations 
with his Russian counterpart.55 Ironically Okamoto’s attempt to recover from the diplomatic 
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retreat made by Koide in the previous year seems to have caused the Russians in Nikolaevsk 
to think that military posts were not enough to sustain their position in Sakhalin.56 On 19 
September 1868, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Mikhail Korsakov, told St. 
Petersburg that ‘the existence of military posts alone is insufficient for the achievement of our 
goal. Political and economic considerations demand the urgent founding of a settled 
agricultural population on the island.’57  
 The typical Japanese view on Ezo was that Russia was ‘drooling’ over it and Japan 
needed to act quickly in order to secure its possession.58 It was little different from the 
bakumatsu period when the shogunate had appointed domains in northeastern Japan to take 
charge of the defence of the island.59 The sense of urgency only increased after the Meiji 
Restoration and led to the creation of Kaitakushi, which took charge of the development of 
Ezo and Sakhalin, on 15 August 1869. At this point the Japanese policymakers saw Sakhalin 
and Ezo as a single geographical space in which their rule had to be reinforced in competition 
with Russia.  
In February 1868 Parkes asked the British China squadron to send a ship to Hakodate 
to prepare for a possible Russian movement. HMS Icarus was dispatched, but it did not 
observe anything unusual. Eusden assured Parkes that the port was ‘in a perfect state of 
security and safety’, and he did not ‘think there was any fear of danger’.60 Eusden sent the 
Icarus back to Yokohama on 16 April.61  On the other hand Admiral Henry Keppel, 
commander-in-chief of Britain’s China squadron, was in a much better place to gather first-
hand information as his ship travelled along the coast of the Russian Far East in August 1868. 
During his visits to several ports in the area, he heard a rumour that Russia had sent a garrison 
to Kunashiri Island, a Japanese territory off the eastern coast of Hokkaido.62 As soon as he 
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came back to Yokohama in early September, Keppel sent HMS Rattler to check on 
Kunashiri.63 Parkes decided to dispatch Francis Adams, the secretary of the legation, and 
Ernest Satow, an interpreter in Japanese, on the ship.64  
Given that Satow was by far the best Japanese speaker among the British corps, 
sending him away for a few weeks amid the great political turmoil in mainland Japan attests 
to the importance Parkes attached to this northern mission. It was also decided that the Rattler 
would cooperate with French navy’s vessel, the Duplex, in carrying out the mission. Parkes 
wrote to London that he had sent Adams because he ‘wanted a head at Hakodate…. Mr 
Eusden is a very amicable man but his despatches show that he is not a man of great power, 
and combined operations with the French require such delicate handling that I felt the need of 
other assistance.’65 Parkes forwarded the report from Keppel to the officials of the emerging 
Meiji government, who had not heard the rumour.66 The Meiji government sent Inoue 
Nagaoki on the Rattler. Inoue had been assigned to the Hakodate office of the Meiji 
government but had still been in Yokohama.67  
 Gordon Daniels has described Parkes’s response to the Russian troops in the north in 
the first years of the Meiji government as ‘practical and well-tempered’ because ‘[h]e advised 
the [Japanese] Government to do nothing which might provoke the Russians and suggested 
that Ministers should concern themselves with strengthening Hokkaido’.68 Nevertheless, 
before his recommendation that Japan should give up Sakhalin, his initial response in 1868 
was frantic. Reading the reports to the Admiralty by Keppel and others who visited the 
Russian Far East including Sakhalin up to 1868, it was the unanimous opinion of the British 
officers in the Far East that Russia intended to take Hokkaido if an opportunity presented 
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itself.69 Given that Britain was in no position to face Russia militarily in the region, Parkes 
and Keppel sought to deal with the situation by minimising the chance of Russia’s taking 
unilateral action in Hokkaido. They thought this could be achieved by opening another port in 
Hokkaido near the Russian troops’ stations in the north of Japan. Thus Parkes ordered Adams 
to see if they could open the port of Shibetsu, which he probably knew nothing about, on the 
opposite coast to Kunashiri, while Keppel told Henry Stephenson, the captain of the Rattler, 
to gauge the possibility of opening a port in northern Hokkaido. Any attempt to open a port, 
which was most obscure even to the Japanese, could only have been a political move. Still, if 
accomplished, Keppel and Parkes thought it ‘would go far to neutralize Russian designs on 
the island’.70 Parkes further told the leaders of the emerging Meiji government that they 
should open the port of Sōya in the north for this purpose. Sharing his fear of Russia’s action 
in Hokkaido, the key officials in the Meiji government were keen on taking Britain’s advice. 
On 28 September, Kido Takayoshi, one of the councillors (san’yo) who collectively ran the 
Meiji government, wrote in his diary: ‘we plan… to open a port to the treaty powers on the 
edge of Ezo; and to dispatch persons there to carry out our policy of securing the borders of 
the land’.71  
This attempt to incorporate northern Japan further into the treaty-port system was a 
typically British response for maintaining its strategic interests in a region where it could not 
make a military commitment against a rival country. It is exactly the same idea as the one 
suggested by Alcock in the London Protocol of 1862 about Tsushima. When preventive 
occupation – which was the Russian approach – was impossible, opening a port for trade and 
neutralising the area was deemed to be the most cost-effective tactic. However, in reality this 
could not be achieved without merchants getting drawn to the region. 
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 This strategy of geopolitical counterbalancing came to an abrupt end with the running 
aground of the Rattler on the cape of Sōya before it could reach Kunashiri.72 But the French 
ship Duplex, which rescued the stranded crew of the Rattler and brought them back to 
Hakodate, confirmed that there were no Russians in Kunashiri.73 Therefore the rumour of a 
Russian invasion of Japanese territory turned out to be incorrect, yet the British continued to 
feel the necessity to preempt Russian adventurism. Until the early 1870s the British officers 
in the Far East continued to firmly believe that Russia’s aim was to expand southwards from 
Sakhalin to Hokkaido and take Hakodate. The communications to London from the British 
representative in Tokyo reflected this view and portrayed the Japanese migration to Hokkaido 
in this light. In the summer of 1872 the British Chargé d’affaires, Robert Watson, went to 
Hakodate and observed that the Japanese migration was ‘perhaps not uncalled for with a view 
to prevent the possibility of any Russian or other settlement being established on some part of 
the island’. He feared that if Russia occupied Hakodate it would be ‘a formidable menace’ to 
the British possession in the Pacific.74 
 Watson and others’ apprehension was not sufficient to persuade London, however. 
Whether or not there was an imminent Russian threat, by the end of the 1860s there was no 
chance that London would endorse any substantial British action on the Sakhalin question. 
Parliament and the British general public had been deeply critical of the aggressiveness of the 
British navy in Japan after the bombing of Kagoshima in the summer of 1863, in contrast to 
the post-facto approval given by the Foreign Office.75 Also in 1869 the newly appointed first 
lord of the admiralty Hugh Childers embarked on reforms in order to cut down on the navy’s 
‘excrescences and redundancies’.76 Nor was there any commercial viability in opening 
another treaty port in Hokkaido. It would be hard to get to because of the constant fog and 
rough sea, and no market of any significance existed in the island or nearby. Even 
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commercial activity in Hakodate, which centred around the export of seafood such as kelp to 
China, was anything but thriving. In 1867 Hakodate accounted for just 2.5 percent of Japan’s 
foreign trade.77  
 From the China station’s viewpoint, too, the project of defending northern Japan 
against Russia was a difficult one to implement. The fleet was already stretched from the 
Strait of Malacca to the coast of China, where more pressing issues such as piracy and the 
aftershocks of the Taiping Rebellion in China required the attention of the fleet. When in 
December 1872 Admiral Henry Kellett, who had replaced Keppel as commander-in-chief of 
the China station, requested a replacement of vessels, the new ships were not intended for 
stationing around Japan but for Malacca and watching and intercepting the coolie trade in the 
Pacific.78 The idea of creating a new treaty port and thereby deterring Russia’s advance to 
Hokkaido may have made abstract strategic sense, but it was never viable in practice. 
 Thus the news that Russia had started to emulate the Japanese effort in developing 
southern Sakhalin presented Parkes with difficulty in the summer of 1869. An account from 
Captain Wilson, a British national who had transported Russian soldiers from Nikolaevsk to 
Sakhalin which reached Eusden in Hakodate, shocked Parkes. On 1 August Russia opened a 
military post in Hakkotomari on the southern coast of Sakhalin and named it Korsakov post. 
This new military post sat just several hundred metres away from the Japanese commune of 
Kushunkotan, separated by a hill. The Japanese officials in Kushunkotan complained that the 
Russians had forcefully taken over land used as an Ainu graveyard, ignoring Japanese and 
Ainu complaints.79 The action struck Parkes as proof of Russia’s aggressiveness in the region, 
rather than as insecurity aroused by the arrival of the Japanese immigrants.  
 If Britain were to counter Russia’s move, the only option for Parkes was to encourage 
and support the Japanese control of Hokkaido. He therefore met with the Japanese leaders on 
the subject five times in the space of two weeks in September 1869. Again his initial response 
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was more fraught than well-tempered. On 9 September he urged Japan to send troops and 
install arsenals on the northern coast of Hokkaido. He also pointed out that Russia’s 
connection of the Amur region with St. Petersburg by the telegraph network indicated its 
preparation for ‘unexpected events’, and thus Japan should draw a telegraph line from Tokyo 
to the northern edge of Hokkaido, too. Japan should also inform the treaty powers if there was 
another clash with Russia, as ‘it will not fall on the deaf ears of the ministers (kōshi wa 
kikizute niha itasanu hazunari)’, Parkes assured Iwakura Tomomi, a court noble and one of 
the key figures in the leadership.80 This would have encouraged Iwakura, who had devised a 
plan to send migrants to Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Iwakura’s plan was to relocate from 
Hakodate the former soldiers who had surrendered in the Restoration War to the new 
government in the spring of 1869. This would save the government the cost of sending 
reinforcements from the mainland, as well as the cost of shipping the defeated soldiers back 
to their original domains. Iwakura and Ōkubo Toshimichi planned to send 500 of them to 
Sakhalin, with another 500 in Nemuro, on the eastern coast facing Kunashiri, and 300 to Sōya 
on the northern tip. They also decided to send 200 ‘Tokyo poor’, vagrants from the war-torn 
capital, to Sakhalin.81  
 The vast majority of the officers, if not all, in the early years of the Meiji Restoration 
assumed that Russia’s ultimate aim was Hokkaido, which led to the government’s quick 
responses to strengthen its position on the island. The first package was to give it the official 
name, Hokkaido, to divide it into eleven ‘countries’, and to designate various domains, court 
nobles, temples and individual samurai to take charge of defending it, all of which was done 
in late 1869.82 Parkes supported the development of Hokkaido as well as Sakhalin. But after 
learning that the Japanese were far outnumbered and outgunned in southern Sakhalin from the 
report by Caption Wilson, he changed his tone and recommended a more moderate approach. 
Due to the imminent expansion of Russia’s military force in Sakhalin, as the report suggested, 
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up to 1,200 men, there was no chance that the Japanese could match that, nor should they try. 
Besides, in the British perception, this many soldiers concentrating on Sakhalin could not 
possibly be there only for the defence of the island. On 14 September Parkes recommended to 
the Japanese not to send troops to Sakhalin.83 Parkes was convinced that Russia had a plan to 
invade Hokkaido, as Wilson’s report told him that ‘it is general talk at Nicolaevsk that the 
Russians will very shortly be in the possession of the island of Yesso’.84 Wilson was told by a 
Russian officer that ‘if the Japanese made a war… then the Russians would take Yesso, as 
they required Hakodate for a harbour’.85 Parkes suggested to Keppel that Britain should send 
a vessel to Sakhalin to collect information.86 Keppel, who already held the opinion in 1868 
that Russia wanted to obtain a port in Hokkaido or Korea, concurred. Now that this possibility 
was imminent, Keppel asked for the Admiralty’s instruction to deal with ‘the various 
contingencies that may result from Russian aggression on Japan’.87 
 Sharing the belief that Russia wanted to take Hokkaido, the Meiji government kept in 
close communication with Parkes on the subject. On 18 September 1869, Iwakura explained 
to Parkes the revised plan was to send migrants and to develop those places ‘on the principle 
of sheer tranquillity’. He ruled out sending troops to Sakhalin. With regards to Hokkaido, he 
now intended to send troops to Sōya and Nemuro, and family migrants to the city of Ishikari 
in the southwest. Parkes approved and said he would be ‘completely satisfied’ if they could 
accomplish all of it within the year. He impressed upon Iwakura that this plan should remain 
unchanged and be executed immediately. ‘He looked very much worried about this issue’, 
Iwakura wrote to his colleague Ōkubo after the meeting.88 Parkes was no doubt highly 
alarmed, as he reported to London that the Japanese plan of sending troops to northern 
Hokkaido but not to Sakhalin, where they would only strengthen the presence ‘in an industrial 
sense’. It was ‘natural that the Japanese government should view with apprehension the 
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collection of so large a force at a point separated only by a narrow strait from their own 
territory.’ The Japanese, Parkes further noted, ‘will remonstrate with the Russians against the 
aggression which they believe the latter committed… but they are equally resolved to avoid 
collision and not to afford the Russians a pretext for attacking Yezo’.89 This latter comment 
was Parkes’s own policy as well. All told, even though Parkes was apprehensive that Japan’s 
sending troops even to Hokkaido was going to increase tensions, this was necessary for its 
defence.  
It appears that Parkes never thought Russia’s move could have had a defensive 
reason. Reporting to London that ‘it is difficult to see what interest the Russians have yet 
formed in Saghalin that can require the protection of even six hundred men’, he did not think 
of the possibility that these soldiers were intended to protect the Russian Far East against his 
own empire.90 The news that Russia had established a penal colony in Sakhalin reached him 
not before the end of 1869, through a dispatch from Buchanan in St. Petersburg forwarded by 
London.91 In any case, the British government in London had already decided by early 1870 
that Sakhalin should go to the Russians. In St. Petersburg, where Stremoukhov suspected that 
the British were helping the Japanese to resist Russia in Sakhalin, Buchanan assured the 
Russians that ‘this information was entirely erroneous, and that on the contrary, the Japanese 
had been advised to consider favourably any reasonable and fair offer, which might be made 
to them for the cession to Russia of their portion of the island’.92 
Concurrently with the dispatch of migrants and troops to the north, the Meiji 
government sought a diplomatic solution vis-à-vis Russia with the help of the United States. 
Historians who have written about the history of Sakhalin in this period have taken only a 
brief note of the fact that the United States attempted to work as a mediator between Japan 
and Russia at the turn of the decade. Even though it did not materialise into any agreement, 
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the involvement of Charles DeLong, American minister to Japan, sheds light on the broader 
international relations of the North Pacific and tells us that Russia’s Sakhalin policy did not 
exist in isolation from Russo-American relations.  
In December 1869 in Tokyo, DeLong informed the Japanese foreign ministry that the 
United States was ready to mediate Japan’s border dispute with Russia, ‘with a view of 
promoting peace and goodwill – and the interest of Japan’. DeLong had obtained information 
that Japan was responding to the recent fortification by Russia of the southern coast of 
Sakhalin by preparing ‘hostile proceedings’, which probably referred to the plan for installing 
cannons at Sōya that Iwakura and Parkes had discussed in September.93 DeLong’s offer was 
at least partly motivated by the fact that American fishing vessels operated in the northern rim 
of the Pacific, and St. Petersburg had made complaints about these vessels exploring their 
waters.94 He therefore wanted to clarify where the northern border of Japan lay.95 
This, no doubt, sounded like a blessing to the Japanese leaders including Ōkubo 
Toshimichi, one of the councillors, who around that time described to Iwakura the question of 
Sakhalin as ‘today’s immense fear…. To say that dining and sleeping cannot be done at ease 
does not begin to describe it’.96 Now that direct negotiations with Russia had proved futile, 
asking for a third party’s mediation was the only course if Japan were to retain any territory 
on Sakhalin. The Meiji government hoped that the US might be able to play Britain’s role in 
Tsushima in 1861. On 4 March 1870, three senior officials – Itō Hirobumi, Ōkuma Shigenobu 
and Terashima Munenori – met with DeLong and asked for his opinion on the possible 
measures to be taken. Following the failure in St. Petersburg two years previously, ‘we are at 
a loss’, they told him.97 DeLong replied that Japan should quickly end the state of dual 
possession under the 1867 temporary regulations. He asked the Japanese to prepare a letter 
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addressed to Washington and guaranteed that the American minister in St. Petersburg would 
then approach the Russian government on account of the fact that Japan had no permanent 
representative stationed there.98  
Eleven days later the Meiji government sent a draft letter requesting mediation to 
DeLong. They also took a leaf out of Parkes’s book and proposed to open a treaty port in 
Kushunkotan.99 The Japanese government held high hopes that this could provide a way out 
of the stalemate. There is some indication that Parkes complained to the Japanese officials 
responsible for the Sakhalin affairs about this approach to the Americans, but it did not stop 
them.100 In the summer of 1870 the Dajōkan, a cabinet-like higher body of the government led 
by a court noble Sanjō Sanetomi, gave an official order to the foreign ministry that it should 
‘discuss well with the Americans and send an envoy to the United States if necessary’.101 The 
Japanese diplomats began collecting evidence supporting their claim on Sakhalin.  
The United States was no Britain, however. The process of preparing an official 
request for the American president was slowed down by the personal feud between DeLong 
and his secretary, Anton Portman, who objected to American involvement in the dispute. 
Because Portman thought the Japanese diplomats were dragging DeLong into an issue that 
was ‘unripe or raw’ and the United States would only hurt itself if it agreed to mediate, he 
refused to copy the documents relating to the issue. Other American residents in Yokohama 
noticed DeLong’s resulting predicament. Thomas Walsh, a prominent American merchant in 
Yokohama, wrote to American president Ulysses Grant that DeLong ‘has, or very recently 
had, neither Secretary, clerk, interpreter nor attaché to aid him… but was obliged to do every 
part of those duties himself, even to the copying of his own despatches’.102 The animosities 
between DeLong and Portman led to the latter’s six-week-long sabotage, and Delong was 
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forced to hire a Japanese interpreter.103 The materials prepared by the Japanese to buttress 
their claim on Sakhalin were finally sent off to Washington in September.104 DeLong, who 
remained optimistic in spite of the internal mess, told Hamilton Fish, secretary of state, that 
he felt ‘convinced… that successful action… upon your part will go very far to advance 
American influence and promote American interests here’.105  
As the Meiji government and DeLong waited to hear from Washington, another 
opportunity arose for the Japanese to discuss Sakhalin with the United States. On 4 October 
1870, former secretary of state William Seward stopped at Japan on his way to a trip around 
the globe in a private capacity.106 In a conversation with him, Foreign Minister Sawa 
Nobuyoshi broached the issue of the border negotiations with Russia and asked if the United 
States could serve as a mediator. Seward sounded positive, telling Sawa that the United States 
had had an issue with Russia on illegal fishing by American vessels around the coast of the 
Russian territory in the Pacific, but had managed to settle it with the purchase of Alaska. He 
then suggested Japan do the same with Sakhalin. This commercial approach was not what 
Sawa wanted to hear. He told Seward that Japan could not buy things that were already theirs, 
and that was the end of the conversation on the topic.107 Sawa was clearly hoping that Seward 
would help persuade the Russians to agree on drawing a border at the 50th parallel.  
In Washington, on 11 November, Fish wrote to Andrew Curtin, the American 
minister to Russia, instructing him to enquire about Stremoukhov’s view on possible 
American mediation in an informal conversation before making an official offer.108 But the 
discussion did not go any further, and the reason can be found in Stremoukhov’s frustration 
with the United States with regards to the North Pacific. On 1 June 1870, Stremoukhov told 
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Buchanan the United States was ‘the last power in the world’ Russia would ask for mediation. 
This was because:  
 
the aggressive proceedings of American citizens, on the coast of the Russian 
possessions in the Pacific, had rendered it necessary to keep a naval squadron in these 
waters, to maintain police, and to protect Russian fishing stations and the 
neighbouring coasts, on which the crews of American vessels are in the habit of 
landing and wantonly destroying game and timber.109  
 
Stremoukhov told Buchanan that the United States had recently proposed a convention with 
Russia ‘by which the two powers should grant to each other a reciprocal right of fishing on 
their respective coasts in the Pacific’. This struck Stremoukhov as a ‘one-sided proposal’ and 
he ‘did not conceal his apprehension this question might lead ere long to a serious 
misunderstanding between Russia and the United States’.110 
The Japanese learnt that Russia would not accept the proposed American mediation 
from Eugene Butzow, the Russian minister to China, who stopped at Yokohama on 24 
December 1870.111 Butzow opposed the Japanese approach to the Americans and instead told 
Soejima Taneomi, foreign minister, that Japan should contact St. Petersburg directly.112 On 
the next day Japan announced to DeLong that it would no longer pursue American 
mediation.113 DeLong proved to have been overly sanguine about his government’s relations 
with Russia. Stationed in a location far removed from both the United States and Europe, 
DeLong was not best placed to keep track of the temperature between other capitals. In 
conversation with Butzow, the Japanese made a last attempt to retain southern Sakhalin by 
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telling him that it ‘should be a tip of an iceberg’ for such a large country as Russia, but 
Butzow flatly denied any chance of agreeing to divide the island.114  
 
 
Coastal survey by HMS Sylvia  
 
In retrospect, it was Britain that was committed to Japan’s rule of Hokkaido 
throughout the early years of the Meiji government, in resistance to the Russian activities. In 
March 1870 Japan offered to pay the British navy for conducting a hydrographical survey of 
the coast of Hokkaido.115 The Japanese officials were so keen on doing this quickly that they 
even offered to employ some British surveyors in Japan who were about to take leave from 
their employment in the Royal Navy.116 It was ‘principally a political question’, as the 
hydrographer’s office of the Admiralty observed, because the commercial activities around 
Hokkaido by British ships were minimal.117 HMS Sylvia, the surveying vessel of the China 
station, had been concentrating its efforts around the Inland Sea, which had had the heaviest 
traffic of foreign ships, connecting Nagasaki with Osaka. However, having completed the 
survey of the most essential part of these waters, Kellett agreed to send it to the north. In May 
1871 the ship surveyed the coast of Nemuro and Kunashiri, struggling with bad weather and 
drift ice. Having killed time around Hakodate, probably waiting for favourable weather, the 
Sylvia began a circumnavigation of Hokkaido in August, which it did in twenty-three days.118 
As the Sylvia was concluding the mission, the Admiralty in London had already decided that 
one year of digression was enough for the purpose and directed the ship to resume its 
surveying work in the Inland Sea.119  
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 Throughout this period Parkes and Kellett constantly received reports from Admiralty 
officers as well as from Buchanan in St. Petersburg that did nothing but reinforce their 
conviction that Russia was going to take Sakhalin and proceed to Hokkaido unless Japan took 
some measures to stop it. The reports told them such things as ‘the general impression formed 
by foreigners [in Sakhalin] is that the Russians will not be content till they get possession not 
only of Saghalien but also of Yezzo with the port of Hakodate’;120 or that a Russian officer in 
Busse, a coal mine on the southern coast of Sakhalin, ‘gave me to understand that in time 
Russia would possess Sakhalin… the present treaty [i.e. the 1867 temporary regulations] was 
very unsatisfactory… the strait of La Perouse made a natural boundary….’;121 ‘altogether 
from what I saw and heard, I fancy that any winter, when there is little communication with 
other ports, the Russians might pick a ground of quarrel with the Japanese, take temporary 
charge of the place, and then use that as a means of getting it ceded to them by treaty….’;122 
‘there can be little doubt… that the Russian government have decided to obtain eventually 
possession of the whole island, and… they will succeed at last in forcing the Japanese to 
accede to their wishes’.123 Even though there was an occasional acknowledgement that some 
of the Russian officers denied having any aggressive intentions towards Hokkaido,124 such 
evidence was overwhelmed by ‘the voluminous correspondence which has been referred to 
the Admiralty by the Foreign Office during the last several years - that Russia has a strong 
yearning towards Yezo and its off-lying dependencies’.125  
 
 
Conclusion  
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 The years between 1867 and 1871 were a transitional period for strategic relations in 
the northern edge of Japan, during which each party sought to steer the balance of favour to 
its liking. At the macro level, Russia made a retreat from the Pacific as a naval seafaring 
power and began concentrating on the Eurasian Far East. Because at the centre of that plan 
lay the development of the Amur River region, exclusive control of Sakhalin became its 
priority. This led to the establishment of a penal colony on the island in 1868. To the 
Japanese, these Russian moves reinforced the old fear about Russia’s southward advance 
towards Japan that they had held since the early-nineteenth century. Koide’s mission was to 
use the border settlement as a way of enhancing national security, but Russia did not agree to 
drawing a border on the island.  
 During the Boshin War the Japanese sought to sell part of Hokkaido for short-term 
gain. Such feelers demonstrate that Japan’s attitude towards border zones did not always see 
the maximisation of its territory as the highest priority. Land, like mineral resources, was a 
tradable commodity. But this attitude quickly dissipated as soon as the Meiji government 
consolidated its regime throughout the Japanese archipelago. Instead, establishing firm 
control of the border zone in the north of Japan became a foreign policy imperative for the 
purpose of maintaining the balance of favour and preventing the first domino to fall. Through 
the negotiations with Gaertner, the government realised its precarious situation: if one country 
gained a territorial concession from Japan, the others would soon demand the same. This was 
why the government spent $62,500 to buy back a piece of land from Gaertner. 
 In much the same manner as at the time of the Tsushima incident, the Meiji 
government’s first strategy towards the border question in Sakhalin was to side with the 
British and keep up with the Russian settlement while avoiding escalation. In Sakhalin, 
Russia was the country that had the largest to lose if it failed to secure the territorial control. 
If any foreign presence on the island remained, either militarily or commercially, that could 
open a path for other powers to move in. In the same way that Japan wanted Tsushima free 
from foreign hands, Russia wanted Sakhalin for itself. The Japanese briefly sought to employ 
American support, but soon went back to the partnership with Britain. The Anglo-Japanese 
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joint hydrographical survey around Hokkaido in 1871 was made possible due to the 
prevalence of the perception among the Japanese and the British that Russia aimed at 
expansion into Hokkaido. The degree of coordination marked the high point of the 
cooperation between the two countries. 
 The balance of favour that the Japanese policymakers realised up to 1871 was a 
negative one, meaning that a domino could fall and threaten the existence of Japanese 
territorial integrity. In the next few years, however, they began to understand the other side of 
the mechanism. If there existed a diplomatic and military equilibrium among the Western 
countries, Japan could defend its territorial claims without exercising military power. Neither 
Russia, nor Britain nor the United States were willing to proactively tip the balance in order 
to seek exclusive control around the Japanese archipelago. The next chapter discusses how 
the Meiji negotiators took advantage of this positive balance of favour. 
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Chapter 4 The balance restored 
 
 
 
By the beginning of the 1870s the Meiji government had exhausted its diplomatic 
options to maintain a presence in southern Sakhalin. The British, while encouraging the 
Japanese to focus on the development of Hokkaido and cooperating on such moderate 
measures as the surveying of Hokkaido’s coast, did not directly intervene to ward off the 
Russians from southern Sakhalin as they had in Tsushima in 1861. Neither did St. Petersburg 
accept the American proposal for mediation that the Meiji government had sought. Foreign 
Minister Soejima Taneomi’s attempt at negotiating with Russia in the Maritime Region in the 
summer of 1871 failed because St. Petersburg refused to send a plenipotentiary, knowing that 
it could not accept Soejima’s insistence on drawing a border on the island anyway.1  
In spite of – or perhaps because of – such diplomatic frustration, the Meiji 
government in the early 1870s pursued de-escalation between the Russians and the Japanese, 
in response to the rising level of violence in southern Sakhalin, as will be seen below. One 
could also see this as the restoration of the balance of favour in Japan’s northern edge, 
providing the conditions conducive to its adventurism in the south discussed in chapter 6. 
How did this restoration of balance come about? The crucial point in approaching this 
question is to see the agreed deal as a tacit Russo-Japanese demarcation between Sakhalin and 
Hokkaido, rather than to focus on the territorial swap between Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands 
which the treaty terms stipulated. The emergence of boundaries in the Kuriles had a different 
character from that in Sakhalin and will be dealt with in the next chapter. What was important 
for Russia, Japan, as well as Britain, was the fact that the border emerged in the Sōya (La 
Perouse) Strait. Most importantly, the decision makers in the Meiji government on the 
northern policy came to the realisation that their interests regarding Hokkaido were in fact not 
opposed to Russia’s.  
                                                           
1 Yasuoka Akio, Soejima Taneomi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012), 134-6. 
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Sakhalin-Hokkaido demarcation 
 
Many of the Japanese in Sakhalin, especially until 1868, were seasonal workers who 
would engage in fishing in Sakhalin in the summer and spend the winter in a less hostile 
climate. It was after the Meiji Restoration that it became imperative to construct more 
substantial year-round settlements in order to claim control on southern Sakhalin. That was 
why in mid-August 1868, Okamoto Kansuke, an enthusiastic official who had been put in 
charge of the Japanese settlement in Kushunkotan, adjoining Korsakov, arrived there with 
eighty officers and 200 migrants from Hakodate and dispatched officers to eight stations in 
the southern part of the island.2 However the settlers themselves found the place difficult to 
cultivate. John Will, the captain of a British ship the Khankai, who had long experience of 
sailing around northern Japan, observed the predicament of the Japanese colonists in 
Kushunkotan already in 1870. When he took several Japanese officials to Kushunkotan in the 
early summer of 1870, he also took aboard some 120 migrants from Hakodate under the 
Japanese government’s request.3 When he arrived, the beach next to the Japanese settlement 
was covered with pots buried in the sand for fermenting herring, which had caused ‘a 
malaria’. A third of the migrants transported on the Khankai ‘got sick or died’ during the 
three weeks of the ship’s stay. On the return trip Will was asked to take on board around 
eighty seriously ill Japanese migrants. ‘One dozen were able to get up with help, but more 
                                                           
2 Akizuki, Nichiro Kankei to Saharin Tō, 189. 
3 Akizuki has noted that Will wrongly recorded the year and this visit actually took place in 1868, but 
Akizuki’s interpretation does not square with other parts of Will’s text. After three weeks in 
Kushunkotan, Will returned to Hakodate, and after ‘a couple of weeks’ he was ordered to go to 
Kushunkotan again and then to Sōya in order to retrieve the goods from a wrecked HMS Rattler. The 
British consul Richard Eusden in Hakodate recorded that the Khankai arrived with the Rattler’s guns 
on 20 October 1870, and therefore Will’s visit to Kushunkotan most likely happened in 1870 too. See 
Akizuki, Nichiro Kankei to Saharin Tō, 89, 221n5; John Baxter Will, Trading under sail off Japan, 
1860-99: The recollections of Captain John Baxter Will, sailing-master & pilot, ed. George Lensen 
(Tokyo: Sophia University in cooperation with the Diplomatic Press, Tallahassee, Fla., 1968), 61-3; 
TNA FO262/192 no35. Eusden to Parkes, 3 October 1870. On the wreck of HMS Rattler, see 
Hagiwara, Edo Kaijō. 244-56. 
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than half had to be hoisted on board and lowered in the hold by tackle’.4 Eusden in Hakodate 
noticed that the Khankai came back with ‘the whole of her crew suffering from fever’.5  
The Karafuto Kaitakushi, the Meiji government’s branch responsible for the 
administration of Sakhalin, reported from Kushunkotan to the Meiji government that 130 of 
the residents were sick and lacked medicine, and eighty of them had been taken to Hakodate. 
But as the facility in Hakodate could not possibly treat all of them, it pleaded with the 
government to provide assistance.6 Three months later the government told the Tokyo 
prefecture to receive thirty-eight ill migrants who had been sent back from southern Sakhalin. 
The Tokyo office complained that they should have been settled in Hakodate, since the 
migrants had lost their registration with the city, which was already swarming with the 
homeless poor. Tokyo in the end grudgingly accepted them, noting that they would not repeat 
this in the future.7 
 Another source of difficulty for the Japanese in Sakhalin was a series of violent 
episodes and clear limitations on the rule of law. In southern Sakhalin, the tension between 
the Russians and the Japanese grew in 1873, following the relocation of Russia’s battalion to 
Korsakov in the previous year. Lawlessness and chaos was especially prevalent in Korsakov 
and the neighbouring Japanese settlement of Kushunkotan, including incidents involving 
indigenous peoples. In late March 1873 a Tungus man named Gherasim Germogenov and the 
two Yakuts, Erasen Petrov and Ivan, confined an 18-year-old Ainu woman named Kematonke 
in a hut in a mountain for five days, raped and killed her, and dumped her body into a river. 
The case was exposed when an Ainu man heard the story from a Yakut and reported it to a 
Japanese officer. Three Ainu, one of whom was the victim’s brother, and a Japanese migrant 
fisherman went to Germogenov’s house and captured him. They took Germogenov to Higashi 
Tonnai, the nearest Japanese settlement and tied him to a pillar in the settlement’s office. The 
                                                           
4 Will, Trading under sail off Japan, 62-3. 
5 TNA FO262/192 no28. Eusden to Parkes, 1 August 1870.  
6 NAJP, KO00426100. Kōbunroku Meiji San’nen. Vol.111, ‘Karafuto Kaitakushi Ukagai’. Karafuto 
Kaitakushi to Benkan, 4 August 1870.  
7 NAJP, KO00426100. Kōbunroku Meiji San’nen vol.111, ‘Karafuto Kaitakushi Ukagai’, ‘Ijūmin 
byōshin kyojaku no mono Tokyo fu he fukuseki ukagai’, Tokyo prefecture to Benkan, tenth 
(intercalary) month of Meiji 3 (1870). 
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Japanese fisherman then interrogated Germogenov, beating him several times on his back 
with a stick. He admitted that he was present at the hut but that the other two were culpable.8  
It is not clear from the sources how the other two were captured but all three were 
interrogated by a team of Japanese and Russian officers, and eventually sent off to 
Nikolaevsk to face a trial. The result of the trial is not known.9  
 The violent atmosphere peaked in April with an arson attack on Japanese warehouses 
by Russian soldiers. Drunken Russian soldiers set fire to the warehouses that stored fishing 
nets and other equipment, collectively obstructed the Japanese from trying to put out the fire 
by throwing stones at and beating them, and robbed the Japanese of their water pumps and 
put them into the fire. Nevertheless, when the news arrived in Tokyo the response was more 
measured than in 1869. Instead of escalating tensions, the Japanese foreign ministry simply 
suspended the border negotiations with Butzow that had been going on and off since his 
arrival and the two parties sent investigators. The investigators conducted interviews with 
both sides and referred the case to the governor of the Maritime Region, although it was only 
in August 1875 that the verdict was notified to the Japanese. All suspects had been acquitted 
on account of insufficient evidence.10  
The first half of 1873, when the Korea question dominated the Meiji leaders’ minds 
in Tokyo, was not a time for quick military reinforcement or escalation – not, in particular, 
for the sake of a migration project that was deemed to have little chance of success. Shortly 
after taking charge of the development of Hokkaido, it was clear to Kuroda Kiyotaka, the 
head of the Kaitakushi, that the colonisation project of southern Sakhalin had to be abandoned 
regardless of the competing Russian presence. In October 1870 Kuroda anticipated that mixed 
inhabitancy in Sakhalin would not last for more than three years.11 His trip to Sakhalin in the 
next year only reinforced his view as to intractability of the colonial problem for his 
                                                           
8 NAJP, A01100069800. Kobunroku Meiji Shichinen. Vol.234. Kaitakushi Ukagai.  
9 Akizuki, Nichiro Kankei to Saharin Tō, 218. 
10 Ibid., 210-3, 224n50. 
11 ‘Hokkaido Karafuto Kaitaku ni Kansuru Jōsō’, October 1870, in Kenseishi Hensankai Shūshū Monjo 
488 ‘Kuroda Kiyotaka Iken Shorui’, 10-21. Also see Akizuki Toshiyuki, ‘Meiji shonen no Karafuto: 
Nichiro zakkyo wo meguru shomondai’, Slav Kenkyū, no. 40 (1993): 1-21. 
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government. Akizuki has noted that after submitting a memorandum on his views in early 
1871, Kuroda began to focus on the protection of migrants and temporary workers rather than 
any further development.12  
Kuroda’s view was not widely shared within the government. Maruyama Sakura, one 
of the senior members of the Kaitakushi office in Sakhalin, firmly believed that a Japanese 
presence was a security imperative against expansionist Russia and was in favour of a 
military buildup in Sakhalin.13 He told his subordinates that nobody in the government 
supported Kuroda’s memorandum.14 Sanjō Sanetomi, the prime minister, also maintained 
doubts about negotiating a treaty with Russia until January 1874, as he feared the possible 
negative consequences in the future.15 Regardless, when in March 1874 the Kaitakushi in 
Sapporo, which had absorbed the branch in Sakhalin, called for applicants to move from 
Sakhalin to Hokkaido, almost ninety percent of the Sakhalin residents applied and left the 
island.16 The Japanese settlers were clearly in retreat before the dual possession came to an 
end. 
If indeed Russia wanted Hokkaido, the failure of the Japanese in southern Sakhlain 
should have been a welcome sign. Especially the clash between the Russian soldiers and the 
Japanese in April 1873 provided an excuse, if the conduct of Western imperialism in other 
parts of the world was any guidance, to justify a beefed-up military presence of Russian 
troops in southern Sakhalin and the occupation of parts of Hokkaido, as feared by many in 
Japan. Newspapers in the mainland Japan reported not only Russo-Japanese clashes in 
southern Sakhalin, but also the Russo-British rivalry in Central Asia as evidence of Russia's 
expansionist inclinations. For instance, a Tokyo-based newspaper informed its readers on 3 
September 1873:  
 
                                                           
12 Akizuki, ‘Meiji Shonen no Karafuto’, 7. 
13 Maruyama Masahiko, Maruyama Sakura Den (Tokyo: Chūaisha, 1899), 60-61. 
14 AH B0-69/1 Doi Toyoki Nisshi, 23 July 1870.  
15 Sanjō to Iwakura, 10 Juanuary 1874. Reprinted in Sasaki et al (eds.), Iwakura Tomomi Kankei Shiryō 
vol.1, 203-4. 
16 Akizuki, Nichiro Kankei to Saharin Tō, 220.  
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The Russian government gradually seeped into Central Asia and seems to be nearing 
British India. It has now defeated Khiva in Central Asia and subjugated its ruler. 
Although it is not known what will ensue, [Russia] will probably add that land to its 
own territory. Therefore it looks as though Britain and Russia would stand in each 
other’s way, and within several years the two countries will enter a showdown in 
Afghanistan or in India.17  
 
While the specific tactics to be employed against Russia varied, it is fair to say that one thing 
was clear to the Japanese people: ‘even a three-year-old child knows Russia is aiming at 
Hokkaido.’18  
 In reality this did not happen. The Russian response to the series of violence and 
crime in Sakhalin was to investigate them, often in collaboration with the Japanese 
counterparts. The temporary regulations adopted in 1867 had little specific guidance to this 
effect, and therefore the officers improvised the procedures as they went along. The 
investigation into the murder of a Japanese settler named Katō Motosuke was one such 
example. On 29 October 1873 the body of Katō was found under a bush on the outskirts of 
Korsakov, a few kilometers away from his house in a nearby Japanese village. The Japanese 
officers talked to the witnesses, including Motosuke’s wife. They then captured a Manchu 
man named Mikhail Spuichin who lived in a hut on the nearby coast. Spuichin had visited 
Motosuke’s house on the morning he disappeared, and so the suspicion fell on him. The 
interrogation of Spuichin took place with a surprising degree of cooperation between the 
Japanese and Russian authorities. The suspect was taken into custody by a team of Japanese 
officers and Russian soldiers and put under house arrest while awaiting interrogation in a 
Russian military barracks since the Japanese did not have any facility on the island in which 
to confine a criminal suspect. 19  Because he turned out to be a Russian subject the 
investigation was conducted by Russian officers. Justice, though, was hard to achieve, for the 
                                                           
17 Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, 3 September 1873. 
18 Nakajima Yū, untitled essay, in Sada Hakubō, ed., Karafuto Hyōron (Tokyo: Chōfun Girōbō, 1875). 
19 NAJP, KO01256100. Kōbunroku Meiji Shichinen. Vol.234. Kaitakushi Ukagai. 
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Japanese later discovered that in fact Spuichin had been sent back to Manchuria. The 
Japanese complained and he was brought back to Sakhalin for trial in the summer of 1874. 
However, the case never saw an end before the transfer of the island to Russia.20  
All told, the atmosphere in southern Sakhalin was markedly tense for the Japanese 
residents. Between 1871 and 1874 at least five Japanese were murdered in Sakhalin. With this 
grim picture emerging as to the future of Japan’s Sakhalin settlement, however, some of the 
most well-informed Japanese leaders were beginning to realise the flip side of the coin as far 
as the diplomatic environment was concerned. Russia’s attitude in the north was beginning to 
look calmer than before. In 1872 Russia effectively closed its consulate in Hakodate with the 
opening of the legation in Tokyo.21 The gaudy building that they built in 1860 gazing down at 
the town of Hakodate from a hilltop had led the residents to rumour that it was meant to be a 
future government office once they occupied the island. That day never came. It is impossible 
to fully understand the Russian thinking as to why this was the case without examining 
Russian primary sources, as carried out by Gentes and Corrado, and it falls beyond the scope 
of this thesis.22 What is important here is the gradual realisation on the Japanese side that 
Russia might not be as aggressive as had been imagined regarding Hokkaido.  
 
 
The Sakhalin-Korea linkage and the Treaty of St. Petersburg 
 
As the question of an expedition to Korea became the top issue for the government in 
1873, those who advocated the dispatch of troops thought they needed to prevent Russia’s 
intervention. It was clear that given its Far Eastern possessions Russia would not welcome 
Korea coming under Japanese influence, if not outright occupation. The underlying 
geopolitical logic was the same as that which Russia had used when it sought to occupy 
                                                           
20 Akizuki, Nichiro Kankei to Saharin Tō, 218. 
21 Hakodate Shishi Hensanshitsu (ed.), Hakodate Shishi Tsūsetsuhen vol.3, 1032. 
22 Gentes, ‘The institution of Russia’s Sakhalin policy, from 1868 to 1875’; Corrado, ‘The “end of the 
earth”: Sakhalin Island in the Russian imperial imagination, 1849-1906’.!
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Tsushima in 1861. Soejima Taneomi, a firm proponent of sending troops to Korea sought to 
use the border negotiations in order to obtain the Russian neutrality in Korea. He proposed to 
Butzow that Japan give up southern Sakhalin in exchange for a Russian pledge of neutrality 
over Korea in the event of a Korean-Japanese war. Soejima told Parkes that he was confident 
that Russia would agree, making a lasting impression on Parkes's mind.23 Yet Butzow 
declined to get into such terms with Japan and the talks halted when Soejima left office 
following the defeat of his group in the leadership split over the Korea policy.24 
When Ōkubo Toshimichi emerged as the effective leader of the government 
following the leadership split and the resignation of Soejima, Saigō Takamori and others, he 
believed that a Russian pledge of neutrality over Korea in the event of Korean-Japanese war 
could not be trusted. Therefore the instructions for Enomoto Takeaki, the plenipotentiary for 
negotiating the boundaries between Russia and Japan, in March 1874 prior to his departure to 
St. Petersburg did not include any conditions about Korea. It simply stated that he should 
offer to yield southern Sakhalin and in exchange receive the Kuril Islands, the numbers of 
which were not specified. The instructions also told Enomoto to secure fishing privileges 
around Sakhalin and tax-free access to the ports there for Japanese fishermen.25 Nevertheless 
it was clear to the leadership that the Korean question might be brought up during the talks.  
When appointed to serve as the negotiator on the boundary questions in St. 
Petersburg, Enomoto was serving in the Kaitakushi under Kuroda, having recently been 
released from imprisonment for his treason against the emperor during the Boshin War of 
1868-9. The only reason he had escaped execution, despite the fact that he was the leader of 
the rebellion in Hakodate, was that Kuroda had stood up and sued for his pardon.26 The latter 
understood the value of Enomoto’s knowledge of the northern frontier, international law and 
naval affairs. Enomoto had participated in the Tokugawa exploration mission to Hokkaido 
and Sakhalin in the early 1850s, had then started his career as a naval trainee in Nagasaki in 
                                                           
23 Parkes to Derby, 24 July 1875. Tokyo. TNA FO46/192 no94.  
24 [Enomoto to Terashima,] 22 November 1874. St. Petersburg. DNGM 7, 446. 
25 Sanjō Sanetomi to Enomoto Takeaki, 5 March 1874. DNGM 7: 420-421.  
26 Saigō Takamori to Katsura Shirō, 12 January 1873. Saigō Takamori Zenshū Sensan Iinkai (ed.), 
Saigō Takamori Zenshū vol.3 (Tokyo: Yamato Shobō, 1978), 215. 
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1856, and went on to study international law in The Hague for five years before coming back 
to Japan to join the pro-Tokugawa cause. No one else in the Meiji government could match 
his expertise.  
Enomoto left Japan on 10 March. He travelled through the recently opened Suez 
canal, made a couple of stops at European capitals and reached St. Petersburg on 22 June 
1874.27 Enomoto then spent the summer negotiating the handling of the incidents in southern 
Sakhalin involving the Japanese nationals. The first negotiations on the border question 
between Enomoto and Pëtr Nikolaevich Stremoukhov, the head of the Asian Division of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry, took place on 14 November. Stremoukhov’s approach had softened 
compared to his stance vis-à-vis Koide. Stremoukhov emphasized that there was no intention 
on the Russian side to expand its territory. He asserted that Russia just wanted to establish a 
penal colony, and having a border on the island would only cause trouble. He also showed his 
willingness to consider giving compensation for receiving the southern end of the island.28 
Enomoto reported to Tokyo on 26 November: ‘it does not seem Russia is wrestling to get 
Karafuto quickly by force, they mainly use tactics.’29 He observed that Russia wanted to 
achieve two things: the development of the coal mines in Sakhalin, which would help supply 
the Siberian fleet in Vladivostok; and to command the La Perouse Strait between Sakhalin 
and Hokkaido so as to secure its fleet’s access to the outer sea.30 
Enomoto did not waste time debating the relative strengths of the two countries’ legal 
standing in Sakhalin. His approach was pragmatic and aimed at reaching a political 
settlement. What Enomoto had in mind was in fact more aggressive than Soejima’s quest for 
Russian neutrality. Enomoto wanted to make Russia accept Japanese rule over Pusan if 
Japanese troops took it, in return for yielding southern Sakhalin. Enomoto believed that 
taking possession of Pusan and controlling the Tsushima strait was vital for Japan’s national 
security. This would allow Japan to prevent the Russian fleet in Vladivostok from getting out 
                                                           
27 Enomoto Takeaki to Terashima Munenori, 22 June 1874. DNGM 7: 426. 
28 DNGM 7: 442. 
29 Enomoto Takeaki to Terashima Munenori, 26 November 1874. Encrypted telegram. St. Petersburg. 
Reprinted in Terashima Munenori Kankei Shiryōshū vol.1, 135-6. 
30 DNGM 7: 445-446. 
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of the Sea of Japan, just as the 1856 Treaty of Paris cloistered Russia in the Black Sea. If 
Russia was interested in such an offer, however, the ‘wording needs to be carefully done,’ 
Enomoto wrote to Tokyo.31 Even though Soejima's idea of Russian neutrality over Korea had 
been dismissed by Ōkubo, Korea was still part of the picture for Japanese diplomacy vis-à-vis 
Russia. ‘Korea was constantly on Enomoto’s mind,’ as Kim Key-Hiuk has noted.32  
On 2 January Stremoukhov proposed to secede the Kuriles except for the two 
northernmost islands. This was a major concession and should have been welcome for Japan 
given the instructions from Sanjō. However, Enomoto did not think it was imperative to seek 
the maximum territorial gain. His response was to request just three islands in the southern 
part of the Kuriles and instead asked for Russian battleships in exchange for the control of 
southern Sakhalin.33 This surprised Stremoukhov, but he agreed to consider the offer. In the 
next meeting on 11 January Enomoto dropped the demand for the islands, except for Urup, 
where some merit was expected in sea otter hunting and building ports, and focused his 
compensation on battleships. Russia declined this peculiar demand,34 but by the end of 
February Enomoto was still optimistic. He wrote to Yamanouchi Teiun, his old friend who 
now worked for the Kaitakushi in Tokyo, that because the Russian side was hoping for a swift 
conclusion he would be able to draw a substantial compromise. He even thought drawing the 
border on the island was not impossible with the current Russian attitude, but that was not his 
goal.35 
As he observed the diplomatic situation in Europe firsthand, Enomoto’s view on 
Russia markedly differed from what was prevalent in Japan. He pointed out that Russia had 
too large a territory which imposed financial constraints on them.36 It was less than fifteen 
years since Russia had taken the Maritime Region and its power could not be substantial in 
the near future. Due to these financial and geographical reasons, Japan need not worry about 
                                                           
31 DNGM 7: 446. 
32 Kim, The Last Phase, 219. 
33 Enomoto Takeaki to Terashima Munenori. 3 January 1875. St. Petersburg. DNGM 8: 168. 
34 Enomoto Takeaki to Terashima Munenori. 15 January 1875. St. Petersburg. DNGM 8:179. 
35 Enomoto Takeaki to Yamanouchi Teiun, 28 February 1875. St. Petersburg. NDL-ETKM 6-4. 
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Sakhalin as much as people feared. Yet he also reminded Yamanouchi Teiun that ‘this is only 
for the ears of the learned, not for the commoners’.37 He said so presumably because public 
fear of Russia would facilitate the occupation of Pusan that Enomoto wished to see, possibly 
with the ships that he hoped would be handed over from Russia.  
On 4 March, in the sixth meeting with Stremoukhov, Enomoto switched gears and 
demanded the transfer of the entire Kuriles. Stremoukhov was reluctant on the grounds that it 
would leave no passable route to the Pacific for the Siberian fleet. ‘The Ministry of Navy 
does not agree,’ he said.38 Enomoto acknowledged that losing this passage would certainly be 
inconvenient for them if any difficulty arose in case of war, but went on to elaborate the other 
compensation he wanted. Among these conditions were the opening of ports in the Maritime 
Region for Japanese trade, and allowing a Japanese consul there. Stremoukhov agreed to the 
former, but not the latter. He said a commercial agent would be acceptable but not a consul, 
because Russia ‘does not want Britain’s consul in the region, so we do not allow it to other 
powers.’39 This is another example of the delicate balance of rights and privileges in the 
North Pacific. It also shows that Russia was continuously concerned about Britain around its 
Far Eastern possession and saw Japan’s presence as a possible avenue which might invite 
British activities. 
The two sides came to an agreement for the most part on 24 March. Enomoto’s 
telegram to Tokyo on the next day reported that Russia agreed on the major issues and he 
asked for the emperor’s permission to sign the treaty.40 The treaty was signed between 
Enomoto and Prince Gorchakov, the foreign minister, on 7 May. It stipulated that the whole 
island of Sakhalin was to become Russian territory, while the Kuril island chain went to 
Japan. They agreed that Russia would buy up the Japanese properties left on Sakhalin, the 
value of which would be determined when officials from both countries investigated them. It 
was also agreed that Japan would do the same for Russian property in the Kurils, though 
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Stremoukhov assured Enomoto that there was none.41 Japanese fishermen were granted the 
right to engage in fishing around Sakhalin for ten years, and also enjoyed tax-free access to 
Korsakov for ten years; Japan would have the right to put a consul in Korsakov; and the 
Japanese ships would enjoy most-favoured nation treatment in ports around Okhotsk and 
eastern Kamchatka and for fishing in those areas.42 The indigenous people were to choose 
either Russian or Japanese nationality within three years. 
Enomoto obtained almost all that he had sought aside from the initial request for 
Russian battleships as part of the compensation. In exchange for southern Sakhalin, from 
which the Meiji government had already decided to retreat, Japan obtained the whole of the 
Kuril Islands and cut off Russia’s Siberian fleet from the north Pacific. It also secured 
monetary compensation for the properties in Sakhalin; and the Japanese commercial interests 
were largely guaranteed. Russia gained almost nothing in material terms other than exclusive 
control of southern Sakhalin. All the treaty did for Russia was that it removed a source of 
instability in the Far East. Although the local admiral called the swap ‘a mistake’ and said 
that the Siberian fleet was ‘disgusted’ with the deal,43 Russia could now concentrate on more 
pressing issues closer to home. In the spring of 1875, a ‘war scare’ spread around Europe 
suggesting that Germany might stage a preventive war against France, which was still 
recovering from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. Tsar Alexander II tried to 
contain Germany by visiting Berlin himself.44 Hanabusa Yoshimoto, then first secretary of the 
Japanese Legation in St. Petersburg, observed that foreign minister Gorchakov was anxious to 
cut a quick deal in order not to delay his departure to Berlin.45 The Tsar and Gorchakov left 
for Berlin to attend a summit meeting with German emperor Wilhelm I on the day after 
Gorchakov signed the treaty with Japan.46 The Japanese public, meanwhile, was not entirely 
                                                           
41 Enomoto Takeaki to Terashima Munenori, 17 April 1875. Telegram. St. Petersburg. DNGM 8:202. 
42 Article 6, the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed 7 May 1875. DNGM 8: 220-1. 
43 Eusden to Parkes, 4 September 1875. Hakodate. TNA FO262/273 no 30.  
44  Robert Blake, Disraeli (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), 571; A.J.P.Taylor, Bismarck 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955), 154; Kajima Morinosuke, Bisumaruku no Gaiko Seisaku (Tokyo: 
Kajima Kenkyūjo, 1958), 25-34. 
45 Hanabusa’s diary entry, 6 May 1875. DAJP HYKM F-25. 
46 Loftus to Derby, 11 May 1875. TNA FO65/909 no148. 
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pleased, for it suspected that this agreement might not stop the Russians even if a deal had 
been reached on Sakhalin.47 
Throughout the negotiations, Enomoto kept in touch with Terashima Munenori, the 
foreign minister in Tokyo, via telegraph. This was a new development for the Russo-Japanese 
boundary negotiations – or for any diplomatic negotiations that the Meiji government was 
engaged in for that matter. In contrast to the case of Takenouchi mission in 1862 or Koide 
mission in 1867, Enomoto was able to report to Terashima the details of the conditions agreed 
upon in St. Petersburg through encrypted telegraphs and then ask for the emperor’s approval 
to sign the treaty on his behalf. This greatly facilitated the process, although some of the 
details had to be confirmed after an on-site investigation by both parties.  
What did the two parties agree about Korea in the end? Shortly after the negotiation 
concluded, Enomoto’s telegram to Terashima read that ‘[u]ntil today this [Russian] 
government has never said a thing about Korea, and so of course I have not uttered a word. 
Given that Russia has not sorted out the Maritime Region there does not seem to be as much 
planning as people in our country surmise.’48 All the urgent communications had been 
conducted through telegram between Tokyo and St. Petersburg. As far as the remaining 
telegrams go, no word on Korea is recorded in the Japanese communications. Thus it is fair to 
say that, despite the fear of Parkes and the extrapolation of some historians, no secret 
agreement over Korea seems to have existed.49 The link between the two issues remained 
hypothetical rather than real, though it did affect the negotiators’ strategic considerations. 
Enomoto’s aversion to mentioning Korea during the negotiations speaks to its 
potential to spoil the talks. As Enomoto contemplated in November 1874, control of the 
southern end of the Korean Peninsula was of paramount importance for the command of the 
East China Sea. If Russia built a base on the opposite coast to Tsushima, Japan ‘would lose 
                                                           
47 For scepticism on the effectiveness of border settlement for halting Russia’s advance, see Tokyo 
Akebono Shimbun, 13 June 1875. Reprinted in Meiji Hennenshi Hensankai, Shinbun Shūsei Meiji 
Hennenshi vol.1 (Tokyo: Rinsensha, 1940), 337-8. 
48 Enomoto Takeaki to Terashima Munenori, 10 April 1875. St. Petersburg. Reprinted in Terashima 
Munenori Kenkyukai (ed.), Terashima Munenori Kankei Shiryōshū, vol.1, 36-37. 
49 Ishii Takashi suspects the existence of secret agreement on Korea. See Ishii Takashi, Meiji Shoki no 
Nihon to Higashi Ajia (Tokyo: Yūrindo, 1982), 279, 323. 
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the big goal of naval defence,’ he wrote to Terashima.50 Pusan in his mind was ‘absolutely 
necessary’ in order to command the Korean strait and the western coast of Japan. He argued 
that this was the crux of the Korean expedition; the outrage over ‘national humiliation’ was a 
mere ‘pretension’. If Japan had Pusan, Enomoto wrote, ‘we can safely call that double-headed 
eagle a blank threat.’51  
 
 
The British balancing 
 
While the negotiations were taking place in St. Petersburg, Britain watched the 
development of Japanese diplomacy towards Korea anxiously. When in September 1874 
Parkes visited Hakodate, he drew a comparison between Japan’s opening of ports and that in 
Korea:  
 
I have taken a short trip to Hakodate… .It is a terribly lifeless place… It is also a fine 
station for our fleet to visit in the summer, for purposes of health, and the only point 
from which we may watch Russian proceedings on the opposite coast. I hope Korea 
may not pass into their hands some fine day. The opening of the Hakodate Port saved 
Yezo, and if the Koreans were not such fools, they would see that the opening of their 
territory would be their salvation also.52  
 
One could observe that here Parkes’s attention was turned from Hokkaido to Korea. Also 
notable is his interpretation that Hokkaido had been secured under the Japanese sovereingty 
with the opening of Hakodate, which is too kind to himself given that he was frantically 
trying to open an additional port in northern Hokkaido in order to stop the Russian intrusion 
                                                           
50 Enomoto Takeaki to Terashima Munenori, 11 January 1875. St. Petersburg. DNGM8: 172-8. 
51 Enomoto Takeaki to Yamanouchi Teiun, 12 January 1876. St. Petersburg. NDL-ETKM 5-9. 
52 Parkes to Sir D. Brooks Robertson, 23 June 1874. Cited in Frederick Dickins, The Life of Sir Harry 
Parkes vol.2 (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1894), 193-4. 
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just a few years previously. Nevertheless, he does share the view with the Japanese that 
Russia’s priority for development had moved to the Eurasian continent. 
Japanese domestic politics also caused some concern for Parkes, too. The Meiji 
government’s grip on the country looked far from perfect. Indeed, the government had just 
quelled a rebellion in Saga in northern Kyushu led by Etō Shimpei in February 1874. After 
the rebellion was quelled, Parkes observed that the Meiji government was fortunate because 
the various segments of the society that held remonstrance to the Meiji government – destitute 
low-rank samurai, marginalised former feudal lords, and struggling peasants – did not join 
Etō’s call to attack the government. He was not sure, however, whether ‘this good fortune’ 
could be repeated when Japan was poised to take action in the Korean peninsula.53  
Parkes thus felt the necessity to act pre-emptively in coordination with the navy. Vice 
Admiral Alfred Ryder of the British navy’s China Squadron in Hong Kong and Parkes wrote 
to London on 20 July 1875 and proposed that Britain should occupy Port Hamilton, a small 
island off the southern coast of the Korean Peninsula. Ryder observed straightforwardly: 
‘Russia is rapidly encroaching. A German vessel is surveying west coast of Corea. Japanese 
vessel the east coast. Both with a view to occupation’.54 Parkes brought in everything he 
could think of to buttress the case for occupation. He pointed out that Britain did not have a 
port north of Hong Kong in case of a war between Japan and Korea and if China remained 
neutral. He enclosed an American newspaper article that speculated on the Russian intention 
to occupy Korea. The article asserted that Russian officers in the ports of Japan and China 
were gathering information on Korean ports.55  Parkes even referred to the possibility of 
Russo-Japanese joint occupation of Korea, though without mentioning the source. ‘The plan 
of a joint occupation of that country might be looked forward to as promising even greater 
                                                           
53 Parkes to Derby, 17 July 1875. Tokyo. TNA FO46/192 no91.  
54 Ryder to Admiralty, 20 July 1875. Yokohama. Copied in TNA FO46/200. 
55 For the text, see ‘Russia and Corea,’ The New York Times, 3 June 1875. The original article that 
Parkes enclosed was Acta California, 29 May 1875, which the New York Times reprinted. 
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advantages to Russia than those which she has desired from the joint occupation of Saghalin,’ 
he wrote.56 
London was not impressed. While they busied themselves wondering how they could 
defend India from Russian intrusion through Afghanistan, they had no time for the Far East, 
which could not compare with India in strategic importance. Lord Augustus Loftus, the 
British ambassador to St. Petersburg, dismissed the scare raised by Parkes and Ryder. He 
observed that the area was too remote and the tsarist government’s financial situation would 
not allow any hasty action in the Far East when it had more pressing issues in Europe. The 
15th Earl of Derby, the foreign secretary, thus concluded that the occupation of Port Hamilton, 
which could trigger a general scramble for territory in East Asia, was not necessary. He wrote 
back to Parkes on 3 August: ‘H.M’s govt do not think it desirable to set to other nations the 
example of occupying places to which Great Britain has no title.’57 Parkes and Ryder were ten 
years ahead of the time, for this was the course of policy Britain carried out in 1885, when 
war with Russia was thought to be ever more imminent. But at this point, Britain chose not to 
be the first country to tip the balance around Japan. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the outside observers of the Russo-Japanese negotiations learnt of the 
signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg by late May through a trickle of information by 
newspaper reports, the negotiations were actually not over. This was because Enomoto and 
Stremoukhov did not have up-to-date information on the situation in Sakhalin and could not 
decide on the amount of monetary compensation for the Japanese properties in Sakhalin that 
were to be purchased by Russia. Occasionally the negotiators received newspaper articles sent 
from their colleagues in the Far East, but they could not sign treaty terms based solely on such 
                                                           
56 Parkes to Derby, 20 July 1875. TNA FO46/192 no92.  
57 Derby to Parkes, 3 August 1875. London. TNA FO46/189 no76.  
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information. Telegrams were available in Tokyo and Vladivostok, but not anywhere in 
Hokkaido, Sakhalin or the Kuril Islands. Enomoto and Stremoukhov agreed that an 
investigatory mission needed to visit Sakhalin and the Kurils before determining the exact 
manner of the transfer. Therefore the negotiations on the transfer were handed over to 
Terashima and Karl von Struve, the Russian minister in Tokyo. The talks in Tokyo mainly 
concerned the specificities of the transfer, including the value of the Japanese properties, and 
the rights of fishermen around the islands. On 31 July 1875, Struve told Terashima that he 
wanted to remove a clause that guaranteed life-long tax-free status for Japanese fishermen. He 
feared that such a clause would become grounds which other states could use to demand the 
same rights. As was the case with the negotiations in St. Petersburg over opening a consulate 
in Vladivostok, here again the issue was not only bilateral. This put a strain on the talks, but 
Struve found a way out. On 4 August, he proposed to ‘acquiesce (mokkyo)’ to the Japanese 
fishermen without explicit mention. This was something that Enomoto had initially thought 
would be written into the annex.58 When Terashima asked why, Struve replied: 
 
If we have a treaty we have to give the permission to foreigners. This hunting is 
something we allow only to your nation. Therefore it is better not to have a treaty… 
Our people will be retreating from fishing in this area…. and the treaty text reads 
Sakhalin and not Okhotsk, therefore if [we] sign the treaty we have to grant it to other 
nations and so I would like to conclude this with an exchange of letters.59 
 
This statement does not fully square with the final text of the annex signed by Terashima and 
Struve on 22 August, for this said that Japanese fishermen enjoyed most-favoured nation 
treatment for fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk and around the Kamchatka Peninsula. Neither this 
annex nor the main treaty mentions fishing rights in Sakhalin, contrary to what Struve stated 
on 4 August. It looks as though the reference to the fishing rights around Sakhalin was 
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deleted from the draft of the annex. Though their discussion ostensibly pertained to fishing, it 
is possible that Struve had in mind a strategic concern about the British navy’s or possibly 
American vessels’ access to the Kuril Islands, as Stremoukhov had told Buchanan five years 
previously. Yet at least one can observe here Struve’s recognition of the subtle balance of 
favour in the Okhotsk Sea region. However unlikely from a practical viewpoint, Russia 
probably could not run the risk of allowing a British presence in the Kuriles. Another 
possibility is that he feared convicts getting help from foreign ships, either for mutiny or 
escape. Its inaccessibility to the outer world was the sole point of having a penal colony on 
the island. For Russia, therefore, the signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg was the final 
piece for this project. In parallel with the Great Game mindset, domestic considerations 
affected Russia’s decision to sign the treaty with Japan with substantial compromise. The 
seemingly bilateral negotiations of Russia and Japan never existed in isolation from other 
foreign policy issues, while Britain watched the situation with great care, at least from Tokyo. 
Enomoto understood that the alleged Russian threat was not immediate and was not directed 
towards Hokkaido. The key decision makers in the Meiji government did not see the viability 
of the Japanese outposts in southern Sakhalin, and they sold it for maximum gain to the only 
bidder.   
It is important to note the difference between the perceptions about Russia held by the 
hardliners within the government, who comprised the majority, and the best informed few. 
The former remained alarmist until well into the 1870s. The latter, however, had come to a 
realisation sometime around 1872 that Russia’s territorial aims in the Far East did not extend 
to Hokkaido. In other words, the Japanese foreign affairs experts realised the existence of a 
balance of favour based on power politics as well as legal structure, including international 
law in general and the specific treaties that Japan had signed with the Western powers. This 
led the Meiji government to assume that it had a fair chance of survival on the diplomatic 
front.  
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Chapter 5 The Kuril Islands 
 
 The existence of the contemporary territorial dispute has naturally led historians 
interested in the Kuril Islands to portray its history exclusively in the context of Russo-
Japanese relations. From the perspective of the border history of Japan in the late nineteenth 
century, however, the Kuril Islands need to be placed in the broader regional framework of 
the North Pacific. The nineteenth century was a period when the human extraction of 
resources in this region greatly intensified: whales, seals, and sea otters were the main targets. 
The main actors in this process around the Kuril Islands were American merchants from San 
Francisco, who extended their operations from the newly acquired state of Alaska after 1867. 
The intensification of their commercial activities led to increased attention on the 
administration of cross-border activities by the Meiji government, especially the Kaitakushi 
(Hokkaido Colonial Office). The islands therefore became a contact point for various political 
and commercial opportunists who risked the difficult voyage for the prospect of handsome 
profit.1  
 
Map 4: Aleutian Islands and Russian America 
 
                                                           
1 As the titles of the books by Stephan, Akizuki, Hasegawa, and Kimura all suggest, the history of the 
Kuriles has been understood as a Russo-Japanese story. The brief accounts of Stephan, Hasegawa and 
Kimura on the 1870s including the Treaty of St. Petersburg make little or no mention of Americans. 
Stephan, The Kuril Islands, 90-91; Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute, vol.1, 26-7; Kimura, 
The Kurillian Knot, 30-31. Akizuki has written at some length on the American hunters, but does not 
discuss the Japanese response to them. Akizuki, Chishima Rettō, 231-5. 
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Russia’s ‘thin’ rule  
 
The first phase of the integration of the Kuriles into a sovereign political entity took 
place in the 1730s when a Russian expedition headed by Vitas Bering visited the area. At this 
point no one had complete knowledge of the geography of the islands, nor was it clear where 
they were located relative to Japan or Sakhalin. However, Russian attention towards the 
North Pacific was heightened in 1740 when Bering brought back a pile of fur skins (sea otters 
and seals) taken in the Aleutian Islands. This commercial success became the catalyst for a 
Russian rush into the region. The 1740s thus saw Russian tax collectors chasing Ainu fur 
hunters southwards along the Kuriles, starting from the Kamchatka Peninsula, in the same 
way as they collected the yasak, or tribute in fur, in Siberia.2 This process increased Russia’s 
knowledge of the Kuriles, and the conquered aborigines (Ainu) were forced to adopt various 
aspects of Russian culture: language, clothing, names, and religion.3  
The Russian government learnt about the sea otter population in the Urup Island, 
north of Etorofu in the southern Kuriles, through a tax collector’s report in 1769. The report 
prompted Russian exploitation and a clash with the Ainu hunters. Since the Ainu had been in 
trade relations with the Matsumae domain, which had established settlements in the southwest 
of Hokkaido (then called Ezo), Russia and Matsumae began to see each other as potential 
trade partners as well as foes. In 1779 the first official, ceremonial exchange of goods 
between Russia and Matsumae took place in Akkeshi on the southeastern coast of Hokkaido.4 
Matsumae never reported this encounter to the shogunate as it feared losing the trading 
opportunity.5 In 1795 the first Russian settlement appeared in Urup, and five years later 
Japanese samurai arrived in Etorofu under the order of the shogunate to guard the island 
                                                           
2 On the clash between the Russians and the Ainu in Urup in 1770 and 1771, see Walker, The Conquest 
of Ainu Lands, 162-3. 
3 Akizuki, Chishima Rettō, 61-2. 
4 Ibid., 67-72. 
5 Ibid., 73. 
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against the Russians. This set the foundation of the border to be drawn six decades later.6 
Russia’s eastward advance through the northern rim of the Eurasian continent in the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth century was primarily led by the search for fur animals in 
order to finance the empire. Thus it took little interest in creating political institutions among 
the peoples they conquered beyond ensuring the steady supply of fur.7 This ‘thin’ rule based 
on yasak came to change when competitors emerged and Russia felt the need to establish a 
monopoly over the furs that the indigenous peoples in Alaska produced. The Russian 
American Company (RAC), established on 8 September 1799, received imperial protection 
and a monopoly over hunting rights in Alaska for twenty years, but no mention of specific 
support from the government was made. The activities of the company were left up to 
individual merchants and hunters, because the Russian Imperial Navy and Army lacked the 
ability to send troops if and when the RAC ships clashed with foreign ships (this proved 
particularly relevant in the Crimean War). Initially the company’s activity concentrated on 
North America, where it competed with Boston merchants who repeatedly engaged in an 
underground trade with natives on the Russian America’s coast. Worse from the Russian 
perspective, the Americans sold guns to the natives in exchange for fur, threatening the 
sustainability of the hunting. As overexploitation soon led to a sharp drop in the number of 
furs produced there, the RAC began to turn to the Kuriles.8  
In the spring of 1828 the RAC dispatched twelve Russian labourers and forty-nine 
Aleuts, natives of Kodiak Island off the southern coast of Russian America and the centre of 
fur trade then, to Urup.9 The mission proved to be successful. The Aleuts managed to catch 
otters and spend the winter in Urup without incurring casualties from malnutrition and scurvy 
as had been the case during previous hunting operations in the Kuriles. Two years later the 
RAC moved some of the Russians and the Aleuts from Urup to Shimshir, the next island to 
the north, where another hunting ground was found on the northern tip. The introduction of 
                                                           
6 Ibid., 131.  
7 Bassin, Imperial Visions, ch.1; Alexander Etkind, Internal Colonization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011), 75-6. 
8 Akizuki, Chishima Rettō, 182-3.  
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settlers employed by the RAC changed the nature of political rule in the Kuriles. Instead of 
the collection of fur tributes, the employment contract with the RAC became the bulwark of 
the relations between the people and the state. The biggest difference from the yasak system 
was that now the Aleut hunters were no longer able to store their surplus catch and sell them 
to other buyers than the RAC. All furs had to be given up. The contract forced the Aleuts and 
the Russians in the Kuriles to pay one-third of their annual wages to buy provisions from the 
RAC. Yet this still fell short of the exercise of sovereignty under the nation-state system; the 
relations between the state, represented by the RAC, and the people were primarily 
commercial. No administration was introduced in the Kuriles beyond what was necessary for 
the hunting operations.  
 
 
The American arrival 
 
After the settlement of the Aleuts by the RAC in Urup and Shimshir, the sea otter 
population in the Kuriles plummeted. Part of the decimation was caused by hunting vessels 
unaffiliated to the RAC - or poachers, seen from the company’s perspective. By 1844 the 
RAC abolished its Kuril division, though the Aleuts remained on the islands.10 By the 
beginning of the 1860s the RAC was a lost cause, and Tsar Alexander II chose not to renew 
the company’s rights to Russian America in 1861.11  
The 1867 sale of Russian America meant the liquidation of the RAC, but no 
concerted retreat was made from the Kuriles. It remained Russian territory according to the 
Russo-American treaty.12 The Aleut hunters were simply left to their own devices. According 
                                                           
10 Ibid., 188. 
11 Morinaga Takako, Roshia no Kakudai to Kegawa Bōeki (Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 2008). 
12 See Article I of the Treaty concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by 
his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to the United States of America. Reprinted in Library of 
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border is to be drawn ‘so as to pass midway between the island of Attou [spelled Attu today, the 
westernmost island of the Aleutian Islands] and the Copper island of the Kormandorski couplet or 
group in the North Pacific ocean’. Here 541. 
 146 
to interviews carried out by Japanese officials who visited Urup in the summer of 1875, a 
Russian official stationed in Sakhalin had visited the island in 1870 and told the Aleuts that 
they were now allowed to trade furs with whoever they wanted. Thus the relationship 
between the Aleuts and the Russian state was rescinded. The Kuriles between 1868 and 1875 
became a political vacuum where no state exercised sovereignty. 
In December 1867 an American merchant from San Francisco named Hayward 
Hutchinson arrived at Sitka, the former base of the Russian governor in Alaska, to bid for the 
RAC’s liquidated assets, including huts, boats, nets and various other hunting equipments 
scattered around the North Pacific. However what made Hutchinson and other merchants 
from the western coast of the U.S. rush to Sitka was the rumoured existence of piles of furs 
stocked in the RAC huts.13 In Sitka he met with Prince Dmitrii Maksutov, the last chief 
manager of the RAC and the effective representative of the Russian government in Alaska. 
Hutchinson managed to purchase the assets, which included the right to hunting operations on 
Pribilof Island, some 320 kilometres away from the southwestern coast of Alaska and roughly 
on the same longitude as the Bering Strait, where the Aleuts clubbed fur seals on a massive 
scale.14 By mid-March, Hutchinson merged his business with another company in San 
Francisco owned by William Kohl that also had purchased other RAC assets. This was the 
beginning of Hutchinson, Kohl & Company (HKC). Another merger took place on 10 
October when HKC and others formed a new company called the Alaska Commercial 
Company (ACC).  
The ACC appears to have become a multi-national cartel formed by those who had 
managed to snatch a stake in the fur-sealing business around Alaska and the neighbouring 
islands. It rigorously defended its business by exerting political influence in Washington D.C. 
When in 1869 the U.S. government entertained the idea of limiting the scale of seal clubbing 
over Pribilof for fear of overexploitation, the company partners successfully lobbied Congress 
                                                           
13 Molly Lee, ‘Context and Contact: The History and Activities of the Alaska Commercial Company, 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23. 
 147 
and the government to maintain their position. On 3 August 1870 the ACC received an 
exclusive, twenty-year lease of Pribilof from the U.S. government for fur seal hunting for an 
annual rent of $55,000 and $2.625 per skin. In return the company was to provide food, 
housing, fuel, education and health care to the indigenous Aleut residents in Pribilof. Armed 
with this lease the ACC began slaughtering sea otters, seals and foxes in the region, which 
lasted for the next two decades, excluding all competitors. During the twenty-year lease of 
Pribilof, the U.S. Congress held four investigations into the company’s business but each time 
found no fraud. The lease survived the intended period of twenty years, but when it expired in 
1890 it was given to a competitor company in San Francisco.15 
Meanwhile in the Kuriles, Alexander Philippeus, a Russian merchant based in 
Petropavlovsk, on the southeastern coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula, inherited the RAC’s 
business in 1871 with a three-year contract lasting until 1 January 1875. The available records 
suggest that he entered into a partnership with HKC sometime in 1874. The reason for this 
business alliance is not clear, but he likely shared the interest of HKC in suppressing other 
vessels’ activities in the North Pacific which could challenge their monopoly and bring down 
the profit.  
The year 1872 was a turning point in the fur trade in the Kuriles. A lone American 
vessel from San Francisco led by a certain Captain Kimberley, unaffiliated with Philippeus or 
the HKC, wandered into the southern Kuriles and discovered a large population of sea otters, 
which the crew caught easily until the ship’s storage filled up. The vessel then came to 
Hakodate, one of Japan’s treaty ports located on the southwestern part of Hokkaido, where it 
processed and sold the fur.16 Their choice of selling the fur in Hakodate was an astute one 
because it enabled them to escape the obstruction from the HKC or Philippeus that they 
would have faced in San Francisco or Petropavlovsk.  
As soon as the news reached San Francisco, where strong opposition against the ACC 
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monopoly in Alaska had existed since almost immediately after the company’s birth, 
shipowners who were not part of the ACC saw a tremendous commercial opportunity. At 
least two of the vessels that went to the southern Kuriles in the mid-1870s had previously 
gone to Alaska for fur seal hunting in 1869, but after 1870 had been denied access due to the 
ACC’s lease.17  
 
Kaitakushi meets the Americans 
 
The Japanese rule over Ezo (Hokkaido) and the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands 
resembled that of the Russian American Company. It was a ‘thin’ rule known as the basho 
ukeoi sei (contract fishery system or zone commissioning system) that had developed in Ezo 
under the rule of the Matsumae domain during the Tokugawa period, and it covered most of 
the coast of Ezo. The shogunate granted Matsumae exclusive rights to trade with the Ainu, 
and the Matsumae lord in turn divided up among his subordinates the rights to engage in 
annual trade with the various corners of Ezo. Over the course of the seventeenth century the 
trade came to be undertaken increasingly by merchants from the mainland who had more 
capital and experience. Therefore the samurai of the Matsumae domain sold licenses to 
mainland merchants to trade with the Ainu in the designated areas.18  
These trading posts across the coast of Ezo established by Matsumae and 
administered by mainland large-scale merchants transformed the life of the Ainu and made 
them dependent on the Japanese for daily necessities. The Ainu entered the monetary 
economy and their dependence on Matsumae was so great that the latter could threaten the 
Ainu into starvation by refusing to trade.19 Forced into a subordinate position the Ainu 
mounted an armed resistance, known today as the Menashi-Kunashiri War (1789). After the 
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Ainu were defeated the shogunate put Ezo under its direct control. The Ainu in Kunashiri and 
Etorofu were cut off from the maritime trade network of the North Pacific and drawn closer to 
the Japanese economy, toiling in Japanese-controlled fishing sites. Authority over affairs at 
ground level switched hands a couple of times between the shogunate and the Matsumae 
domain in the first half of the nineteenth century, but the Ainu position remained the same.20  
The Meiji government’s development of the Kuriles up to 1873 was predicated on 
two assumptions: that it needed to get rid of the basho ukeoi sei and that it must guard the 
area against potential Russian aggression – a natural conclusion from their experience until 
the mid-nineteenth century. The 1855 Treaty of Shimoda was the first to demarcate the 
Russo-Japanese border in the southern Kuriles. The Japanese had initially in these talks 
asserted their rights over the whole archipelago, but before long settled on a border drawn 
between Etorofu and Urup. In 1869 the Meiji government installed an administrative structure 
in Ezo and gave it a new name: Hokkaido. The government divided the island into eleven 
provinces (kuni) and ordered the mainland domains, temples, and individuals to assist with 
the administration of the provinces. 21  Etorofu and Kunashiri islands, which had been 
confirmed as Japanese territory by the Treaty of Shimoda, were given the name Chishima and 
made up one of the eleven provinces. The Kaitakushi itself took charge of Kunashiri, while 
Etorofu was divided into four and Hikone, Saga, Sendai and Kōchi domains were assigned to 
look after its defence and development.22 However financial difficulties forced Kōchi and 
Saga to give up their assignments within one year. Sendai took them over, though shortly 
afterwards the abolition of the domains resulted in the extension of Kaitakushi administration 
to Etorofu.23 
Meanwhile, by the autumn of 1873 it was clear that the Kurile sea otters had become 
accessible to anyone willing to risk the voyage. In July the Kaitakushi officials received a 
warning from Charles Walcott Brooks, the Japanese consul in San Francisco, that some ships 
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had left for the southern Kurils for sea otter hunting in the early summer.24 The Japanese 
officers proved utterly unprepared to meet the hunting vessels. In the summer of 1873 at least 
seven foreign ships went to Urup and Etorofu to hunt otters.25 Some of them ended up landing 
on Etorofu due to shipwreck, which was Japanese territory under the 1855 Russo-Japanese 
treaty and not open to foreigners according to the treaty terms. On 1 June officers in Etorofu 
reported to Hakodate that four foreigners had landed on the island. The Japanese did not have 
an interpreter, but managed to communicate with one of the foreigners who understood some 
Japanese. They had run away from a hunting vessel on which they had found employment 
because of harsh treatment by the ship’s captain. The Japanese pointed out that Etorofu was 
not open to foreigners and told them to leave. The foreigners said they could not because they 
did not have a boat. Eventually they were sent to Hakodate for investigation.26 In November 
the Kaitakushi officers in Nemuro captured twenty crew from the British ship, Swallow. 
Eleven of them were foreigners, including the captain Henry James Snow. This twenty-five-
year-old British man had heard the story of sea otters the previous winter in Yokohama and 
bought a ship to come to the southern Kuriles for hunting. On his way north the ship had been 
damaged and had to spend three weeks in Sendai, in northeastern Japan, for repairs. After 
hunting for three months around Etorofu, the ship was no longer navigable and the crew had 
to abandon it on the coast near Nemuro.27 
The Kaitakushi and the Japanese government, embroiled over the Korea debate 
within the leadership in Tokyo throughout the summer, failed to take a quick, concerted 
response to the intruders. Internal communications indicate that at this point some of the 
Kaitakushi officials did not share the sense of urgency of those who had directly dealt with 
the foreign castaways.28 The discussion within the Kaitakushi over what to do with the sea 
otter hunters around Etorofu began only in the autumn of 1873. Enomoto Takeaki, having 
spent three years in prison in Tokyo on the charge of leading the rebellion against the imperial 
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force in the Boshin War of 1868-9 but lately released with a special pardon by the emperor, 
had found employment with the Kaitakushi and was at the time in eastern Hokkaido 
investigating its mineral resources. In Nemuro, the easternmost port of the island facing 
Kunashiri, he met Japanese sailors who had worked on Snow’s hunting vessel. Based on these 
accounts, Enomoto sent a detailed report on sea otter hunting to the headquarters of the 
Kaitakushi in Sapporo. Enomoto urged the Kaitakushi to guard the coast as well as to begin 
hunting sea otters by themselves, for ‘it will be difficult to prevent them when we are not 
hunting’.29 The Kaitakushi decided to send two steamships, the Genbu-maru and the Capron, 
which it had just purchased from New York and received in Hakodate in May 1873, to guard 
the coast in the next season.30  
Along with these measures on the frontline, Japan brought the Kuriles up as a 
diplomatic issue. In May 1874 the government announced to the foreign representatives in 
Japan a set of guiding principles on what they described as ‘illegal fishing in Hokkaido and 
the adjacent areas’, in an attempt to protect their fishing rights but also to establish stricter 
border control in the northern edge of the country.31 The proposed rules claimed that Japan’s 
jurisdiction covered the sea three miles from the coastline. The Kaitakushi officials borrowed 
the basic idea that a state’s legal jurisdiction could extend to its coastal waters from Elements 
of International Law, an influential text on international law written by Henry Wheaton.32  
The regulation stated that if foreigners were found engaged in hunting within this 
limit, the Japanese authorities would capture them and send them to Hakodate for a trial in the 
consular court. Due to the right of extraterritoriality, Western citizens in Japan were not 
subject to the local legal procedure when they were accused by the Japanese. Consuls served 
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as judges, however perfunctory their handling of legal matters might have been.33 If they 
resisted, proportionate use of force was permitted. Terashima Munenori, the foreign minister, 
was careful to distinguish poachers from ships in distress and in need of procurements, for 
which there was a different procedure to follow.34  
This announcement met with staunch opposition from the ministers. Harry Parkes, 
the British minister in Tokyo, attacked the trial of Henry Snow which took place based on this 
regulation because in his view:  
 
Japanese jurisdiction cannot extend to three Ri [miles] from the shore, and until they 
have made and proclaimed distinct laws on the subject they have not the right to seize 
foreign ships which may engage in fishing off the Japanese coast. A foreign ship 
cannot be charged with the breach of a law that does not exist.35  
 
Terashima replied by saying that ‘the thing about within three miles is the world’s 
conventional law (sekai ippan no hō)’ and thus required no prior legislation.36  
On 7 October, the Japanese government wrote up general regulations on fishing and 
hunting around Hokkaido that would formalise the guiding principle announced in May into 
law. It aimed at exacting fines from the transgressors, with the amount ranging from 400 yen 
(for disobedience to the consular court procedure) to ‘not less than 1,000 yen’ (for fishing or 
hunting within the Japanese waters). The foreign ministers again resisted, because they saw 
the specification of the penalties as a backdoor approach by the Japanese for curtailing 
extraterritoriality. Changes of this nature, they argued, ‘ought to be submitted to their 
respective governments for instructions, pending which the further discussion of the question 
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should be postponed’.37  
The summer of 1874 is usually remembered in Japanese history as the time of the 
Taiwan Expedition and the following negotiations with the Qing on the ‘punishment’ of 
Taiwanese aboriginals over the killing of Ryukyuan men. In the beginning of June, as the 
former samurai fought with the Butan clan of the Taiwanese aboriginals, at the other end of 
the Japanese archipelago the Kaitakushi officers struggled with a ‘wild goose chase’ for 
poachers off the coast of Etorofu.38 Brooks wrote from San Francisco that at least ten hunting 
vessels had left the port for Japan by mid-April.39 Henry Snow, whose ship the Swallow had 
been lost in Nemuro in the previous summer, fitted out a new ship in Hakodate and came 
back to the hunting ground.  
Because this was the first season in which the Kaitakushi introduced coastal patrol by 
steamships, the foreign hunters were unaware that the Japanese officers began looking for 
them. Thus finding foreign vessels turned out not to be the most challenging part for the 
Japanese. The two steamers of the Kaitakushi, Genbu-maru and Capron, caught six ships 
between May and June. The real difficulty for the Japanese unfolded after the officers 
boarded the foreigners’ vessels for inspection and interrogation, at which point they faced the 
hunters’ various excuses and counter-arguments. One captain shocked the Japanese officials 
by remarking that ‘fish or sea otters arising from the ocean cannot be ruled to be any 
country’s possession, [therefore] it is permitted to hunt them’. The Japanese officials claimed 
that international law stated that a country possesses rights to products within three miles 
from a country’s coast. The captain replied: ‘As I said before, the premise that things arising 
from the ocean of the earth belong to a government concerned is wrong’.40 Other captains of 
the hunting vessels complained to the Japanese that Japan’s vice consul in San Francisco had 
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told them that there was no prohibition to hunting around Etorofu.41 Others simply claimed, 
for the sake of convenience, that they had been hunting outside Japanese waters, which of 
course was impossible to prove or disprove. Snow, when he was caught for the second time in 
1874, confronted the inspectors through a struggling Japanese interpreter on the Capron Maru, 
with the argument that he had ‘never measured the distance from off shore where we had 
killed them [i.e. otters], and that if they got any of our skins they would have to take them by 
force’.42 When the Japanese found out that they had otter skins on board, the interpreter said: 
‘then you are robbers, and we will confiscate your vessel and everything belonging to it’. One 
of Snow’s colleagues replied that Japan’s jurisdiction could not extend beyond three miles. 
He also pointed out the ship did not receive prior warning from the Japanese. The interpreter 
asked if they had hunted within three miles from the shore last year. Snow answered ‘very 
possibly’. Interpreter then said: ‘Then we will take you to Hakodate. The others may go, but 
having admitted that you may have hunted last year within three miles of our coast is 
sufficient to show that you have been defrauding the Japanese Government’. After some more 
wrangling, both verbal and physical, the Japanese side said they would give them ten hours to 
leave the Japanese waters and let Snow and his crew go back to their ship.43  
Much like this case with Snow, the Japanese had to take satisfaction from making the 
captains of the ships sign a written notice that they had been told to leave within ten hours. 
Only on one occasion did a foreign vessel acquiesce to Japanese confiscation of the sea otter 
skins. The lack of ability to enforce such regulations was apparent. At least three of the 
vessels came back within the same season and were caught again.44  
The only possible course of deterrence that the Japanese could resort to was 
confiscation of skins. The inspectors succeeded to do so in some cases, but under the 
principle of extraterritoriality, they could only follow this up by handing the hunters over to 
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consuls in Hakodate where they were put on trial and received a nominal fine. In August 1875 
the American consul in Hakodate tried four hunters who had spent the winter living on 
Etorofu Island and caught fifty-three otters. The consul found them guilty of entering an 
unopened Japanese port, and ordered them to pay a fine of 100 dollars.45 Given that each skin 
they obtained was sold for between thirty and sixty dollars in Hakodate,46 the existence of the 
consular court had no power to stop the hunters.  
Otter hunting in the north of Japan was a lucrative business, but also a dangerous one. 
Shipwreck was so common that it looked more a matter of when rather than if. Five American 
ships were wrecked in the area in eighteen months up to August 1875.47 Many hunters were 
stranded, as a result, on the shore of Etorofu or on the east coast of Hokkaido, typically near 
the port town of Nemuro. This, however, did not mean the stranded crew needed to look for 
employment in another vessel passing by in order to go home. Once the sailors were 
transferred to Hakodate by Kaitakushi to face investigation and, if unlucky, trial in a consular 
court, an American mail steamer operated by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company (PMSC) 
had agreed to take wrecked sailors on board for a small fare of ten dollars, paid by the 
American government, and the ship would take them to a destination of their wish, be it 
Yokohama or San Francisco. This was an agreement that the PMSC had concluded in 
exchange for receiving subsidies from the American government for the mailing service.48 
Thus the danger of wreckage had only a limited effect in deterring the reckless and avaricious 
hunters. 
All this created a frustrating situation for the Kaitakushi. With the 1874 season 
ending with only partial success in deterring the foreign intruders, Kaitakushi asked the navy 
to offer support. Next year one of the navy’s steamships, the Teiyūkan, went to guard Etorofu 
in addition to the two Kaitakushi vessels, but the ship was soon lost. The navy understandably 
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grew wary of sparing any ship for the northern border and took the attitude that the 
Kaitakushi should be solely responsible for anti-poaching operations.49  
 
 
After the territorial ‘expansion’ 
 
In this light the acquisition of the entire Kuriles, with the signing of the Treaty of St. 
Petersburg in May 1875, might not have been welcome news to the Kaitakushi officers. When 
the Charge d’Affaires of the American legation in St. Petersburg, Eugene Schuyler, learnt of 
the conclusion of the negotiations, he said to Enomoto Takeaki, Japan’s chief negotiator, that 
the deal would benefit both Russia and Japan. On the Kuriles his comment was ‘something is 
better than nothing’.50 Many among the Japanese public saw the territorial swap as uneven 
and were infuriated by the terms of the treaty.51 Why did Enomoto take the Kuriles then? An 
obvious answer is that he followed government instructions to that effect. But he was willing 
to contradict them and in the course of the negotiations had once asked for Russian 
battleships as compensation for abandoning Japan’s claims on southern Sakhalin.52 One could 
argue that it was a geopolitical manoeuvre in pursuit of denying the Russian fleet easy access 
to the Pacific, which was a major concern for the Russian Pacific fleet as seen in chapter 4. 
This view has some plausibility considering Enomoto’s insistence on taking over the entire 
island chain, but it is unclear to what extent Enomoto thought Japan could impose the 
containment with its underdeveloped navy. He would have also understood that the lack of 
good ports and rough weather in the Kuriles gave it no clear military advantage. The language 
of geopolitics, as far as the Kuriles were concerned, was probably more symbolic than 
substantial. 
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Another feasible explanation for Japan’s north-eastward territorial ‘expansion’ – if 
not stretch – is that it was an attempt to put a semblance of reciprocity on what would 
otherwise have looked like a diplomatic defeat to the Japanese observers, who felt they had 
the right to possess southern Sakhalin, if not all of it. This view was not shared beyond the 
best informed within the government, such as Enomoto, Terashima, Kuroda and some other 
officers in the Kaitakushi, who understood that the main purpose of the settlement on the 
Sakhalin question was to remove the future risk of war with Russia. Shortly after the signing 
of the treaty Enomoto wrote to his brother and sister in Tokyo, reporting that he had received 
personal notes of congratulations from Terashima and Kuroda, while warning them that ‘there 
will be people saying various things [about the territorial swap], but please do not worry 
about it’.53 
Regardless of the motivation behind it, Kuroda Kiyotaka, who headed the Kaitakushi, 
was now tasked with the development of the entire Kuriles with a budget that had been fixed 
until 1884.54 The task of the Kaitakushi in the Kuriles was threefold: to determine the status 
of its inhabitants, including those wishing to leave for Russia; to design an anti-poaching 
scheme; and to develop the Kuriles as a viable part of the Hokkaido economy. 
The supplementary article to the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed in Tokyo in August 
1875, stated that the indigenous peoples in the Kuriles had to choose, within three years, 
between remaining in the Kuriles as Japanese nationals or leaving for Russia as Russians.55 
Until then their fishing and hunting rights would be preserved as before. In 1875 the only 
Russian residents in the Kuriles were three agents of Philippeus, who took charge of trading 
fur and daily necessities based on the contract.  
Shortly after the news of the territorial swap signed by Enomoto reached Japan, 
Kuroda sailed to Petropavlovsk to investigate the current situation in the Kuriles. The 
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Japanese officers were not impressed with the rugged lives of the Russians in the port town, 
and were surprised to find out that the Russian officers in Petropavlovsk did not even know 
the exact population of the Kuriles, leaving everything up to Philippeus. The business 
transactions did not appear to be entirely clean. Kuroda’s delegation learnt that the HKC, of 
which Philippeus was now a partner, was supposed to pay forty dollars per sea otter skin. 
However it was rumoured around the town that because the Aleuts and the Ainu were 
illiterate the HKC did not pay the full amount and subjected the indigenous hunters to a 
minimum level of subsistence and forced them into debt.56 For instance in Shumushu, the 
chief of the Ainu told the Japanese officials in 1876 that all the foxes they had caught last 
year had been bought by the agent.57 One report quipped that ‘the method of sinister 
merchants suppressing moronic people through debts is the same everywhere’.58 
Before discussing the Japanese development of the Kuriles after 1875, it is necessary 
to reiterate that access to the Kuriles by sea was extremely difficult. Floating ice blocks the 
route in the winter – many whaling ships had been trapped and abandoned in the Okhotsk Sea 
– and frequent fog complicates summer voyage. The surviving records show that Japan sent 
eight ships in the years between 1875 and 1884, but never landed on all the islands. No 
officials stayed permanently on the islands north of Etorofu. The Kaitakushi ships focused on 
the administration of the inhabited islands, while for the others it sufficed to observe the 
terrain from the sea. 
In the summer of 1875, Kuroda and others of the Kaitakushi went to Petropavlovsk 
and met up with a Hakodate-based Russian consular officer. Together they sailed southwards 
from Petropavlovsk and visited the Kuriles in order to notify the indigenous peoples about the 
territorial swap. The party identified five islands as inhabited: Shumushu, Onekotan, 
Shaskotan (by the Kuril Ainu), Simshir, and Urup (by the Aleuts). Agents of Philippeus also 
lived on Shumushu, Simshir, and Urup and took charge of buying fur skins and providing 
daily necessities. The indigenous people on each island had a population of between sixteen 
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to fifty-nine. The total population of the indigenous inhabitants, in their count, was 164.59 
Even though all of them had a contract with Philippeus, which compelled them to sell all their 
catch to his agents, occasional raids by American vessels took away some of their furs. In 
addition to forcing the indigenous hunters into giving up furs, the sailors also shot sea otters 
by themselves. The sound of gunfire, which had not been heard before in the Kuriles because 
the Aleuts and the Ainu had not used guns, scared the otters away and made the indigenous 
hunters’ operations more difficult. The Aleuts in Urup were especially badly hit. Their catch 
decreased by half between 1874 and 1875 and they were forced into further financial debt 
with Philippeus’s agent.60 
The Ainu people in the northern three islands told the Kaitakushi officers in 1875 that 
they would decide what to do about nationality after they meet up in 1876. The Aleuts in 
Simshir and Urup expressed a desire to leave for Russia. When the Japanese visited the island 
in 1876 they were waiting for a Russian vessel to take them, and in Urup the chief of the 
Aleuts asked the Japanese to take a letter explaining their situation to the Russian consul in 
Hakodate. The records suggest that they left their respective island in 1877. In Shumushu, 
twenty-two people in the end opted to stay on the island and live under the Japanese rule.61 
The Japanese official suspected that their destitution had been partly due to American vessels’ 
raids.62 
While Kuroda and others were getting their first glimpse of this newly acquired 
territory, in Tokyo the foreign ministry was in the process of negotiating revised regulations 
for fishing and hunting around Hokkaido. When they drafted the new regulations Terashima 
asked Parkes to give his comments. In July 1875 Parkes and Terashima met a few times to 
discuss the subject. Parkes suggested that a boundary be set using latitude and longitude: ‘for 
instance make the 42nd parallel the boundary, the rule applies north of this [line], and not 
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south’. Terashima was reluctant as he thought it would be ‘difficult to make degrees [of 
latitudes or longitudes] a boundary’, and announced the regulation without making the 
changes suggested by Parkes.63 Parkes then pointed out that there was a possibility that a 
cargo ship unrelated to hunting activities might be forced to submit to inspection utilising this 
regulation. Terashima admitted that that would be ‘a difficult case’.64 But Terashima in the 
end insisted that only fishing and hunting vessels would pass the areas referred to as ‘around 
Hokkaido’.65  
With its limited budget on the one hand and the anticipated arrival of poachers every 
season as long as there were fur animals on the other, Kuroda faced two options for the 
development of the Kurils. One was to follow the RAC’s approach and give out exclusive 
hunting rights to a private company, which would for its own interests ensure that no one 
breached the border and interrupted their business. This was not dissimilar to the Tokugawa 
shogunate’s basho ukeoi sei, under which merchants were given their slots in Etorofu where 
they hired the Ainu in the same way the Americans and the Russians did elsewhere in the 
North Pacific. The second approach was, as the Kaitakushi was beginning to attempt in 
Etorofu, to suppress foreign poachers on its own and simultaneously encourage the Japanese 
to raise profits from the business of fur animal hunting as well as to create settlements where 
the land conditions allowed. With the limited resources and the difficulty of preventing the 
poachers completely, there were opinions within the Kaitakushi that called for the first option. 
In Sapporo, Yamanouchi proposed to Kuroda that ‘these islands are not the place where 
national interests should be enhanced; therefore we should suffice it to take proportionate 
measures, economise on expenses and avoid losing the substance of protection’.66  
There was no shortage of foreigners who would take up the contract if the Kaitakushi 
decided to offer it. In the spring of 1875 Enomoto in St. Petersburg received an offer from a 
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powerful Boston merchant for the lease of Simushir while he was still negotiating the 
territorial swap. Meanwhile, Henry Snow, the British businessman who went to Etorofu in 
1873 and 1874, discussed with the Kaitakushi in Tokyo during the winter of 1875 his possible 
employment by the Kaitakushi as an agent in charge of sea otter hunting. One U.S. 
government officer in Washington D.C. also privately advised the Japanese minister there that 
signing a lease would be more cost-effective than trying to enforce border control at its own 
cost.67 Despite all this Kaitakushi chose the second option. Instead of selling the lease, it 
encouraged the Japanese to engage in fishery and fur animal hunting in the Kuril Islands by 
giving them a tax break of five to ten years (the duration varied from one island to another). It 
was in essence an extension of the development programme it had introduced in Hokkaido.  
Why did the Kaitakushi choose this seemingly more challenging approach? As noted 
earlier the security concern with Russia was not on their mind by this point. The Kaitakushi 
officials, especially Kuroda, understood the challenge they faced was with from the San 
Francisco poachers, not the Russian fleet. The Kaitakushi seems to have been driven by the 
idea that it had to break away from the basho system introduced under the Tokugawa 
shogunate, which they saw as a symbol of the old rule in Ezo that they had overturned.68 In 
addition to this, the experience of dealing with rough-mannered Western sailors, inept 
Russian officials in Petropavlovsk, aggressive Russian soldiers and convict-exiles in 
Sakhalin, as well as drunken, dirty and destitute Ainu seems to have convinced them that the 
Japanese under the Meiji government were the ones to bring civilisation to this part of the 
world. One report from Etorofu stated in April 1876, noting the vulgar behaviour of the 
sailors who had come on shore with the excuse of procuring water and firewood, ‘they claim 
to be the civilised country, the civilised race, [but] the behaviour of the lowly boatmen is most 
                                                           
67 Yoshida (Japanese minister) to foreign ministry, 12 June 1876. AH Bosho/5913 Kaitakushi 
kōbunroku Meiji kunen’. 
68 Kaiho Yoko argues that the abolition of gift-giving on the basis of hierarchical relationship between 
the Matsumae domain and the Ainu by the Kaitakushi in the early 1870s represented the latter’s desire 
to ‘civilise’ the Ainu by denying them their custom. Kaiho, ‘“Iiki” no naikokuka to tōgō’, in Kurahara 
and Gabe (eds.), Ezochi to Ryukyu, 132. 
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questionable’.69 One Kaitakushi officer urged Kuroda in the immediate aftermath of the 
territorial swap to create an inhabitants’ register as the first step of administration, for: 
 
the inhabitants in these islands, whether they are Russians from the Kamchatka 
region, the Manchu settlers, or those comprising a village on its own without national 
affiliation, or the mixture of these three, their number is not clear; even though [their 
number is] extremely small, it goes without saying that we cannot put them aside and 
regard them as animals (kinjū).70 
 
While on the rhetorical level Kuroda remained committed to the idea that Japan had to bear 
the burden of development in the Kuriles, the discussions within the Kaitakushi in the 
summer of 1876 also reveal his keen attention to cost-effectiveness. When Kuroda received 
proposals for the development of the Kuriles his comments concerned mostly the financial 
plausibility of the suggested measures such as tax breaks for the new settlers and the 
provision of food and other daily necessities by government vessels. He then told the authors 
of the proposal to give a concrete estimate of annual sales from fur production in the islands 
concerned. To him, the sequence of the islands to be developed and the total cost were the 
two focal points of the enterprise.71 However, throughout the rest of the 1870s, his initiative 
did not bear much fruit. Foreign vessels continued to roam around Etorofu and mostly got 
away with it. Japan’s own efforts to create a sea otter skin industry did not lead to anything 
substantial. Administrative integration of the Kuriles to the mainland, or even to Hokkaido, 
remained minimal.  
On 10 April 1876 the Meiji government in Tokyo announced its general regulations 
on fishing and hunting in Hokkaido. It prohibited foreign vessels from fishing and hunting 
‘within the distance reachable by a cannon shot from various parts of Hokkaido and other 
                                                           
69 AH A4/303 Chishima Shotō Shisei Junjo Ukagai. 
70 AH A4/314 Hokkaido Shokengensho, Sugiura Makoto to Kuroda, 25 October 1875. Notice that the 
Russians and the indigenous peoples are put in the same category here. 
71 Kuroda to Orita Heinai, Tokitō Tametomo, and Hasebe Tatsusure. August 1876. AH A4/314 
Hokkaido Kengensho.  
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[adjoining] islands’, going back to the language used in Wheaton’s text. Japanese officials 
would inspect transgressors, if found, and take them to a treaty port and ask for due 
punishment judged by the consul.72 The Kaitakushi, however, opposed this regulation because 
it judged it to be impracticable. Bringing an entire group of poachers to a consulate in a treaty 
port in reality was ‘deemed to be extremely difficult’, because they would do everything to 
protest against such legal measures having come from thousands of miles away. Their 
counter-proposal therefore was to take one of the crew onto the Japanese vessel and take him 
to the consulate while expelling the vessel.73 
As the Kaitakushi failed to devise any effective measures to guard the coast of the 
Kuriles, the onslaught on fur animals by foreign vessels continued. In 1879 hunters found fur 
seals on the Ushishir Island and its neighbouring rock reefs. By this time the number of sea 
otters had plummeted to the extent that one rather thick-skinned American shipowner, who 
himself had hunted sea otters for five years in the Kuriles, warned the Kaitakushi that, if the 
current pace of exploitation continued, ‘in a very few years none will be left’.74 Some hunters 
switched their main target to seals. One of them was Henry Snow, who recorded that he 
caught some 3,200 seals in 1881.75 The same pattern of weak regulation and overexploitation 
was emerging for seals. A Japanese cook who worked on a Russian hunting vessel that went 
to the Ushishir from Yokohama told the Japanese officials that if unregulated the entire seal 
population there would vanish within several years.76  
 The Kaitakushi, which the Meiji government had created in 1869 as a temporary 
measure to develop Hokkaido partly with a view to emulating Russia’s activity in Sakhalin, 
ran its course and was abolished in 1882. Hokkaido was then divided into the three provinces 
of Sapporo, Hakodate and Nemuro (which included the Kuriles). In 1884 the governor of 
Nemuro, Yuchi Sadamoto, went to Shumushu to persuade the Kuril Ainu there to relocate to 
                                                           
72 Sanjō Sanetomi to Kaitakushi, 10 April 1876. AH Bosho/10740/5 Seishiroku Meiji 9-10 nen, 
document 6.  
73 Orita, Tokitō, Hasebe to Kuroda, August 1876. HULNSC A4/303 ‘Chishima Shotō Shisei Junjo 
Ukagai’. 
74 Werner to Kaitakushi. 25 June 1879. HULNSC Werner, John C. 001. 
75 Akizuki, Chishima Rettō, 233. 
76 'Chishima Junkō Yomon', HULNSC CHI-915-Ha Chishimashū Kankeisho. 
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Shikotan so as to facilitate the Japanese rule. When he arrived in Shumushu he found out that 
some fifty Ainu had moved to Shumushu from Rashowa.77 The Japanese had had no 
knowledge of this group of people. Fumoto Shinichi’s recent work has cited a Hakodate-
based newspaper to claim that the Rashowa Ainu had not known that the Kuriles had become 
Japanese until 1883,78 but the record of a conversation between Yuchi and Yakov, the chief of 
the Rashowa Ainu, shows that the latter had heard about the transfer in 1878, which made 
him think that ‘as our plan was to permanently live in that island of course we thought we 
would be Japanese nationals’.79 What seems more striking is the fact that that the Japanese 
had failed to realise Rashowa had inhabitants nine years after the transfer of the Kuriles, 
which goes to show the limitations they faced in the islands’ administration. Meanwhile the 
task of chasing the poachers remained as daunting as before. Yuchi admitted that it was ‘just 
like chasing flies over smelly food’.80  
 
 
Conclusion: The Kuriles’ nominal end as a border zone 
The sale of Russian America and the liquidation of RAC left the Kuril Islands in an 
ambiguous status. They were the territory of the Russian Empire, but in practice a hunting 
ground run under contract by a private business. After the Japanese acquisition of the entire 
Kuriles in 1875, the Kaitakushi struggled for nine years to introduce a modern political 
institution in the island chain. Yet it should be remembered that this was not the reason why 
the Japanese acquired the Kuriles. For Enomoto, who negotiated the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 
the acquisition of the Kuriles was a second best scenario that he only acquired after failing to 
purchase Russian battleships in return for abandoning southern Sakhalin. Because he 
negotiated from a weaker position, in the sense that the Japanese community in Sakhalin was 
already in a fatal decline, Japan had to suffice with the acquisition of the largely useless 
                                                           
77 For the location of Rashowa, see Map 3 on p. 88.  
78 Fumoto, ‘Kakutei Sareru Kokkyō’, 151. 
79 ‘Rasawotō dojin jinmon chōsho’, 2 July 1884. HULNSC CHI-915-Ha ‘Chishimashū Kankeisho’. 
80 Nemuroken keisatsu honsho, Chishimakoku shotō mitsuryo ni kansuru shorui, 14 November 1884. 
HULNSC ‘Rakko ryō enkaku’. 
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island chain.  
Kaitakushi tried to develop the Kuriles after 1875 with the same methods used for the 
development of Hokkaido: giving tax breaks for fishermen and hunters so as to encourage 
Japanese settlement and entrepreneurship. The reason behind adopting this approach was the 
issue of prestige or the nation’s external image. However, not much progress could be 
observed by the end of the 1870s. Foreign vessels with multinational crews – including many 
Japanese – sailed along the island chain and hunted sea otters and seals or forced the 
indigenous hunters to give up their catch with de facto impunity. For the Kaitakushi 
inspectors, the natural conditions proved to be formidable challenges considering the 
technology available to them in the late-nineteenth century. This meant that the poachers got 
their way as long as they were not shipwrecked – and even if they were, the laxity of the 
consular court based on extraterritoriality and the subsidised return tickets to San Francisco 
from Hakodate guaranteed the profitability of the enterprise.  
The case of boundary making in the Kuriles was driven by the fur animal hunters 
from San Francisco, who were partly driven to the area as a result of the monopolistic 
administration of the Alaska hunting grounds, and the Kaitakushi’s ultimately failed effort to 
suppress them. Thus as far as the Kuriles constitute a part of the emergent Japanese territory 
in the 1870s and the early 1880s, what was in the process of emerging should be seen more as 
a U.S.-Japan boundary and less a Russo-Japanese one as has been assumed so far. Also 
important is to note the role of commercial actors. The story cannot certainly be reduced to 
one of imperialism, but needs to include resource extraction by private businesses as an 
important factor that impacted the way in which the boundary emerged in the Kuriles. 
It is abundantly clear that the financial capital and technology available to Kaitakushi 
in the 1870s fell far short of what was necessary to introduce strict border controls and thus 
render the Kuriles part of the Japanese territorial sovereign state. Moreover the nine years 
between the Treaty of St. Petersburg and the relocation of the Kuril Ainu from Shumushu to 
Shikotan makes it clear that the Japanese effort bore little fruit. They failed even to recognise 
the presence of the Kuril Ainu in Rashowa until they encountered them in Shumushu in 1884. 
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The suppression of poaching by foreign vessels remained imperfect. Especially the fur seal 
hunting escaped the attention of the Kaitakushi completely. No diplomatic measures seem to 
have been taken by the foreign ministry vis-à-vis the United States. The removal of the Ainu 
from Simushir to Shikotan in 1884 signified the Kaitakushi’s acknowledgement that the 
introduction of ‘thick’ rule in the Kuriles had failed.81  
Overall the Japanese in the Kuriles had a stronger sense of international law as a 
binding force than the Western sailors or bureaucrats. They were more eager to introduce 
regulations based on international law because they did not have the military or economic 
prowess to buttress their claims. This is where the oft-told image of Japanese modernisation 
needs revisiting: at times the Japanese went ahead of their Western counterparts in adopting 
international law as the guiding principle to co-ordinate different interests between nations. 
Holding the Westerners accountable for international law was their tactic. In the Kuriles, 
international law was a weapon of the weak – but without the power to enforce it, it proved to 
be a weak weapon. 
The Kuriles were thus a place where the Japanese rule over Ezo, the Russian rule of 
its Far East, and the American rule of Alaska encountered one another. In terms of where the 
sovereignty lay the entire island chain became a Japanese possession after 1875, but the 
reality was far more complex than the language of the treaty suggested. The 1867 sale of 
Alaska and the liquidation of the RAC meant that from then on Russian rule over the Kuriles 
was non-existent. It became a playground of American vessels searching for fur animals who 
were excluded from the commercial opportunities in Alaska by the ACC which had inherited 
the RAC’s assets and firmly guarded its monopoly with the help of the U.S. government, 
which was probably keen on ensuring a steady flow of profits from this controversial 
purchase by William Seward, secretary of state. The American vessels reached Etorofu in the 
early 1870s, prompting some Japanese response. After the Russo-Japanese swap of Sakhalin 
and the Kuriles, the Japanese, and specifically the Kaitakushi, took charge of bringing the 
Kuriles into the modern state structure based on the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
                                                           
81 Fumoto, ‘Kakutei sareru kokkyō’, 152. 
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However their insistence on the extension of territorial sovereignty three miles from the coast 
met diplomatic opposition from Parkes, was laughed at by hunters, and proved simply 
impracticable. After a decade of futile attempts to exercise border control and develop the 
island chain into an economically viable and culturally advancing part of the Meiji state, the 
Japanese government in 1884 acknowledged their loss by vacating the Shumushu and 
Rashowa islands where the Ainu people had resided and leaving the entire area north of 
Etorofu unmanned. The technological standards of the nineteenth century, its politically 
subordinate position fixed in the unequal treaties, and the financial constraints collectively 
prevented the Japanese from overcoming the natural conditions and fully incorporating the 
Kuriles into their emerging territorial sovereign state. The Kaitakushi’s struggle over these 
commercially minor (from the government’s perspective) and militarily unimportant islands 
under the nominal Japanese sovereignty shows that the ‘thin’ rule continued to exist until the 
1880s, without much changes from the time of the Russian control.  
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Chapter 6 The southward swing 
 
 
 
As the Meiji leaders slowly came to realise that the Russian threat to Hokkaido may 
have been exaggerated, they turned their attention to the southern border zones. This chapter 
deals with Taiwan, the Bonin Islands, and the Ryukyu Kingdom. Japan’s attitude to these 
border zones and how and why it tried to incorporate them varied. The situation observed 
within the border zones was equally divergent. It is especially important to treat the cases of 
Taiwan and the Ryukyu Kingdom separately, since conventional historiography too often 
lumps them into a single narrative of nascent Japanese imperialism, assuming Japan’s policy 
towards the southwest border zone to be an expansionist response to the impact of the arrival 
of the Western countries.1  
The varied response by the Meiji government that this chapter tries to portray 
collectively opposes the interpretation that there was a single ‘southern policy’ within the 
Japanese government – the image that implicitly emerges from the above-mentioned 
interpretation. The situation in each of the three cases dealt with below differed to the extent 
that a tailored response for each was necessary. If there was any commonality among the 
three southern border zones, it was the lack of a short-term security threat in the way that 
Russia was perceived as posing on the northern border. This made it easier for the Meiji 
government to take bolder measures in the Bonins and the Ryukyu Kingdom, while the 
border zones themselves did not have other sovereign states to play Meiji Japan against. 
Taiwan was a difficult issue for the Meiji government precisely because of the danger that 
collision with the Qing’s claim could lead to a war. 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the varied nature of the border zones’ incorporation 
into the territorial sovereign state system in the East China Sea and the Pacific, and to show 
that the Japanese government’s boldness was to a great extent driven not by the existence of 
                                                           
1 Kim, The Last Phase; Suzuki, Civilisation and Empire. 
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competing claims, but by the fear of losing the balance in other edges of the archipelago as a 
result of losing out in the south. The cases are examined in the way that the critical moment 
for each appear in rough chronological order: Taiwan, the Bonins and the Ryukyu Kingdom. 
 
 
Map 5: Taiwan and the Ryukyu Kingdom 
 
 
The colonisation project of eastern Taiwan 
 
Between 6 and 14 May 1874, some 1,100 Japanese troops in four vessels landed on the 
south-western tip of Taiwan named Liang-Kiou. On 22 May they were joined by 1,800 more 
soldiers on the Takasago-maru, under the command of Saigō Tsugumichi, the head of the 
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Japanese government’s Colonisation Office (banchi jimukyoku).2 One British surveying ship, 
HMS Dwarf, and two Qing battleships were present in the port at the time of the second 
Japanese’ arrival. On the next day several Chinese officers went on board the Takasago-maru 
and met with Saigō. Asked about the purpose of the fleet’s visit, Saigō replied that they had 
come to ‘punish’ the Taiwanese aboriginals over the killing and robbing of Ryukyuan and 
Japanese men when they had been stranded on the shore of Taiwan. Several days before this 
meeting Japanese soldiers engaging in reconnaissance on the island had skirmished with 
Taiwanese aboriginals, killing about thirty of them. According to Saigō’s dispatch, on 26 May 
seven heads of the Taiwanese clans in the area wearing Chinese garb and Manchu-style 
queues visited Saigō. Through communication by writing in Chinese, it transpired that these 
Taiwanese clans had been harassed by the Butan (Paiwan) people, on the south-eastern coast, 
whom Saigō’s troops had meant to attack. Thus these clans agreed to guide the Japanese 
troops to the Butan territory. Saigō gave them swords, guns, and garments, and received ten 
cows in return.3 On 1 June the soldiers headed eastwards on three different routes, and by the 
3rd they attacked and conquered the Butan people who mounted only sporadic sniper attack 
from the bushes. Saigō reported to Tokyo his troops ‘completely burnt down’ their village.4 
This expedition was no ordinary event, for no Japanese overseas expedition had taken 
place since Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea in the 1590s. Moreover, the Meiji 
government had just rescinded the decision to dispatch Saigō Takamori to Korea on a 
battleship, marking the defeat of the seikanron proponents in the leadership. How then did 
this expedition to Taiwan come about just half a year later? Historians have generally taken at 
face value the official explanation that Japan went ahead with the expedition in order to 
strengthen its argument for annexing Ryukyu – a kingdom that had signed treaties with 
foreign powers on its own, and had sent tributary missions to Beijing all the while under 
                                                           
2 The literal translation of the Japanese term is ‘administrative office for the land of barbarians’, but the 
Meiji government used in its official documents the English title of Colonisation Office. See Eskildsen, 
‘Of Civilizations and Savages’, 397. 
3 Taiwan Jōkyō Kikitorigaki’, WUL OSM I14_A0151. The account here is based on an interview by 
Miyagawa Fusayuki, governor of Nagasaki, with Nakao Yūkurō, an officer who had served on the 
Takasago-maru. 
4 Saigō Tsugumichi to Ōkuma Shigenobu, 7 June 1874. WUL OSM I14_A0153. 
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Satsuma domain’s military dominance. The report of an incident involving a Ryukyuan vessel 
wrecked in Taiwan, the argument goes, provided an impetus for the Meiji government, 
especially foreign minister Soejima, to take decisive action with regards to the status of 
Ryukyu. Akira Iriye has noted that: 
 
if those fishermen, Ryukyu subjects, were to be considered Japanese citizens, it would 
be incumbent upon the government to seek satisfaction for their tragedy from the 
Chinese government, which had control over Taiwan, a province of China. If they were 
not viewed as Japanese citizens, Japan’s claim to the Ryukyus would, of course, be 
destroyed.5 
 
Accounts to this effect, which portray the Taiwan Expedition and Ryukyu annexation as two 
phases in the single story of Japanese expansion to the southwest, abound in the conventional 
historiography. In such narratives the invasion of Taiwan is seen solely as a stepping stone 
towards the annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Sometimes the argument also goes the other 
way round; one historian has noted the reason that the Meiji government established ‘the 
Ryukyu domain’ in 1872 was ‘because, needless to say, it [the Meiji government] needed to 
clarify that Ryukyu was part of Japan in order to justify the Taiwan expedition’.6 This last 
claim is problematic given that in 1872 the expedition to Taiwan had not become a concrete 
policy of the Meiji government.7 To say the move on Ryukyu from the beginning of the 1870s 
was a preparation for the Taiwan invasion is to mix up the chronology. It is true that after the 
abolition of the feudal domains in August 1871 there were opinions within the Meiji 
                                                           
5 Akira Iriye, ‘Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status’, in Marius Jansen (ed.), The Emergence of Meiji 
Japan (Cambridge, 1995), 288–89. Calling the victims of the killing ‘fishermen’ is problematic, 
because the account told by the survivers note that forty-eight out of the original sixty-nine passengers 
on the ship were officials of the Miyako Island. The ship was carrying annual tax from Miyako to 
Naha. Kabira Wekata, Kamekawa Wekata, Ginowan Wekata and Yonagusuku Wekata to Satomura 
Tōdayū, Toyomigusuku Wekata, Ikegusuku Wekata, July 1872,  DAJP 1.1.2.1.  
6 Maehira Fusaaki, ‘Bakumatsu ishinki ni okeru Ryukyu no ichi’, in Meiji Ishinshi Gakkai (ed.), Meiji 
Ishin to Ajia (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001), 196.  
7 Mōri Toshihiko, Taiwan Shuppei (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1996), 17-18. Namihira Tsuneo has raised a 
slightly different opposition by arguing that the Meiji government’s designation of Shō Tai as Ryukyu 
han’ō, the lord of Ryukyu, never included an explicit declaration to establish a Ryukyu domain. See 
Namihira, Ryukyu Heigō, ch.2. 
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leadership calling for the reconfiguration of relations with the Ryukyu Kingdom. But these do 
not explain sufficiently why it decided to send troops to Taiwan – a major undertaking for a 
six-year-old government mired in internal strife. Nor do they acknowledge the variety of 
opinions within the Japanese government as to what the expedition should aim for. With this 
in mind, Japan’s internal politics and the Sino-Japanese talks over Taiwan in 1873-4 need to 
be revisited. 
The exact development of the killing of the Ryukyuans is difficult to reconstruct 
because one has to rely on the accounts told by the survivors, and each version offers a 
slightly different explanation to the other. However the gist of the events can be summarised 
as follows. On 30 November 1871, four vessels from the westernmost islands of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, namely Miyako and Ishigaki, left Naha, the main port of Okinawa Island, after 
having carried the annual tax rice there. The ships lost their way before getting home and two 
of them, both from Miyako, got stranded on Taiwan. One of them reached the south-western 
coast and was immediately caught by the Qing authorities. The other ship was less fortunate. 
It landed on the south-eastern coast, controlled by the aboriginal Paiwan people (referred to as 
Butan or Bootan in the writings of the time), with sixty-six surviving crew out of the original 
sixty-nine; three people had drowned. In the next several days the survivors wandered in the 
mountains in search of refuge, during which the Butan people robbed them of their 
belongings and killed fifty-four of them. The rest managed to escape into the Qing-controlled 
part of the island with the help of Chinese residents. The survivors were then sent to 
Taiwanfu, where they reunited with those who were from the other ship. The Ryukyuans were 
then collectively shipped to Fuzhou where they had a trading house, according to China’s 
standard procedure for treating Ryukyuan castaways at this time. They went back to Ryukyu 
in early June 1873.8  
 
 
The expedition plan with multiple faces 
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 Historian Mōri Toshihiko has argued that the initial news of the Ryukyuans’ deaths 
received only minor attention in Tokyo. It was only after a Japanese officer in Beijing, 
Yanagihara Sakimitsu, learnt the potential significance of the situation through a conversation 
with the British minister in Tianjin that the foreign ministry began to consider responding on 
behalf of the Ryukyuans’ plight.9 What decidedly changed the Meiji government’s attitude 
was the coincidental visit of Charles LeGendre, a former American consul in Amoy, to Tokyo. 
DeLong, the American minister, introduced him to Soejima in late October 1872.  
A civil war veteran who had fought under General Ulysses Grant, LeGendre served 
as American consul in Amoy (Xiamen) from 1866 and had been through the experience of 
negotiating with the Taiwanese aboriginals as well as the Qing court over the killing of 
American sailors who had got stranded in Taiwan. LeGendre stopped at Tokyo on his way 
home, after finishing his term in Xiamen. During two meetings with Soejima in October 
1872, LeGendre provided detailed information about the ethnic demography in Taiwan and 
Beijing’s policy towards control of the island, and insisted that Japan should take the eastern 
part where the Qing did not exert authority over the local aboriginal communities. LeGendre 
recommended that Japan build an arsenal for the protection of future stranded sailors as well 
as a lighthouse to mitigate the problem of navigation along Taiwan’s coast. Soejima said that, 
before the meeting with LeGendre, his initial plan on the handling of the Ryukyuans’ incident 
was to send 10,000 soldiers to the island. But he was worried about the reaction from Beijing. 
LeGendre assured to Soejima:  
 
It seems that China regards Formosa as being in the hands of other countries. 
Whichever country controls it would be fine, but if Japan among the Asian region 
                                                           
9 Mōri, Taiwan Shuppei, 3-4. 
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could own it that would be appropriate, so I encourage you to do so. I will do my 
little part to help you.10  
 
Thus Soejima hired LeGendre as his adviser.11 The two lost no time in devising a concrete 
plan for an expedition, in which LeGendre proposed colonisation of the eastern part of the 
island. LeGendre’s plan rested on the assumption that the Qing would dissociate itself from 
the acts of the Taiwanese aborigines on the eastern part of the island and thus deny any claim 
to sovereignty.12 It was at this point that the Meiji government began to see eastern Taiwan as 
potential Japanese territory, and the possibility of somehow carving out the entire island for 
itself. Soejima told Ōkuma Shigenobu on 17 February 1873 that he could obtain half of 
Taiwan through negotiations with the Qing, and if that materialised the rest of the island 
would fall into the Japanese hands within four or five years.13 
 
                                                           
10 Conversation between Soejima and LeGendre, 28 October 1872. DAJP 1.1.2.1 ‘Taiwan Seito Kankei 
Ikken’. My translation. The same document is reprinted in DNGM 7: 14, with slight variation in 
wording.  
11 DNGM 7: 15-6. 
12 Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nananen Taiwan shuppei no shokuminhiteki sokumen’, 72. 
13 Quoted in Mōri, Taiwan Shuppei, 46. 
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Figure 1: LeGendre’s Map of southern tip of Taiwan, November 1872. Aside from the site of the 
Ryukyuans’ arrival in December 1871, the map shows several wreckages around the southern 
peninsula. It also notes the places LeGendre has visited. 
NAJP 177-0051 ‘Taiwan Nanbu Seiban Chizu’. 
 
 176 
In the spring of 1873 Soejima had a chance to confirm LeGendre’s assumption about 
the weak Qing position on Taiwan, when he travelled to Beijing for the exchange of 
ratification of the Sino-Japanese treaty that the two countries had agreed two years before.14 
One of Soejima’s men, Yanagihara, received the word from the Qing officials on 21 June that 
the Taiwanese aborigines were ‘beyond the purview [of the Qing Empire]’.15 To the Japanese 
delegation this confirmed LeGendre’s assertion that the Qing would not intervene in any 
Japanese war with the Taiwanese aboriginals on the eastern coast. Even though this 
conversation between Yanagihara and the Qing officials became the main foundation of the 
Japanese government’s position until the end of the expedition, from Beijing’s perspective 
this was far from giving a green light to the Japanese troops to attack Taiwanese aboriginals 
on the east coast. The Qing government did not accept that a territory’s ownership should be 
determined by the presence of effective rule. The remark was made only verbally and the 
Qing officials did not mean to say eastern Taiwan did not belong to its territory. However, for 
the Japanese government that had begun an assimilation policy towards the Ainu in 
Hokkaido, not engaging with the indigenous peoples was tantamount to abandoning the 
territorial claim. For instance, in 1872 Kuroda Kiyotaka wrote that ‘through development 
projects [Hokkaido] will become a developed area like the mainland, so I want there to be no 
difference between them and us [the Ainu]’. Here, Kuroda writes as though the development 
of land and assimilation of Ainu people were interchangeable, or at least that advance in one 
aspect would bring about the same in the other.16 Soejima acted quickly once Yanagihara’s 
conversation seemingly confirmed LeGendre’s assertion about the Qing’s response. From 
Beijing he instructed Saigō Tsugumichi to gather a battalion from Kagoshima.17 Upon 
                                                           
14 Hagiwara, Daibunretsu (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2008), 154-7. Also see Kunaichō, Meiji Tennōki 
vol.3 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1968). 
15 DNGM6: 178. 
16 Quoted in Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan, 61. 
17 Saigō Takamori Zenshū Sensan Iinkai (ed.), Saigō Takamori Zenshū vol.3 (Tokyo: Yamato Shobō, 
1978). 
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returning to Tokyo he told Parkes that Japan would send a fleet to Taiwan ‘in the next 
month’.18  
Not all people in the Meiji government bought into the logic provided by LeGendre, 
Soejima, and Yanagihara for the justification of Japan’s action in eastern Taiwan. Erasmus 
Peshine Smith, a lawyer from New York and the first legal adviser to the foreign ministry, 
took a more cautious view. Smith’s memorandum, which was written sometime before 
Soejima’s delegation departed for Beijing in the spring of 1873, predicted that the Qing 
would not withdraw its claim to eastern Taiwan. His recommendation was that Tokyo should 
persuade Beijing that Japanese control of eastern Taiwan would be more desirable than 
Western control of the same. This tactic of emphasising the threat of other imperialist powers 
in an attempt to protect and promote one’s own political or commercial interest was a familiar 
line of argument for diplomats in the late-nineteenth-century East Asia.19 In this example, 
Smith suggested that Japan present itself as a friendly power to the Qing with whom it could 
jointly resist Western imperialism. Of course for the Qing, the recognition that Japan was a 
friendly nation took a serious blow as a result of its expedition to Taiwan. Smith and 
LeGendre both started from the assumption that effective control over the population was the 
necessary condition for claiming sovereignty over a certain territory. The two Americans 
differed, however, on the prediction of the Qing's response. Whereas LeGendre argued that 
his experience showed that the Qing would not intervene and that Japan should have freedom 
of action in eastern Taiwan, which included building a colony, Smith thought that the Qing 
would stick to its claim on eastern Taiwan. Yanagihara’s conversation seemingly proved 
LeGendre right, but that was not the case. 
From early 1873 to right before the expedition, several Japanese went to Taiwan for 
reconnaissance. Some of them received government's instructions, while others were students 
                                                           
18 Parkes to Granville, 25 August 1873. Hakodate. FO46/167 no67 incl.1, 20 August 1873. 
19 Recall Townsend Harris’s strategy in concluding a US-Japan commercial treaty in 1858, where he 
referred to the British attack on China as indicating a possible course of events for Japan in the near 
future if it failed to open itself for trade. See William Beasley, ‘The foreign threat and the opening of 
the ports’, in Marius Jansen (ed.), The Cambridge History of Japan vol.5: The Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 259-307. Here 278-9. In Russia, Pëtr Stemoukhov 
stressed the expedience of Russian presence in southern Sakhalin in the 1867 negotiations with Koide 
Hidemi. See chapter 3.  
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in Hong Kong. They stayed in various parts of Taiwan for months, and wrote reports on how 
the expedition should be carried out. Their reports present different plans from that of 
LeGendre and illustrate a more diverse picture of how the Japanese perceived the purpose of 
this expedition. Kabayama Sukenori, Fukushima Kyūsei, Narutomi Seifū, and Kodama 
Toshikuni were army officers, while Mizuno Jun and Kurooka Yūnojō were language 
students in Hong Kong. Their inspection focused on the northeastern part of the island, as 
opposed to LeGendre’s knowledge of the southern tip. Their reports were based upon up-to-
date and direct information from their personal experience, and their contact with the Soejima 
delegation in China as well as the employment of many of them by the expeditionary force 
suggest that the government took them seriously.  
Fukushima, who stayed in Taiwan for the first time from June to July 1873, 
recommended that Japan should start contacting aboriginals in the northeast where Qing rule 
was tenuous and begin trading with them.20 His plan resembled the Meiji government's policy 
towards the Ainu in that he saw Japan’s role as providing them with daily necessities and 
‘bringing them up to civilisation’. Here his focus was on raising profits from trading with the 
aboriginals and not on sending settlers from Japan. Fukushima's vision is clearer in his second 
memorandum in December 1873 that he wrote after his second visit to Taiwan. In this report 
he argued that retaliating to the aboriginals who killed the Ryukyuans is only to ‘gain acclaim 
today’ but if Japan ‘nurtures (buiku)’ the aboriginals that would be the path towards 
controlling the entire island and securing economic profits for the future. Therefore 
Fukushima proposed that Japan should claim the punishment of the Butan people as the outer 
motive, while in reality aiming at subjugating the aboriginal areas of the island. What is also 
noticeable is his recommendation that such a job should be taken up by a private company.21 
Thus his vision was heavily skewed towards making profits as opposed to creating Japanese 
settler colonies with which to buttress Japanese control of the island. Fukushima wrote two 
                                                           
20 Robert Eskildsen has mentioned Fukushima's report, but he has wrongly surmised that Fukushima's 
source of information was Japanese spies such as Kabayama. In fact Fukushima himself went to 
Taiwan twice. Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nananen’, 73; DAJP 1.1.2.1-1. 
21 Fukushima to the foreign ministry, August 1873; Fukushima’s memorandum, incl. to Ueno to 
Iwakura, 5 December 1873. DAJP 1.1.2.1.  
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more memoranda in January and February 1874 and stuck with his position that Japan should 
gradually develop trade relations with the Taiwanese aboriginals without being noticed by the 
Qing government. Up to February 1874, he did not show any recognition that Japanese rule of 
Taiwan would require large-scale migration from Japan or that their action will show Japan’s 
advance towards civilisation to the Western countries.22 
In contrast to Fukushima’s mercantilist approach, Kabayama, Narutomi, and Kodama 
took a more hard-line position. Kabayama, who first brought the issue to the Meiji 
government from Kagoshima in August 1872, was in favour of immediate military action. He 
regarded half of Taiwan as outside Qing control and believed therefore that Japan should at 
once send troops from Ryukyu.23 Narutomi’s memorandum in December 1873 recommended 
Japanese migration, the transfer of agricultural technology and infrastructure development. 
Kodama wrote to Tokyo in January and February 1874 both times from Danshui in northern 
Taiwan. He had been waiting for the Japanese troops there all through the latter part of 1873, 
without knowing that the government had been shaken up by the leadership split. Kodama’s 
proposal was different from the others in that he argued that the Japanese expedition of 
Taiwan and the subjugation of the aboriginals would eventually lead to safer maritime 
transport, which  Japan could then use to send merchant ships to ‘China and India’ and build a 
path towards development. The second memomandum contained further details of his plan, 
and his vision was more long-term than Fukushima or Narutomi. Importantly, he regarded the 
development of Taiwan following the expedition as a southern counterpart of the Kaitakushi 
in Hokkaido. He argued that Japan should establish a ‘Taiwan Kaitakushi’ once the 
expedition was over; and introduce the tondenhei system that was being implemented in 
Hokkaido from that year.24 He also suggested that 800 Kagoshima men who had served in 
                                                           
22 NDL ‘The Selcted Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy and other Government Agencies,1868-
1945’, Reel 34; WUL OSM I14_A0126.  
23 NDL Kensei Shiryōshitsu Shūshū Monjo 243-7. Kabayama Sukenori to Kirino Toshiaki, 11 October 
1872.  
24 Tondenhei, translated as ‘soldier-farmer’, was a system that originated in ancient Japan and was 
revived by the Meiji government when carrying out migration projects in Hokkaido. Applicants 
received necessary equipment, annual stipend in rice and cash, and a piece of land that they would 
cultivate. They also engaged in military training. Michele Mason has noted that the hidden purpose of 
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Hokkaido should be a good fit for the job in Taiwan since they had the experience of starting 
a settler colony.25 He proposed that the compensation for labourers in Taiwan should be in 
accordance with that of labourers in Hokkaido under the Kaitakushi. Kodama put together a 
blueprint of Taiwan Kaitakushi including its expected budget, which included expenses for 
food for six months.  
These memoranda had one important difference from LeGendre’s recommendations. 
They were of the opinion that Japan was in competition with the Qing in ‘bringing up’ the 
aboriginals. A similar perspective has been observed among the Japanese and Russian 
officials in Sakhalin in regards to the Ainu and other indigenous residents. For the Japanese 
inspectors, the question over Ryukyu was not the ultimate reason why the Taiwan expedition 
was necessary. Many of them came from Satsuma and, as Ryukyu had been under their 
domain’s control for over two centuries, they naturally believed that Japanese control was 
already an undisputed notion that did not need any further strengthening. In their minds, 
Taiwan was the real prize. The official position of the foreign ministry was different, but it is 
important to take note of the former-Satsuma officers’ view as they played key roles in 
developing the plan for the Taiwan expedition.26  
After Soejima left the government in the leadership split in October 1873, the idea of 
building a colony in eastern Taiwan was passed on to Ōkuma Shigenobu and Saigō 
Tsugumichi. Yet the government's view of the Taiwan expedition was in a confused state. 
Yanagisawa wrote up a plan for the expedition in late January 1874, in which he insisted that 
the aim should be the colonisation of eastern Taiwan. But the nine-article proposal drafted by 
Ōkubo and Ōkuma based on Yanagihara's draft omitted any mention of colonisation and 
stated that the aim was to bring redress for the distressed Ryukyuans. There is, though, an 
indication that colonisation as a formal aim re-emerged as official policy, for on 13 March 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the tondenhei was to disarm domestic unrests in the early Meiji period, and for that purpose the project 
needed a paretic and militaristic discourse aimed at Russia. See Mason, Dominant Narratives, 40-44.  
25 Kabayama was on the same ship with these 800 men on his way from Tokyo to Kagoshima in the 
autumn of 1872. Saigō Totoku Kabayama Sōtoku Kinen Jigyō Shuppan Iinkai (ed.), Saigō Totoku to 
Kabayama Sōtoku (Taipei: Saigō Totoku Kabayama Sōtoku Kinen Jigyō Shuppan Iinkai, 1936), 157. 
26 Among the inspectors, Kabayama and Kodama came from Satsuma. 
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LeGendre’s memorandum to Ōkuma Shigenobu, the colonial minister who was to be formally 
appointed on 4 April, stuck with the line he had been advocating together with Soejima. It 
stated that ‘the ostensible object of the expedition will be simply to punish the Boutans and 
prevent the recurrence of their evil practices in the future, while in fact, its real object will be 
the annexation of Aboriginal Formosa.’27 
Robert Eskildsen has argued that colonisation remained government policy at least 
until the middle of April 1874. He has also argued that the connection with Ryukyu was made 
in order to avoid criticism from the Western nations about the colonial project.28 But the 
instruction containing the colonisation clause was changed once again shortly before Saigō 
Tsugumichi was appointed to lead the troops to Taiwan. In the draft instructions to Saigō 
written sometime in late March for the approval of prime minister Sanjō Sanetomi, the 
following clause appeared (showing the original strikethrough):  
 
After the war it is to be the purpose that (we establish government offices in strategic 
points and build soldiers’ colonies in various places); [and that we,] with 
administration and education, gradually guide and enlighten the barbarians (dojin) 
and establish a fruitful enterprise between the barbarians and the Japanese 
government.29  
 
This draft shows that the Meiji government had in fact abandoned the colonial aspect of the 
Taiwan expedition before the dispatch of Saigō and replaced it with a project of bringing 
civilisation to the Taiwanese aboriginals. It is not known who initiated the change, but Sanjō 
explained to Ōkuma Shigenobu, who was appointed as colonial minister soon afterwards, on 
28 March: 
 
                                                           
27 LeGendre to Ōkuma, 13 March 1874. NAJP A03030002600 ‘Naikaku Tankōsho Banchishori’. 
28 Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, 388-418, here 397; Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nananen’. 
29 The author of the document is unknown, ‘Taiwan chihō jimu totoku ininjō an narabini setsuyu an’, 
March 1874. WUL OSM I04-A0128. The parentheses and the strikethrough are as in the original. 
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it is not that the issue of colonisation and land appropriation (shokumin ryakuchi) 
have been finalised in the discussion hitherto held … it would be inconvenient if we 
did not have a discussion once again. But when we actually visit and see [Taiwan] for 
the purpose of regulation (torishimari) and if [we decide that] we take the above 
action as appropriate for the purpose of appeasing and nurturing the barbarian 
residents (banmin), then [further] discussion will not be needed. However all of us 
have agreed yesterday on the point of conducting the expedition for punitive purpose 
only. Thus if we are going for land appropriation, there might be disagreement on 
doing so without having some discussion.30  
 
The government agreed that the revised version of the instructions, with the reference to 
colonisation removed, should be sent to Saigō Tsugumichi on 5 April.31 The plan conceived 
by Japanese inspectors and LeGendre to create a Japanese colony in north-eastern Taiwan 
was thus thrown out, at least for the time being. The complication was that this did not mean 
that all parties concerned understood or accepted the revised purpose of the expedition. 
Iwakura expressed concern to Sanjō on 16 April by saying that  
 
Even though the instruction was revised, the mood on the ground has already been 
bent on colonisation, and the commander [Saigō]’s execution would undoubtedly 
look like colonsation. In this case [difficult] relations with other countries would 
arise, … I am terribly worried.32   
 
The ensuing controversy among historians over what caused Japan to invade Taiwan in 1874 
has not been settled, and the upshot might simply be that different people in the decision-
making process had different ideas and believed in their own version of the state’s 
motivations. 
                                                           
30 Sanjō to Ōkuma, 28 March 1874. OSM I14_B0022_0004. 
31 DNGM 7: 19-20. 
32 ITKM vol.6, 41. Reprinted in Kawabata Megumu, ‘Taiwan Shuppei ni Tsuiteno Ichikōsatsu’, 273. 
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With the complicated motives and varied explanations given by different parties, the 
policy did not go down well on the diplomatic front. It is true that the Japanese assertion of its 
role as ‘civilisers’ in Taiwan garnered some support from the Western diplomats, such as the 
Italian Chargé d’Affaires, Comte Litta, who told foreign minister Terashima Munenori that 
‘there will be some benefits if [Japan] could send migrants [to Taiwan] in the future’. 
Terashima queried if there would be benefits in migration. Litta replied: ‘In the East your 
country is the beacon of enlightenment [kaika]; you should guide the barbarians and make 
them proceed to humanity’.33 Nevertheless the Meiji government failed to gain support from 
the two most important foreign governments, Britain and the United States. On 18 April the 
United States minister, John Bingham, retracted his support after reading an article in Japan 
Gazette, a local English newspaper, that criticised him for violating the obligation for wartime 
neutrality. He rather belatedly told the foreign ministry that the Sino-American treaty bound 
his country to assist China in case of diplomatic difficulties; that Taiwan in its entirety was 
under Qing control; and therefore the Japanese purported action in Taiwan compelled the 
U.S. government to stop American vessels and personnel from taking part in the expedition.34 
Terashima gave Bingham the official explanation that the purpose of the expedition was ‘only 
to punish’ the aboriginal peoples,35 but the latter was undeterred and promptly ordered 
neutrality for American citizens and vessels. On the same day Parkes sided with Bingham and 
argued that the planned action would amount to an invasion of Qing territory.36 Their 
opposition forced the Meiji leaders in Tokyo to halt the mission on the following day. 
However, the soldiers who had gathered in Nagasaki waiting for the green light did not 
adhere to the new mission directive or the government decision to suspend the expedition.37 
Defying the order from Tokyo, the ships still went off to Taiwan. The fact that the expedition 
took place in spite of British and American opposition poses a question about Shogo Suzuki’s 
                                                           
33 Conversation between Terashima Munenori and Comte Litta, 10 April 1874. IHAA Hanabusa 
Shishakuke Monjo 6, ‘Taiwan Ikkensho’. 
34 Conversation between Ueno and Bingham, 18 April 1874. DAJP 1.1.2.1 ‘Taiwan Seitō Kankei 
Ikken’. 
35 Conversation between Terashima and Bignham, 18 April 1874. DAJP 1.1.2.1-1 ‘Taiwan Seitō 
Jiken’, 311. 
36 Parkes to Tenterden, 7 April 1874. Cited in Hagiwara, Pekin Koshō, 133-4. 
37 Ochiai, ‘Meiji shokino gaiseiron to higashi Ajia’, 103. 
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interpretation that, ‘[h]aving engaged with the notion that “civilized” states had the “duty” to 
“enlighten” the “barbarous” peoples, Japan sent military expeditions to “pacify” the 
Taiwanese “savages” and carve for themselves a “civilized” identity…’.38 
Having won a quick victory over the Butan, the Japanese soldiers began building 
roads and barracks while suffering from the heat and the spread of malaria, which caused 
many deaths among the troops. The real diplomatic conundrum began when the Qing 
protested, contrary to the earlier anticipation by Soejima and LeGendre. Qing opposition in 
writing reached Terashima in Tokyo on 4 June.39 The Qing also dispatched troops to the 
western coast of Taiwan. On 22 June Saigō Tsugumichi received Shen Baozhen, the imperial 
commissioner for negotiations with Japan, and Pan Wei, the magistrate of Fuzhou, on his 
vessel.40 The Qing representatives suggested they assume the responsibility for catching the 
Taiwan aborigines who were responsible for the killing of the Ryukyuans. Saigō declined to 
engage in negotiations and asked them to talk to Yanagihara, the Japanese minister residing in 
Shanghai. The same argument went back and forth in the next three meetings, and on the 26th 
the two sides became a little more forthcoming when they conversed over lunch. Saigō told 
the Qing representatives that Japan could not give up the task of getting redress to the Qing 
having committed so much money and soldiers. The Qing representatives laughed and told 
Saigō that the Butan clan, with a population of just around 200 and ‘possessing merely 
livestock and rice paddies’, could not possibly pay the reparations. He then asked Saigō how 
much the Japanese had spent so far for the expedition. Saigō said it was around 1.2 million 
ryō. The Qing representative said he would write to Yanagihara in Shanghai and asked Saigō 
to refrain from landing any more troops on Taiwan or making any further advance with the 
existing soldiers, to which Saigō agreed. The Qing representative left Taiwan on the next day.  
                                                           
38 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 180.!
39 DNGM 7: 72-7. 
40 Records of conversation reprinted in DNGM misrepresent the Chinese inspector as Pan, but it was in 
fact Shen. This elementary error makes one wonder to what extent the Qing and the Japanese officials 
managed to understand each other. This might also explain why the accounts of the same event vary 
from one another. See ibid.. 
 185 
 On 8 July negotiations ensued between Yanagihara and the Shanghai magistrate. The 
conversation soon arrived at deadlock because the two sides had a conflicting understanding 
of what had been agreed between Saigō and the Qing representatives in Taiwan. While the 
Qing claimed that Saigō had agreed to the swift withdrawal of troops now that the retaliation 
was complete, Yanagihara thought the Chinese side was distorting the records of the 
conversation. In mid-July the Qing sent an official protest to Tokyo, arguing that Japan’s 
expedition breached the Sino-Japanese treaty. Thus Ōkubo Toshimichi, the interior minister 
and the effective head of the government after the split of the leadership in the previous year, 
arrived in Beijing on 10 September in order to negotiate a settlement with the Zongli Yamen 
and Li Hongzhang. The talks circled around the same old point of whether the Qing exercised 
sovereignty over eastern Taiwan, but without seeing either side compromise. The collapse of 
the negotiations and the possibility of war as a result were avoided only because of the 
mediation of Thomas Wade, the British minister to Beijing, who feared that any conflict 
might disrupt British trade in China. Wade managed to get the two parties to finally sign a 
protocol on 31 October. In the carefully phrased agreement the Qing acknowledged that the 
Japanese action was ‘a moral action for protecting citizens’ (homin no gikyo); the Qing would 
pay 100,000 taels as compensation for the families of those killed by the Taiwanese 
aboriginals; and Japan would withdraw its troops by 20 December, after which the Qing 
would pay 400,000 taels.41 
After the news of Ōkubo’s departure to Beijing appeared in newspaper headlines and 
the rumour of war with the Qing grew bigger and bigger, former samurai from across the 
country rushed to take part in what they saw as the long-awaited opportunity to fulfil their 
responsibility to their master. Facing such reforms as the abolition of the domains and the 
conscription act of January 1873, the samurai felt that they had lost their place in the Meiji 
society. Hundreds of petitioners wrote to the army ministry in September and October, 
picturing themselves as fighting for the country against the Chinese. They pleaded with the 
                                                           
41 Hagiwara, Pekin Koshō, 325-6. For the full text of the agreement see DNGM 7: 316-7. For a detailed 
account of the Taiwan expedition and the following negotiations in Beijing, see Eskildsen, ‘Of 
Civilizations and savages’; Hagiwara, Pekin Koshō, 128-46, 163-82, 212-338. 
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government, at this critical moment, to let them ‘atone the sin of having been fed in peacetime 
without merits (heizei sosan no tsumi wo tsugunai)’, and ‘serve even as a bearer’. The fact 
that only a few months ago the Meiji government was the target of their disgruntlement all 
but evaporated.42  
In sum, the rhetorical interpretation of the Taiwan Expedition as a way of advancing 
the Japanese annexation of Ryukyu cannot fully explain the reason why Saigō Tsugumichi, 
defying the government’s order, landed on Taiwan. The English School explanation of 
Japan’s showing its civilising face to the Westerners also falls short as it reads too much into 
the government’s rhetoric and cannot account for the execution of the expedition taking place 
in the face of British and American opposition.43 What led to the Taiwan expedition was a 
combination of contingent events. The killing of the Ryukyuans in December 1871 and 
LeGendre’s assertion about the limits of the Qing sovereignty provided the initial impetus. 
Soejima and many other leaders in the government too easily believed LeGendre’s 
interpretation and misread the Qing response. Incepted by Soejima and LeGendre, the Taiwan 
colonisation project aimed at creating a breathing space for the former samurai class within 
the country, whose social displacement would have caused a serious problem to Tokyo. 
Yanagihara’s confirmation of the limits of the Qing’s control was at best a half-baked 
statement, but the army officers and students jumped on it and helped the leadership in Tokyo 
to put together concrete plans for the expedition, with the final goal of setting up a colony in 
Taiwan and achieve economic development for the benefit of mainland Japan. In doing so, 
the Meiji leadership walked a fine line between having to fight a war with China and risking 
an emergence of violent opposition against the government at home – the example of which 
already appeared in Saga prefecture in early 1874.44 The attempt to push its boundary onto 
                                                           
42 NAJP A01100079100. ‘Ehimeken shizoku Seike Sadatora hoka shijū shichimei negai’, in ‘Seishin 
jūgun negai meibo’ vol.1. 
43 See, for instance, Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 154. 
44 For the Saga rebellion, see Stephen Vlastos, ‘Opposition movements in early Meiji, 1868–1885’, in 
Marius Jansen (ed.),  The Cambridge History of Japan vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: 
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Taiwan was an act of testing the Qing’s position and the feverish desires of the former 
samurai class to grab the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to fulfil their obligation. 
After Soejima was gone, the assumed audience for the Taiwan policy in the minds of 
the Meiji leaders such as Ōkubo and Iwakura seems to have been more domestic than 
international. What they really feared was not so much maintaining face vis-à-vis Western 
observers or colonisation of Taiwan by a foreign country, but the escalation of opposition 
movements led by the disenfranchised samurai class against their government. Although the 
leadership decided to omit the establishment of colonies from the purpose of the expedition, 
and British and American opposition forced them to halt the mission altogether at the last 
minute, pressure from the soldiers who gathered around Saigō Tsugumichi in Nagasaki, and 
the possibility that they could turn against the government if the mission was cancelled, left 
Ōkubo with no choice other than to endorse their dispatch. The Ryukyu connection was a 
pretext in the beginning, but Ōkubo in Beijing had to claim that it had been the Japanese aim 
all through the mission. The departure of Saigō’s Takasago-maru for Taiwan in April 1874 
was merely six years after taking Edo castle, where the shogunate had ruled for over 250 
years. The government’s foundations were far from perfect.45 Iwakura admitted in February 
1875 that he had been unsure of the country’s future until very recently.46 As Parkes observed 
and was picked up by earlier scholarship in the 1970s, the Taiwan Expedition served to 
address the main source of such uncertainty: the jobless ex-samurai.47 The way to do so, as 
they envisaged in the spring of 1874, was not only to give former samurai an opportunity to 
fight a war, but also to give them a new place to live, far away from mainland Japan, 
especially the new capital. By then the Meiji leaders concluded that there was no point in 
                                                           
45 Parkes wrote in the midst of the Sino-Japanese standoff in Taiwan that it was not determined how 
long the current government would last. Parkes to Derby, 16 June 1874. Cited in Hagiwara, Pekin 
Koshō, 201.  
46 Parkes to Derby, 1 February 1875. Cited in Hagiwara, Pekin Koshō, 210. 
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fighting against Russia in southern Sakhalin, where the Japanese had little chance of 
succeeding in settling anyway. Turning south, the Meiji Japan saw Taiwan as a place that 
could have given the nation a breathing space, but Qing opposition denied this possibility. 
During the six-month-long stay in Taiwan, 538 Japanese men out of the total 3,658 perished. 
Ninety-eight per cent of them died of disease, mostly malaria.48 The Taiwan expedition thus 
was a policy disaster for a Meiji government that never controlled the entire policymaking 
process, and was only narrowly saved from an even bigger catastrophe – a war with China – 
by British arbitration in Beijing.  
 
 
The Bonins: Japan’s encounter with the Pacific 
 
If you went to a port town in the north-eastern coast of North America in the first half 
of the nineteenth century and asked a sailor on a street if he had been to Japan, many would 
have said yes. From Nantucket, New Bedford, Boston and other places, numerous ships 
headed for the Western Pacific and passed by Japan. Yet the ‘Japan’ that sailors had in mind 
was not the Tokugawa shogunate in Edo; it was a maritime space which American whaling 
ships frequented. This area, roughly surrounded by the Japanese archipelago in the north, the 
Ryukyu island chain in the west, Saipan island in the south-western corner and the Bonin 
islands on the south-eastern corner, constituted ‘Japan ground’, which offered tremendous 
opportunities to catch sperm whales. While roaming the Pacific, whalers replenished their 
ships with food, water and coal, added new crew or left those who were unfit, exchanged 
letters and information, typically in the Sandwich Islands or the Bonin islands. These tiny 
islands scattered in the Pacific were indispensable for the whalers’ long journeys at sea, often 
stretching to several years without calling at their home port. 
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Kabayama Sōtoku, 471. 
 189 
The impact of the whaling industry is what is unique about the formation of the 
boundaries around the Bonins. The arrival of the settlers and the frequent visits by whaling 
ships created the perception among those who crossed the Pacific that this would become an 
important connection point. The rise of whaling in the ‘Japan ground’ raised the necessity to 
formulate some sort of governance in the Bonins where there had previously been none. 
Between the 1820s and the 1870s three countries emerged as the possible guarantor of law 
and order in the islands – Britain, the United States and Japan – but no formal agreement was 
signed among them in the end to settle the question of to whom the Bonins belonged. Finally 
at the end of 1875 Meiji government officials sailed to the Bonins and declared that they 
would be formally incorporated into Japan, to which neither the settlers, who were mostly of 
European or American origin, or the British and American diplomats in Tokyo voiced strong 
opposition. If this was imperial expansion, it was an unusually quiet example. There was no 
kingdom to be absorbed or conquered. There was no treaty that settled the status of the 
Bonins, unlike in the case of Japan’s northern border. As will be discussed later, the Japanese 
once sent migrants in 1862, but all of them left the island after just one year. Despite all this, 
from 1876 the Bonins were kept under Japanese rule until defeat in the Pacific War, and then 
were put under the American control. The United States returned them to Japanese 
sovereignty in 1968.49 
Why did Meiji Japan, despite its tenuous legal claim and limited financial and 
military resources, establish territorial control over the Bonins? This needs to be understood 
in the context of the gradual but steady territorial scramble in the Pacific that had already 
begun by the mid-1870s. The United States controlled the Midway Islands since 1867, and 
American residents in Hawaii, then called the Sandwich Islands, were already debating over 
the possibility of U.S. annexation of the island kingdom.50 Meanwhile the German navy, a 
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relative latecomer in the imperial competition in the Pacific, sought to possess naval bases 
and colonies in various places around the Pacific in the 1860s, including small islands off the 
western coast of Japan, the eastern coast of Taiwan, New Guinea, and the Sulu islands in the 
Philippines.51 In the spring of 1875 Britain’s China squadron, as well as its minister in Tokyo, 
proposed the occupation of Port Hamilton, a small island off the southern coast of the Korean 
Peninsula.52 In short, the maritime space around the Japanese archipelago in the mid-1870s 
was gradually waking up to the pressure of imperial competition and entering a 
transformative phase into the sovereign state system. But what determined the relative 
passivity of the Bonins’ shift into becoming Japanese territory?  
As noted in the introduction, the legalistic discourse of the existing scholarship 
cannot serve as an adequate history of the emergence of this territorial boundary. It needs to 
be noted that that although the settlers wanted someone to provide law and order53 and 
diplomats did engage in legal debates, neither determined the eventual territorial delimitation. 
Japan took the Bonins not because of the relative merit of its legal claim, but because the 
United States and Britain did not want territorial control, while Japan feared the side-effect 
that disinterest might have on its other border zones. The United States and Britain, in turn, 
condoned Japanese rule while trying to preserve their privileges of extraterritoriality. 
Although the two powers, especially the United States, had an interest in the islands in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, their appetite had dissipated by the 1870s.  
 
 
Bonins before 1862 
 The Bonins were not destined to be marginal in the mid-nineteenth century. People 
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who had knowledge of the islands expected that they would before long develop into a 
transportation hub for trans-Pacific trade and commerce. This naturally led to the question of 
who would control them. If one were to determine the islands’ ownership by the principle of 
‘official’ discovery it was the British who had the best case. The first person to make any kind 
of claim under the name of a state on the Bonins was a British naval captain Frederick 
William Beechey of HMS Blossom who came across the islands during his Pacific expedition 
in 1827. He raised the British flag and left a copper plate stating that he had claimed the 
islands for the British government. He found two Europeans who had been shipwrecked and 
remained there for months.54 But no settlement or effective show of control ensued, and the 
two stowaways Beechey encountered left the island the next year on a Russian Pacific 
expedition’s ship. Fjodor Petrowitsch Lütke, who picked up the stowaways, noted of the 
Bonins in his visit in March 1828: ‘These islands may become very useful and important to 
Kamchatka. The climate is extremely fine, and the plants and fruits of the torrid and 
temperate zone flourish equally well’.55 
 The first settlers came to the Bonins on 26 June 1830. They consisted of two 
Americans, two Britons (one was originally from Genoa), one Dane, and twenty-five 
Sandwich Islanders.56 They had heard flattering rumours about the Bonins, in which the living 
conditions were evidently glorified, as the last paradise on earth. The two British citizens 
named Matteo Mazarro, around fifty years old, and his long-time sailing company Richard 
Millinchamp,57 about twenty years younger, took the initiative and employed Nathaniel 
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Savory and Alden Chapin, both from Massachusetts, and Charles Johnson from Denmark, 
under a one-year contract agreed in Honolulu. The Sandwich Islanders were also contracted 
to Mazarro and Millinchamp for three years. The contract was such that Mazarro and 
Millinchamp would supply daily necessities as well as vegetable seeds for farms, and the 
labourers would work on the land. When the harvest came, the whole produce would be sold 
by Mazarro or Millinchamp to visiting vessels, and the labourers would receive half of the 
sales. This was known by the islanders as ‘going upon halves’.58 About six months later, one 
British naval vessel visited the island and provided the settlers with supplies. It is not certain 
whether this was done in any coordination with Richard Charlton, the British consul in 
Honolulu, who encouraged the migration of the first settlers and provided them with a Union 
Jack, but it is likely that this visit aimed to check on the settlers’ development. Next year 
HMS Churchill stopped at the Bonins. Lieutenant Cole, who headed the vessel, was 
concerned about what might happen in the future in regards to the competitive claims for 
control with the United States. The two principal settlers, Mazarro and Millinchamp, were 
British (or at least they claimed to be), but Mazarro was getting old and Millinchamp could 
easily find opportunities elsewhere.59 This would leave the Americans in a better position. 
Cole wrote:  
 
when the only settlers will be Americans, if they continue & prosper they will no 
doubt soon increase, the proximity of these islands to Japan & northern parts of 
China, may induce many of that enterprising country to come out, in hopes that some 
day they might be of consequence they having been taken possession of by us - & the 
present settlers having the British flag flying, a little now might save much trouble 
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hereafter, they are certainly fine Islands but not what I expected from the description 
I have had of them.60 
 
In short Cole suggested Britain may need to strengthen its claim now if it were to hold on to 
the islands in the future. As the whaling industry underwent a dramatic expansion in the first 
half of the nineteenth-century, people began to realise its commercial impact on the Pacific 
region, including the Bonin Islands. In 1832 a British merchant named Thomas Horton made 
an appeal to his government to establish a proprietary government in the Sandwich Islands 
and the Bonins.61 Three years later another British naval officer Alex Johnson spoke of Port 
Lloyd, the main port in Chichijima, the largest island in the Bonins, that it was said to ‘afford 
shelter to about 40 ships and might be of great benefit to (men of war) or other if any thing 
was to be done along the coast of China.’62 
 As a set of tiny islands in the middle of the ocean, the Bonins presented no commercial 
opportunity in themselves. Seen from the perspective of British officials, as well as 
Americans, it was the islands’ location relative to East Asia that mattered. Alexander 
Simpson, the British Consul in the Sandwich Islands, wrote to the Admiralty in 1842 that the 
Bonin Islands’ location ‘—so near Japan, that mysterious empire, of which the trade will one 
day be of immense value—gives them a peculiar importance and interest’.63 In the same year 
Simpson appointed Mazarro, who had visited Honolulu from the Bonins, as the head of the 
settlers.64 
Americans also saw the potential value of the Bonins as a transportation link. In 
October 1850 the Honolulu-based newspaper Polynesian reprinted an article from San 
Francisco Herald that pointed to the necessity of setting up a coal depot on the Bonins, while 
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estimating that the shortest trans-Pacific route was from San Francisco to Shanghai if the ship 
went via Hawaii and the Bonins, taking an average steamer ‘thirty-two and a half days, 
without including stoppages’. It said that ‘from San Francisco to Honolulu is twenty one 
hundred miles, and the next most desirable stopping place by this route [to China] would be 
the Bonin Islands…. This division of distances would make the shortest stages, and- furnish 
fine harbors…. The convenience of Honolulu is well known, and Port Lloyd in the Bonin 
Islands is quite equal to it.’65 
 It was probably Commodore Matthew Perry who was the most optimistic among the 
Americans, or indeed any Westerners, about the future of the Bonins. His mission to Japan in 
1853 and 1854 aimed not only to open Japan to treaty relations, but also to survey the trans-
Pacific routes for commerce between California and the China coast. Two routes were under 
consideration: the Great Circle route, travelling along America’s west coast and the 
Kamchatka Peninsula, the Kuril Islands and then down the Japanese archipelago; or closer to 
the equator line, via the Sandwich Islands and Nagasaki.66 If the latter were chosen, the 
commercial opportunities for the Bonins would be tremendous. Perry predicted that if a ship 
crossed the Pacific via Hawaii and the Bonins, travel between Shanghai and New York could 
be as quick as the Shanghai-London route.67 Before the Perry expedition, an American 
commander James Glynn had written of the necessity for a coal depot around Formosa, the 
Ryukyu Islands or the Bonins.68 Perry was convinced of the superiority of Port Lloyd over  
Naha after his return from the expedition. Perry stated that the Bonins would be the only 
supply point for coal west of Hawaii in the Pacific.69 He predicted that American, British and 
French ships would come to the Bonins in great numbers for refreshments and supplies. He 
even dreamed of establishing ‘a religious and happy community’ from which missionaries 
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might visit neighbouring non-Christian countries.70 Perry took Glynn’s plea one step forward 
by purchasing a piece of land from the inhabitants and setting up coal depots both in Naha in 
the Ryukyus and in Port Lloyd on Chichijima (called Peel Island by the American navy).71  
 Perry’s act irked the British who had regarded their position in the Bonins as 
uncontested. When Perry’s book on his Japan expedition came out, the British media 
disapproved of his conduct. After quoting a section on the Bonins where Perry questioned the 
validity of Beechey’s proclamation and thus British sovereignty, the London-based 
newspaper The Spectator wrote that readers of his memoir would criticise Perry’s 
‘highhanded’ conduct, disregarding Japanese and Ryukyuan laws, ‘trespassing on their 
regulations and rules, and using “constructive” force’, unless they ‘maintain the doctrine that 
peoples have no right to put themselves out of “comity of nations”, and … think that the end 
justifies the means…’.72 When Captain Beechey died later that year, an obituary published in 
The Athenaeum, a London-based literary magazine, made sure to point out that it was him 
who took formal possession of the Bonin Islands in the name of the Crown.73 
 If Perry’s visit to the Bonins raised British concerns about its claim to the island, the 
Crimean War made the British realise the vulnerability of their possessions in the Pacific in 
general, be they Australia or Singapore, and the importance of strengthening their defences. 
One newspaper in London opined that  
 
the possession by Great Britain of those stations [in the Aleutian and Kurile Islands], 
and of the Bonin Islands (admirably situated upon the south-east coast of Japan, and 
which of right belong to England), would assist the carrying out of that which has 
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long been a great national object with our statement - namely, a large and progressive 
extension of the British whale fishery.74  
 
This reference to the whaling industry, which was completely overshadowed by its American 
competitors who had a seventy-five percent share of the world’s whaling vessels in the mid-
1840s, might have been an exaggeration.75 British interests in the Pacific emanated more from 
the perspective of naval strategy. In contrast, the United States was primarily concerned with 
business when it came to the Bonins. John Pendleton Kennedy, the U.S. secretary of the navy, 
explained in 1853 that the Perry expedition to the Far East was ‘not for conquest but for 
discovery’.76 Perry echoed this view when he spoke with George Bonham, the British 
governor of Hong Kong, when the latter inquired of American intentions toward the Bonins. 
While Perry disputed the British claim of sovereignty over the Bonins, he also stated that the 
coal depot he set up there was solely for the benefit of whaling ships and for the mail 
steamers, which ‘sooner or later must be established between California and China’.77 If the 
contemplated trans-Pacific route passed through the Bonins, that did not require American 
annexation of the Bonins. More important was safe access to the port and the capacity to 
resupply there. Therefore in the mid-1850s the Bonins were beginning to emerge as a point of 
contention between Britain and the United States with slightly different aims on each side.78 
Outside observers nevertheless painted the picture as an Anglo-American competition in 
which, as The Sydney Morning Herald reported, ‘it is very probable that the British 
Government will reject the bargain [i.e. Perry’s purchase of land for coal depot in the Bonins] 
and assert its exclusive right to the Archipelago’.79  
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            American nonchalance over territorial control of the Bonins was not mere rhetoric. 
Willis Williams, who accompanied Perry, noted in his diary on 17 June 1853: ‘if the English 
would govern the island and let the coal depot be managed by the steam company, without 
taxation, the supremacy and interests of the two parties would be amicably managed’.80 
Perry’s expedition report put it bluntly that whether the United States, Britain or the local 
islanders exercised sovereignty ‘would be a question of little importance, so long as these 
ports were open to the hospitable reception of the ships of all nations seeking shelter and 
refreshment’.81 
In sum, the British and Americans agreed on the important location of the Bonins. 
They also agreed on the unspoken assumption that whatever happened to the settlement in the 
Bonins it would not be prosperous on its own. The only difference lay in the reason why the 
Bonins’ location was attractive. Whereas the British Navy wanted it as a refuge point for their 
compatriots in the China coast until the Opium War, and for the purpose of general defence of 
its overseas possession afterwards, American sailors saw its value in its potential as a 
transportation hub. Meanwhile in Edo, where some information on the Bonins had been 
gathered, intellectuals began to secretly discuss the desirability of sending migrants. 
 
 
Japanese settlement of the Bonins, 1862-3 
 
 The Japanese during the Tokugawa era had at best a vague idea of this emerging 
Anglo-American attention on the Bonins. Among the Japanese during the Tokugawa era, 
folklore anecdotes about ‘No-man’s island (Muninjima)’ were born as the result of a few 
episodes in which Japanese castaways had landed on the Bonins and somehow made their 
way back to the mainland Japan after as long as several years’ away.82 The islands were 
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another border zone for Tokugawa Japan, not because they facilitated Edo’s relations with 
foreigners – the islands did not lead anywhere – but because the shogunate banned its subjects 
from travelling there on purpose, despite its understanding of it as Japanese land.  
 By the 1840s the shogunate had learnt about the existence of settlers on the Bonins 
through the castaways’ reports, and some people within the shogunate raised concern about 
the potential appropriation of the island by the British. But Edo did not take any 
countermeasures.83 It was the news of Perry’s visit in 1853 that finally brought Japanese 
attention to the Bonins. The initial response was mixed: one foreign magistrate proposed to 
‘lease’ the Bonins to the United States so as to guard against the British and the French;84 
others suggested the need to develop the island by themselves.85 
At the beginning of the 1860s, the leadership of the shogunate leaned towards 
progressive foreign policies under senior councillors Andō Tadamasa and Kuze Hirochika; 
they had orchestrated the British intervention in Tsushima in the summer of 1861. It was 
under their orders that the shogunate sent the first official mission to the Bonins in over two 
centuries. The man who led the mission was Mizuno Tadanori, the most senior member 
among the foreign magistrates. Mizuno had initially been assigned to the delegation bound for 
Europe in March 1862 to negotiate the postponement of the opening of two ports and two 
cities as stipulated in the 1858 commercial treaties. However, he was removed from the 
delegation after opposition from Rutherford Alcock, the British minister in Edo, who 
mistrusted Mizuno due to his apparent reluctance or inability to punish the perpetrators of the 
recent assaults against foreigners (including Alcock himself).86 Instead of going to Europe, 
Mizuno ended up leading a mission of 107 men to the Bonins, which left southwards from 
Edo Bay on 3 January 1862 on the Kanrin-maru, the steamship that had carried the 
shogunate’s first envoy to the United States in 1860.87 
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The Kanrin-maru arrived at Port Lloyd on 18 January after a difficult voyage. 
Mizuno met Nathaniel Savory, who by then was the effective head of the settler community. 
Mizuno carried a letter addressed to Savory from Anton Portman, the secretary of the U.S. 
legation in Edo, in which Portman spoke highly of Mizuno. Tanaka Hiroyuki has argued that 
the United States implicitly supported Japan’s control of the Bonins as a way of preventing 
British control.88 
Having busied themselves in surveying Chichijima for a month, on 22 February 1862 
the Tokugawa’s mission announced a set of regulations that they intended to implement on 
the island. John Manjirō, a castaway-turned-interpreter read out the English translation to the 
settlers. The regulations stated that the shogunate would guarantee the foreigners’ rights to the 
lands they had cultivated; no boundary would be made for fishing slots for Japanese or non-
Japanese; the residents would receive permission from the shogunate to cut timber and mine 
mineral products; the residents should refrain from hunting animals beyond immediate 
necessity; and any births, deaths, marriages, arrivals, and departures should be reported to the 
shogunate.89 According to the Japanese record, the residents answered ‘that is very good’.90 
But a later report by Russell Robertson, the British consul at Yokohama who visited the 
island in 1876 and spoke to the residents, quoted part of the English translation which was 
‘somewhat unintelligible’.91 Given that most of the settlers were illiterate, it is doubtful how 
much the regulations were understood and remembered simply by oral presentation. 
On the same day Mizuno’s delegation also announced regulations relating to the port 
in the Bonins. It required any vessel entering the port to report to the local Japanese official; 
the shogunate would take no fees for arrival, departure or commercial exchange; if a ship’s 
crew committed a crime the captain would pay a fine; if any member of the crew wished to 
settle in the islands he should report to the captain and follow instructions from the shogunate 
officials; and the same procedure should apply to those wishing to leave the islands. At this 
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point the settlers pointed out that the regulations had no clause on pilot fees. The shogunate 
officials asked them what they had been charging, and simply added those prices to the port 
regulations. The shogunate officials accepted this as a temporary measure until there was a 
rule on pilot fees in the three treaty ports in mainland Japan.92 Therefore both the island and 
port regulations remained only perfunctory, lacking substance or the power for enforcement. 
Robertson was probably right when he noted in 1876 that the rules and regulations ‘appear 
never to have been enforced, and the present settlers seem for the most part ignorant of their 
existence’.93 
Meanwhile in Edo, on 12 March 1862 Alcock asked the senior councillors about the 
status of the Bonins, and claimed British sovereignty on the basis of first discovery. But he 
was not adamant in asserting the British claim. He told Kuze that if the port remained open 
for ships in distress and if residents lived ‘in a state of mixed inhabitancy as in the United 
States, so to speak’, he would not raise opposition. Kuze quickly concurred and the 
conversation moved on.94  
Mizuno spent six weeks in the Bonin Islands, surveying the landscape, topography 
and conversing with the Western residents. Two days before the mission’s departure, an 
American whaler the Cicero entered Port Lloyd for procurement. The chronicler of the ship 
noted that ‘the Japanese War Steamer had taken possession of the Bonin group’.95 The 
captain, John Stivers, exchanged gifts with Mizuno.96 
The Kanrin-maru left Port Lloyd on 7 April but left behind thirteen people. On his 
return, Mizuno argued that foreign countries were inclined to possess the Bonins because of 
their strategic position and thus recommended that the shogunate should send around thirty 
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men and women from Hachijō Island, some 170 miles south of Yokohama, to the Bonins.97 
The purpose of this migration would be to develop the island to raise profits, but also to add 
substance to the alleged Japanese claim as well as to alleviate overpopulation on Hachijō. On 
14 June 1862, Mizuno appointed Oguri Tadamasa, a former foreign magistrate who had been 
the chief negotiator with the Russian navy in Tsushima in 1861, to take charge of the 
migration project. 98 The selection of Oguri gives some clue for the shogunate’s attitude, as he 
was the man who had resigned from the post of foreign magistrate apparently over the 
disagreements with Mizuno as to how to deal with the Tsushima issue. Oguri, who had 
travelled to the United States in the shogunate’s 1860 mission, was known to be a progressive 
and the evidence suggests that he had been in favour of opening a treaty port in Tsushima. His 
appointment for the Bonin migration mission therefore at least suggests the shogunate was 
ready to engage with the Western settlers on the island with a view to formulating some sort 
of working agreement for the governance of the Bonins.  
This positive attitude towards the development of the Bonins was also present among 
the best informed and liberal Japanese intellectuals. Abe Rekisai, a doctor and a member of 
the Edo-based community of scholars of Dutch studies, petitioned the Tokugawa shogunate 
on 8 June 1862 that he be allowed to visit the Bonins. Abe predicted, like his contemporary 
observers in Britain and the United States, that the Bonins would become a hub for inter-
Pacific commerce and that there was money to be made in developing the islands, including 
building a medical facility, which would further increase the traffic. As a botanist he saw his 
role in that prospect as opening a clinic and providing medical services, which he thought 
would help to bring the British to accept the Japanese territorial claim.99 His appeal was 
successful. Four days after Abe’s letter, the shogunate decided to send a group of migrants to 
the Bonins from Hachijō Island, and added Abe to the mission. The Japanese migrants arrived 
at the Bonins on 19 September.100   
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The migration project lasted less than a year due to events developing far away from 
the Bonins. In Edo Andō was attacked by an anti-foreign samurai in early 1862 and his 
injuries forced him to step down on 9 May. Kuze, the other senior councillor, left his position 
on 28 June. Their successor, Matsudaira Shungaku, took a more conservative approach to 
foreign affairs and focused on consolidating the domestic standing of the Tokugawa regime. 
The shogunate’s slow response to the British demand for reparations for the Namamugi 
incident in September 1862, in which a British merchant had been slain, brought the two 
countries to the verge of war. The British squadron gathered in Edo Bay. The shogunate 
ordered the evacuation of civilians from central Edo. In the midst of these deteriorating 
Anglo-Japanese relations, the shogunate called back the migrants from the Bonin Islands on 
28 June 1863, once again leaving Savory, Webb and other non-Japanese settlers as the only 
residents for the next twelve years.101 
 
 
Decline of the Japan ground 
 
 The positive prospects that had once been prevalent among the British and the 
Americans about the Bonins also began to fade away around the same time as the Japanese 
retreat for two reasons. Firstly, the whaling around the Bonins peaked sometime around the 
mid-1850s, due to the depletion of whales in the Japan ground. In the spring of 1859, only 
one out of the 117 whaling ships that departed from Honolulu declared the Bonin Islands as 
its destination. All the rest, except for a few that did not specify the destination, headed for 
the Gulf of Alaska, the Arctic, or the Okhotsk Sea. Of course those from Honolulu were not 
the only whalers, and with no surviving local records, the exact numbers are difficult to 
reconstruct. Yet Savory told the Japanese officials in 1862 that in the first years of his 
residence thirty or forty ships used to appear in one year, while in the last few years the 
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number was around three to five, indicating the general downward trend.102 To make matters 
even more difficult for the whalers, in 1859 an oil well was discovered in Pennsylvania, 
which placed whale oil in a fierce competition.103 The change of the tide is apparent. In 
addition, the whaling industry sharply declined due to the Civil War in the United States. 
Upon the outbreak of the war, insurance prices for ships spiked, forcing the owners to let go 
of their fleets in a hurry. Destruction in the war and the sale of the ships both contributed to 
the downfall of the American whaling industry, which up to that point was by far the largest 
in the world.104 The number of whaling ships in the United States fell from 569 in 1860 to 276 
in 1865, thus losing half its capacity in five years.105 It is undeniable that the depletion of 
whales in the surrounding seas and the Civil War contributed to the general decline of the 
traffic around the Bonins. Apart from the whalers, the islanders saw only sporadic visits by 
American or European naval ships. 
The second source of doubt over the future of the Bonins arose in that the trans-
Pacific shipping turned out not to be beneficial to its economy, betraying the expectation of 
many observers outside the island and the residents. A letter from a merchant in Shanghai, 
dated 21 May 1865, conveyed the sense of disappointment to Nathaniel Savory: 
 
The Mail Route will be established in the course of another year, but I think it will do 
you no good as the projected route is from San Franc: via Sandwich Islands and north 
part of Japan. ... I saw a gentleman the other day upon whose veracity I can rely and 
he told me the contemplated route is Yokohama, so that will do you no good.106 
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As the letter anticipated correctly, the commercial route began to connect Yokohama and San 
Francisco in 1867 in just twenty-four days. John Perry has noted that the ships of the PMSC 
could sail for a month without resupplying coal. The company had a coal base in the Midway 
Islands, but never had to use it.107 As the Pacific transformed from a sea of whaling into that 
of commerce and migration, the necessity for coal depots in the Pacific declined. In short, the 
commercial opportunities bypassed the Bonins and with that the American interest declined. 
 
 
The Japanese move for formal control 
 
Having withdrawn the migration project in 1863, the Japanese became detached from 
the Bonins for a full decade. It was only in the early 1870s that the Meiji government returned 
its attention to the Pacific in earnest. On 17 March 1872, the German minister Max von 
Brandt asked the Meiji government whether the Bonins were Japanese, referring to an entry 
in the British Admiralty’s publication The China Pilot which stated that the Bonins were 
‘formally taken possession of by Captain F.W. Beechey, H.M.S. Blossom, in 1827’.108 
Although the Japanese denied this, von Brandt pointed out the necessity of clarifying the 
ownership of the islands.109 The question caught Tokyo’s attention again when the Japan 
Herald, an English-language newspaper printed in Yokohama, reported in April 1873 an 
incident of a missing sailor in the Bonin Islands and described the latter as American territory. 
Clearly no agreement existed on the Bonins’ status and anarchy prevailed.110 Since no one in 
the Meiji government argued for the abandonment of the Bonins, the question to them was 
how to proceed in order to ensure a smooth re-establishment of authority. The crucial points 
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were twofold: streamlining the boundary by rectifying the Bonins’ special status as a border 
zone; and doing so without getting entangled in disputes with the Western governments. 
Substantial discussion within the Meiji government began in January 1873, when a 
mid-rank officer in the finance ministry named Nakajima Nobuyuki expressed his concern 
about the fact that the current situation in the Bonins did not square with the treaty terms. He 
argued that it was ‘inconvenient’ that foreign ships were freely coming to the Bonins, 
supposedly a closed port. Nakajima also pointed out the lack of measures to collect tax from 
ships sailing between Yokohama and overseas via the Bonins, because this route allowed 
them to dodge custom procedures.111 Since it was impossible for Tokyo to regulate foreign 
vessels’ access to the Bonins without having local officers, the Meiji government first tried to 
address the situation by modifying the regulations. Between June and August, Ōkuma 
Shigenobu, the finance minister, Ueno and Soejima all raised concerns about potential tax 
evasion through the Bonins. Ueno argued that at the least the government should issue 
certificates for exports through the Bonins and then ‘make it a fully open port when the treaty 
revision is done’.112 Soejima suggested that Japan should establish a penal colony in the 
Bonins under the administration of the navy, but he resigned from the government over the 
seikanron split in October. Having gone through the first major reshuffle of the cabinet, it was 
only in December that Iwakura gave the green light to the foreign ministry.113 
How did the British and American ministers respond to the Japanese renewed move 
on the Bonins? On 13 May 1873, deputy foreign minister Ueno Kagenori and Parkes 
discussed the question. Parkes took a more stringent position than Alcock and argued that the 
retreat of the Japanese migrants in 1863 had nullified Japan’s territorial claim, to which Ueno 
did not have a good counterargument.114 After this conversation was reported to London, 
however, the British government was more hesitant than Parkes about taking a stand on the 
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Bonins. Lord Granville, foreign secretary, having discussed the issue with the colonial 
secretary, wrote to Parkes that  
 
I consider the first step which should be taken is to ascertain whether the Japanese 
gov. are wishing to hold possession of the Islands. You will accordingly enquire 
whether this is the case, and you will state that H.M. gov. will not raise any 
opposition to the establishment of the authority of the Japanese Gov. in the Bonin 
Islands but that it is of importance that they should at once take some measures to 
enforce law and order among the settlers.115 
 
Charles DeLong, American minister, turned out to be equally understanding. In April 1873, 
an American named Benjamin Pease turned up at DeLong’s office in Tokyo and requested 
confirmation that the Bonins were American territory based on Perry’s visit. Pease had been 
living in the Bonins for the last three years and was trying to consolidate his position on the 
island by acquiring government backing. DeLong forwarded the inquiry to Washington D.C., 
but Hamilton Fish, the secretary of state, denied American authority in the Bonins because 
Perry’s act had not received approval from Congress. DeLong provided a copy of this letter to 
Soejima and urged him to confirm Japanese sovereignty over the Bonins.116 
With at least one of the two contenders amenable to the Japanese control, the Meiji 
government began planning annexation. As the islands had little prospect for immediate 
economic benefit, the finance ministry balked at making a large financial commitment.117 
Given the generally precarious financial situation, the government needed a plan to secure the 
Japanese claim with minimal expenditure. On 27 March 1874, the finance and interior 
ministry officials put together a proposal for the incorporation of the islands. They suggested 
that the Japanese government hire Pease as the administrator of the island. They also 
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proposed that should he refuse to accept the role, attempts should be made to purchase the 
whole island within a budget of 10,000 yen.118 
The foreign ministry fiercely opposed this idea of land purchase. It claimed that any 
act of land purchase would have a negative impact on the debate over jurisdiction of Japan’s 
frontiers in general, and it feared especially that it might weaken Japan’s position in its 
negotiations with Russia over Sakhalin. ‘Even if it was a tiny piece, purchasing a land 
developed by foreigners will cause inconvenience; whether it is a small piece or the whole 
island does not make a difference…. this could give excuse for the Russians regarding 
Karafuto [Sakhalin]’.119 Two months later Sugiura Yuzuru, one of the two authors of the 
initial proposal, dropped the idea of appointing Pease as the island administrator. He instead 
suggested that the government appoint an interested merchant in Yokohama.120 However, as 
interior minister Ōkubo Toshimichi argued, nothing could be decided until investigating the 
situation on the island.121 The foreign ministry’s comprehensive policy plan in May only 
included the port dues and pilot fees, largely copying the Tokugawa government’s rules 
announced in 1862, but put aside the issue of tax for future deliberation.122 
Then the entire Japanese government got bogged down in the much more imminent 
and important diplomatic dispute over Taiwan. It was only after March 1875 that the 
government resumed formal discussion of the Bonins question.123 The final problem to 
resolve before the dispatch of a mission was whether and how to notify the foreign ministers. 
Should they be told that Japan was sending officials to establish its rule? Were they going to 
dispute it? The finance ministry disagreed with the original plan of describing the mission to 
the foreign ministers as surveyors. If they lost the faith of the foreign ministers by such petty 
lies, ‘it is hard to know what inconveniences might arise’.124  
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The Meiji government was well aware that the Bonin question did not exist in 
isolation. Terashima, the foreign minister, saw the Japanese action in the Bonins as something 
that the Qing had failed to do in Taiwan, namely giving substance to their claim of 
sovereignty over a remote island. He thought that Japan had no reason to tell the foreign 
ministers what it was going to do in the Bonins, just as the Qing had no reason to notify its 
action in Taiwan to anyone.125 Two officers in the Yokohama custom office saw the Bonins 
question in the same way as Terashima did, that is in parallel with the recent expedition to 
Taiwan. The only difference was that Japan’s role was reversed. In the Bonins it was in the 
position to act first in order to avoid intrusion by the foreign powers. These officers proposed 
to the Meiji leadership that Japan should avoid ‘trailing the path of the Qing’ and having to 
pay a huge price as the result of inaction.126 Petitions sent from commoners to the government 
to take part in the development of the Bonins used similar language to the petitions for 
development of Hokkaido and the colonisation of Taiwan. One letter claimed that ‘in the past 
the neglect in the northern border presented its negative effect today, if we worried about the 
southern islands today and repeat the mistake tomorrow, we should not abandon even a 
remote and useless island, since otherwise the imperial state’s realm would inevitably become 
someone else’s possession’.127 Another letter sent in October 1875 by two former samurai 
pledged that they would ‘crush bones and develop the entire island and then possess the 
south-western islands, thereby expanding the great imperial Japan’s realm’.128 While there 
was a slight difference between the understanding of the government and the general public, 
they agreed on the desirability to confirm Japanese rule by sending officials and migrants. 
The final decision to notify the foreign ministers about the dispatch of officials was 
made on 8 October 1875, and the Japanese officials arrived on Chichijima on 24 November. 
According to the report by Russell Robertson, the British consul in Yokohama who landed on 
the island two days after the Japanese, as soon as they disembarked the Japanese told Thomas 
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Webb, one of the residents, to gather as many islanders as possible within a few hours. They 
then hastily read out in English a proclamation of their intention to administer the affairs of 
the island, knowing that, Robertson surmised, the British ship was on their heels.129 The effect 
of this proclamation, however, met with a practical difficulty, for Robertson wrote that ‘Mr 
Webb informed me that from the manner in which the words were delivered in English by Mr 
Hayashi [one of the Japanese delegates], their meaning was almost unintelligible to him’.130 
One article read: 
 
If any person or persons come on shore from any vessel that may be come into this 
port who shall have pleasure hunting and waste upon the land of any inhabitants and 
also committed any of such he or they shall be seized and transported to the Captain 
of their vessel. 131 
 
This was a repetition of the 1862 mission led by Mizuno, when a similar proclamation 
apparently had not achieved much. Yet the Meiji officials remained sanguine about their 
achievement, interpreting Robertson’s silence as ‘implicit acknowledgement (mokunin)’ of 
the Japanese rights.132 The delegation reported to their ministers in Tokyo that the residents 
welcomed Japanese rule and Robertson did not show explicit opposition.133 To their minds, 
the ‘recollection’ project was successful. With the declaration of territorial sovereignty, 
Obana Sakusuke, the interior ministry official stationed in the Bonins, demanded that the 
settlers choose between their original nationality and Japanese. One British and one Spanish 
resident opted to switch to Japanese nationality in 1876, which Obana saw as ‘an honour for 
the country’.134 
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By the end of 1875, Parkes’s lack of interest in the Bonins made a stark contrast to 
his obsessive proposal for the occupation of Port Hamilton.135 Parkes wrote curtly of the 
Bonins on 27 December, after receiving the report from Robertson on the Japanese 
proclamation of control: ‘The islands, though fertile, are so small in extent, and possess such 
indifferent anchorages that they can scarcely be regarded as a valuable acquisition’.136 Having 
faced the deaf ears of the Foreign Office, Parkes had no reason to call for maintaining any 
presence on the Bonins.  
The islanders largely welcomed the Meiji government’s attempt to establish 
sovereignty. Since the 1840s they had suffered from piracy and bandits against whom redress 
seldom took place. Their very point in coming to the Bonins was to avoid having to deal with 
the state apparatus; they did not want to be governed. But they had learnt the hard way that 
not being governed also meant not being protected by law. It is all too well to point out the 
brutality and the vagaries of imperialism around the Japanese archipelago in the late 
nineteenth century and blame Tokyo for becoming mimetic imperialists, but that perspective 
cannot go far in explaining the complex, diverse nature of the boundaries that emerged as a 
result as well as their whereabouts. Japan’s control of the Bonins in no way represents its 
successful expansion into the Pacific; it was primarily the result of a compromise between the 
Americans and the British who did not want to see the islands go to their rivals. London and 
Washington put Japan in place because they saw that the latter was so weak that they could 
give them the Bonins without worrying about the consequences. That was the way in which 
the balance of favour was maintained around the Bonins. In spite of the lip service they kept 
paying about protecting their nationals, Washington and London effectively disowned the 
Bonin Islanders, although some unofficial assistance for the residents’ daily necessities kept 
coming from Lady Parkes after the Japanese incorporation.137  
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The Ryukyu Kingdom and its aftermath 
 
The historical accounts of Japan’s annexation of Ryukyu are extensive. They have 
typically explained it alongside the Taiwan Expedition and by doing so taken the view that 
the Meiji government extended its firm control over the island chain by claiming the 
homogeneity of the Ryukyuans and the Japanese. However, as was discussed above, many of 
the proponents of the Taiwan expedition did not consider Ryukyu to be the primary factor. 
The Taiwan Expedition and the resulting protocol signed by Ōkubo in October 1874 
strengthened the ‘Ryukyuans equal Japanese’ thesis, but it was an outcome rather than a 
cause. Thus it is necessary to look at the Ryukyu Kingdom itself in order to understand how 
the Meiji government put Ryukyu within its boundary. Oguma Eiji has shown that Japan tried 
to assimilate the Ryukyuans by providing education in Japanese, whilst they themselves 
accepted Western technology and culture. However, his explanation deals mainly with the 
post-1879 period and as for the reasons why Japan annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom, despite the 
financial burden, Oguma, as well as other scholars, simply refer to Tokyo’s fear of foreign 
occupation of Ryukyu.138  
As in other places around the Japanese archipelago, depicting Ryukyu as Japan’s 
border zone is by definition a Japan-centred view that only begins to scratch the surface of the 
region’s political order that developed over time. The question could be approached from 
another direction: why did Ryukyu fail to survive as an independent state? Why did it fail to 
define its own boundary around itself and to become a separate sovereign state from Japan 
and China, despite the fact that it signed treaties with the Western countries – a standard way 
to ‘open’ a country according to the eyes of nineteenth-century imperialists?  
The first thing to note as a precondition is the kingdom’s dual subjectivity to China 
and Japan. Ryukyu was a proactive participant in the China-centred tributary trade network, 
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sending by far the largest number of tributary ships to Beijing. It had a trading house in 
Fuzhou where Ryukyuan officials resided and handled business, just as Tsushima officials 
lived in the waegwan in Pusan. Even though the latter was much bigger in size, the 
Ryukyuans enjoyed greater freedom of movement in Fuzhou than the Tsushima officials did 
and the envoys travelled to Beijing for audiences with the emperor. The reason for this active 
participation was more political than commercial. Gregory Smits has noted that, in financial 
terms, tributary relations most likely ended up as a net loss for the Ryukyu Kingdom but that 
it maintained the relationship for political reasons, whilst bringing benefits to the Ryukyuan 
aristocracy and the Satsuma domain.139 At the same time as it engaged in these ritual-based 
ties with China, Ryukyu accepted the Satsuma domain’s military dominance and the terms 
under which it sent annual tribute tax to Kagoshima.140 Ryukyu received envoys from the 
Qing, while Satsuma officials resided in Shuri, Ryukyu’s capital. 
Ryukyu in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century served as Satsuma’s arm for 
foreign trade, an activity which the Tokugawa Shogunate banned the other feudal lords, aside 
from Tsushima, from engaging in. As Robert Hellyer has shown, by the early nineteenth 
century the Satsuma-Ryukyu trade route to and from China began to compete with the 
Shogunate’s trade in Nagasaki. The backing from Satsuma, which provided part of the 
funding for the tributary trade, and its competition with Edo partly explain Ryukyu’s active 
participation.141 Ryukyu and Satsuma thought it best to hide their ties to China so as to ensure 
the continuation of the tributary trade. For instance, the Satsuma men went into temporary 
hiding in the northern part of the Okinawa Island, taking all their ships with them, when the 
Chinese envoys visited Shuri.  
The Ryukyu Kingdom, therefore, was entrenched in the regional trade network of the 
China Seas, dealing mainly with Japanese silver (later marine products) and Chinese silk and 
medicinal items. It was, in this sense, a border zone that connected Fuzhou and Kagoshima. 
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Its political and economic structure was under the heavy influence of the policies of and 
events in Satsuma and the Qing. 
It was no surprise therefore that the political changes in China and Japan had ripple 
effects on the fate of Ryukyu. By the end of the eighteenth century the Qing had greatly 
reduced the tributary trade with Ryukyu, putting a severe strain on the latter’s economy.142  
Having no other choice, Ryukyu deepened its economic dependence on Satsuma.  
Further complicating the economic situation of the Ryukyu Kingdom was its contact 
with Western countries. From the early nineteenth century onwards, Western ships had made 
sporadic appearances in Ryukyu, but their overtures to Shuri began with the end of the Opium 
War. Both Britain and France sent Christian missionaries and demanded a treaty to give their 
nationals safe access to its ports. Unable to ward them off by itself, Ryukyu asked for help 
from the continent. But in the meetings with the British and the French in Canton, the Qing 
officials failed to persuade them to withdraw the missionaries. Satsuma and the shogunate 
were alarmed by this development, but the shogunate refrained from getting itself involved 
and left the issue in Satsuma’s hands.143  
 Faced with the European and American demands for trade with the Kingdom, 
Satsuma’s response was bold and ambitious. It attempted to seize this opportunity to increase 
its grip on the Ryukyus and expand international trade via the Kingdom. The order from the 
domain’s reformist lord Shimazu Nariakira to his aide and the Ryukyu representatives in 
Satsuma in February 1857 included the expansion of Fuzhou trade, the creation of a depot in 
Taiwan, the commencement of trade with France and the Netherlands in Ryukyu, importation 
of steamers and arms from France, the export of old arms to China, and the dispatch of 
students from Satsuma and Ryukyu to Britain, France and the United States. Even though the 
Ryukyu officials were reticent about these changes, the aide that Shimazu sent to Ryukyu 
forced them to accept the terms and sacked the rebellious officials. Under Nariakira’s 
instructions, Ryukyu held negotiations with the resident French missionaries and came very 
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close to starting trading relations, with the signing of a contract for Satsuma’s purchase of a 
French vessel in July. But things were turned around when on 2 September the news of 
Nariakira’s death arrived in Ryukyu. Shimazu Hisamitsu, half-brother of Nariakira, came to 
power and cancelled the progressive policy. Three Ryukyuan officials who had worked under 
Nariakira’s order to negotiate with the French and learnt their language were brutally 
interrogated over made-up charges and persecuted. The result was the death of one officer in 
prison, another sent off to exile after being tortured, and the last was incarcerated in a temple 
for 500 days.144 The purge wiped out the mood of reform from the island. When in 1863, the 
Kagoshima bombardment by the British completely transformed Hisamitsu’s view of Western 
military technology to the extent that he received Harry Parkes in Kagoshima in 1866, no 
officials with experience and training for negotiating trade pacts were left in the Ryukyus. 
The last officer who had worked under Nariakira apparently committed suicide by jumping 
off a boat when he had been summoned by the now reform-keen Hisamitsu.145 Hisamitsu’s 
turn toward reform was not followed in the Ryukyus, where conservative officials continued 
to suppress those who showed curiosity in Western languages and technologies, and instead 
maintained Confucian learning as the bulwark of bureaucratic training.146 
All told, the decline of the tributary trade and the negotiations with the Westerners 
under the whimsical leadership of Satsuma left Ryukyu economically hard-pressed and 
politically immobile, more reliant on Satsuma than ever before. In this sense Ryukyu’s 
situation was similar to that of Tsushima, as discussed in chapter 1 and 2, which also suffered 
from chronic food shortages and piled up debts to local merchants, Osaka merchants and 
foreign financiers. Their collective demise speaks to the decline of the tributary trade network 
as a whole. The treaties that Ryukyu concluded with the United States, France, and the 
Netherlands spoke more to Satsuma’s willingness to reap the benefits of trade by bypassing 
the restrictions imposed by Edo, than to the Westerners’ imposition of their terms.  
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By the end of the 1850s Ryukyu found itself in an uncertain dual diplomatic structure 
of treaty relations with the West on the one hand and the old ties with China and Japan on the 
other, though the latter were beginning to crumble. The following decade was a time of 
economic hardship for the Ryukyuans. In 1860 Satsuma, itself in a financial predicament, 
resumed exacting a sugar tax on Ryukyu that had been suspended since 1852. From 1865 
onwards the Satsuma merchants in Kagoshima dealing with Ryukyu officials increased the 
interest rates on their loans. Furthermore Satsuma implemented drastic fiscal reform within its 
own domain including the revision of exchange rates between copper and iron coins. The 
Ryukyuans followed suit each time the exchange rate was revised for the sake of the smooth 
continuation of its economic ties with Satsuma, but this devastated the local economy with 
confusion, speculation and rampant inflation.147 Another source of pressure on the Ryukyu 
economy was the reception of the Qing envoy who officially bestowed Shō Tai with the 
status of Ryukyuan king – a ceremony long overdue due to the Qing’s domestic disruption by 
the Taiping Rebellion and the Arrow War. From August 1866 until the end of the year, the 
Qing mission, consisting of 434 men, stayed in Ryukyu. The cost of hosting them fell on the 
Ryukyuan royal house and drained what remained of its cash. It had to rely heavily on 
donations from local wealthy merchants and while the preparation of the embassy was taking 
place in Fuzhou the Ryukyuan officials pleaded with the Qing to limit the size of the 
delegation and the amount of the products for official trade.  By 1872 Ryukyu was on the 
verge of bankruptcy, not unlike Tsushima around the same time.148  
What saved Ryukyu from this financial abyss was a loan of ¥200,000 from the 
finance ministry of the Meiji government. But at the same time the government in Tokyo 
began dismantling Ryukyu’s bureaucratic structure, a harbinger of the eventual annexation in 
1879.149 After the abolition of the feudal domains the Meiji government tentatively put 
Ryukyu under the administration of Kagoshima prefecture, the former Satsuma domain. Yet 
this presented an inconsistency in the eyes of Meiji officials. Ryukyu could not keep sending 
                                                           
147 Nishizato, Shinmatsu, 247-256. 
148 Ibid., 257-266; Okinawa Kenshi Kakuronhen vol.5, 20-21. 
149 Okinawa Kenshi Kakuronhen vol.5, 21. 
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tributary missions to China if it were to be under Tokyo’s rule. The Meiji leaders, many of 
them from Satsuma, thought the government needed to have clear and complete jurisdiction 
over Ryukyu. The report of the killing of Ryukyuan men in Taiwan, which reached Soejima 
in September 1872, and LeGendre’s arrival to Tokyo in October, was the catalyst for devising 
a policy to link the Ryukyu question with Taiwan. But the demotion of Shō Tai to being no 
more than a Japanese peer, widely seen as the first decisive act by the Meiji government to 
bring an end to the dual subordination of Ryukyu, took place before Soejima met LeGendre. 
The move for transforming Ryukyu had begun before the Taiwan issue emerged.150  
 Japan did not have a free hand in this. Even though Ryukyu never resorted to armed 
resistance, its officials throughout the 1870s begged Tokyo to allow them to maintain the 
status quo. Progressive voices within Ryukyu called for reform by inviting Japanese officials. 
Some young officers worked with the foreign ministry official Matsuda Michiyuki — who 
took charge of the Ryukyu question and visited Ryukyu once in 1875 and twice in 1879 — to 
promote modernisation, but they never gained enough momentum to change Ryukyu’s desire 
to stick to the old ways.151 The most drastic among their measures was the exile of high-
profile conservative officials led by Kōchi Kōjō, a member of the royal family, to the 
Ryukyuan trading house in Fuzhou after 1876.152 Kōchi used this opportunity to go to Tianjin 
and contacted Li Hongzhang. The Qing then filed a protest through the newly arriving 
minister to Tokyo, He Ruzhang, over Tokyo’s policy towards Ryukyu, but never exerted 
enough pressure to alter Japan’s course.153 The Qing foreign policy makers – the Zongli 
Yamen as well as Li Hongzhang in Tianjin – took a measured approach on the Ryukyu 
question vis-à-vis Tokyo, for it deemed cooperation with Tokyo as necessary to face the 
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Westerners, especially the Russians.154  Nevertheless as Li acknowledged in May 1878, the 
loss of Ryukyu would constitute symbolic damage to the Qing’s status.155 
The takeover of Shuri castle by the Meiji government officials led by Matsuda took 
place on 30 March 1879. Since Ryukyu had not maintained a military force of its own, all it 
took was the presence of 400 Japanese soldiers and some 160 policemen.156 Within two 
weeks the Meiji government declared the establishment of Okinawa prefecture, but the 
Ryukyuans continued their protest by appealing to the Qing for intervention. As Nishizato 
Kikō has argued, the Ryukyuans continued diplomatic resistance through ‘exiles to the Qing’ 
(dasshinjin), who proved to be an important factor in the course of Ryukyu’s last days. 
 The Qing could not ignore the dasshinjin requests for intervention for fear of the 
snowballing effect on other tributary countries.157 Yet the Zongli Yamen and Li could also not 
risk antagonising Japan at a time when China faced a potential conflict with Russia over the 
northwestern border in the Ili region. They thus sought diplomatic arbitration from the former 
American president Ulysses Grant, who happened to visit China and Japan on his way back to 
his country after a circumnavigatory tour. Grant arrived in Tianjin on 27 May 1879, and in the 
following two weeks he held discussions with Li in Tianjin and Prince Kung of the Zongli 
Yamen in Beijing. Prince Kung made an official request for American arbitration over the 
Ryukyu question on 3 June.158 
 Grant delivered the Qing’s message to the Meiji emperor and the Japanese politicians 
during his month-long stay in Japan. At his audience with the emperor in Tokyo on 10 
August, Grant conveyed the Chinese perspective on the issue, and added:  
 
She [the Qing] feels this more keenly now, because she feels that the case of Formosa 
was a humiliation. Suffering from that remembrance, she looks upon Japan’s action as 
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wanting in respect and friendship, and as indicating a disputation upon the part of Japan 
to again occupy Formosa and in doing so bar the channel between China and the 
Pacific Ocean. … The importance of peace between China and Japan is so great that 
each country should make concessions to each other. I have heard it suggested, but I 
have no authority to speak on the subject, that a boundary line running between the 
islands so as to give China a wide channel to the Pacific would be accepted. I have no 
idea how true it is. I mention it to show that while in the minds of Chinese statesmen 
there is a feeling of anger, they are open to accommodation.159  
 
The wording was cautious, but the message was clear. The Qing was ready to compromise on 
a new arrangement for Ryukyu if Japan was willing. Li initially espoused the idea of splitting 
the Ryukyu Islands into three parts, with the northern Amami Group going to Japan, the 
middle Okinawa Island resuming independence as the Ryukyu Kingdom, and the western 
Miyako-Yaeyama group becoming a Chinese territory. However, in light of the necessity to 
maintain good relations with Japan in the face of the Russians on the northwestern frontier, by 
the end of the preliminary negotiations with the Japanese delegation led by foreign minister 
Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese minister to Beijing, Shishido Tamaki, Li accepted a two-way 
split.160 This two-way division was a plan to cede the Miyako-Yaeyama group to the Qing on 
the assumption that Beijing would then give it back to the Ryukyuans for them to restore their 
kingdom, while the rest of the island chain would remain in the hands of the Japanese. The 
official negotiations between Zongli Yamen and the Japanese delegation began on 18 August 
1880 in Beijing. As a quid pro quo for giving up the Miyako-Yaeyama group, Japan 
demanded MFN treatment in China, which would allow Japanese merchants to go beyond the 
treaty ports and access the Chinese interior just as Western merchants did. 
 The Chinese, in turn, demanded the extradition of the former Ryukyuan king Shō Tai 
and his family so as to restore him to the throne in the Miyako-Yaeyama group. The Japanese 
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resisted this and pointed to the fact that Li had hosted an exiled family member of Shō Tai in 
Tianjin.161 By doing so the Japanese were implicitly giving a green light to the restoration of 
the Ryukyu Kingdom on a limited scale. For the foreign ministry in Tokyo, the abandonment 
of the logic that asserted Ryukyu to be a part of Japan and the loss of the westernmost part of 
the island chain were a price worth paying for a step forward in treaty revision and access to 
the Chinese market on an equal footing with the Western merchants. This pragmatic 
approach, led by Inoue, complicates the conceptual interpretation of some historians that 
Japan aspired to achieve the status of a ‘civilised’ nation by acting as a ‘civilising power’ 
towards other peoples.  
 The two countries agreed on the two-way division on 21 October. The Qing officials 
then asked for ten days before signing as they needed to report to the emperor. However when 
Li revealed the agreement to a Ryukyuan exile from the royal family, he refused to become a 
king in a curtailed kingdom. Moreover, the dasshinjin group in Fuzhou hurried north to 
oppose the signing as soon as they heard the news. One of them committed suicide as a means 
of reprimanding the Sino-Japanese deal. Faced with these Ryukyuan protests Li 
recommended postponement.162 This last-minute change of mind on the part of the Qing 
government infuriated the Japanese and Shishido, the minister, left Beijing on 20 January 
1881 blaming the Chinese for the collapse of the deal.  
 One month later the Qing managed to reach an agreement with Russia on the Ili border 
issue which gave the Guangxu emperor breathing space to stand firm on the Ryukyu question. 
In March, the emperor ordered the Zongli Yamen and Li to re-negotiate with Tokyo over the 
Ryukyu issue.163 The Japanese grudgingly came back to the unofficial negotiations in Tianjin, 
due to their need to push treaty revision forward. Foreign minister Inoue, in his instructions to 
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the Japanese consul in Tianjin, compromised to the point where he condoned the handing 
over of Shō Tai and the restoration of the Kingdom in the Miyako-Yaeyama Group with Shō 
on the throne. The problem, however, was that this was not the wish of the Ryukyuans. The 
exiled Ryukyu officials in China continued to plead for help from Beijing for the recovery of 
the entire Ryukyu Island chain as their kingdom and refused to accept anything less. It is true 
that the restoration of the kingdom in the Miyako-Yaeyama group would have been 
unrealistic because, as the dasshinjin group pointed out, these two islands lacked sufficient 
space and agricultural capacity to sustain the population of the entire country. But by 
destroying this deal the Ryukyuan officials squandered the last chance to save their kingdom. 
After 1881 no outsiders would intervene on behalf of Ryukyu, not even the Qing. The 
movement of the dasshinjin continued until the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, which, even 
though the Ryukyuans gathered in temples in Shuri and prayed for a Qing victory, ended in 
Japanese triumph.164   
 This postscript to the Ryukyu Shobun suggests that the Japanese government had 
something more important than the territorial integrity of the Ryukyu Islands under its gaze. 
Their acceptance of the restoration of the Ryukyu Kingdom in Miyako-Yaeyama poses a 
question about the validity of the ‘fear of foreign encroachment’ theory to explain the Ryukyu 
annexation. If the government had been apprehensive about a possible foreign seizure of 
Ryukyu, it seems contradictory to agree to the restoration of the kingdom albeit on a smaller 
scale. The initial move in the early 1870s to strip Ryukyu of its diplomatic function might 
have originated in the fear of foreigners annexing the kingdom, but by the beginning of the 
1880s such fear had abated. The transformation of Ryukyu into Okinawa prefecture therefore 
cannot be sufficiently explained solely by Tokyo’s perceived imperative to act before other 
governments. It was as much the result of the Ryukyuans’ intransigence as the Meiji 
government’s wish to annex the kingdom. 
 
 
                                                           
164 Okinawa Kenshi Kakuronhen vol.5, 88-91; Namihira, Ryukyu Heigō, ch.5. 
 221 
Conclusion: Japan’s southward expansion?  
 
What these case studies begin to tell us is that Japan’s actions on its southern 
boundary were characterised by the lack of an imminent security threat (which nevertheless 
did not ameliorate the fear that Japan’s inaction could lead to someone else’s gain) and 
paradoxically by the weak position of the Meiji government vis-à-vis other foreign powers, 
namely the Qing, Britain and the United States. The border zones themselves were weak in 
terms of political organisation and financial sustainability.  
The expedition to Taiwan met unexpected international opposition from Britain, the 
United States and the Qing, forcing the Japanese soldiers back home, many of them infected 
with malaria. Here the main reason that the Meiji government could not force the cancellation 
of the mission stemmed from the new Meiji government’s need to overcome domestic unrest. 
This was evident to contemporary observers. Parkes thought that the expedition was 
‘foolish’165 and the Japanese ‘had no “case”’, but they went in ‘to satisfy samurai’.166 Li 
Hongzhang, irked by the Japanese aggression in Taiwan and Ryukyu, noted to the emperor 
that Ōkubo’s demand stemmed from the need to deal with domestic unrest.167  
The Taiwan expedition taught the Japanese policymakers a mixed lesson. On the one 
hand, Tokyo paid a high price for miscalculating Beijing’s response to Japan’s attempted 
seizure of eastern Taiwan. On the other hand, the fact that Ōkubo managed to win an 
indemnity from the Qing demonstrated that Japan should avoid leaving its own border zones 
unattended. Thus the Meiji leadership thought that it had to claim the Bonins, even though, in 
the words of Ōkuma Shigenobu, there was ‘no gain in owning and no pain in losing’ the 
islands.168 The other contenders for sovereignty in Washington and London no longer had any 
enthusiasm about the economic prospects of the Bonins, and were happy to see Japanese rule 
as opposed to some other Western power gaining control. 
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The fall of the Ryukyu Kingdom represented the end of the commercial network that 
had been based on tributary trade and the Tokugawa’s bakuhan system. There is a striking 
parallel between the case of the Ryukyu Kingdom and the Tsushima domain, both of which 
suffered from the long-term decline of the tributary trade and the resulting fall in revenue. 
They were also afflicted by internal strife, which prevented the reform-oriented voices from 
becoming dominant. The conservative faction of each polity appealed to the senior partner in 
the tributary relationship so as to maintain the status quo, but ultimately failed. By the time 
Japan took full control of these islands and nullified their special position within the regional 
order, they were effectively bankrupt and had no choice but to accept Tokyo’s bailout. 
Summarising this process of reorganisation into a singular shift from un-demarcated 
border zones to territorial sovereign state does not do justice to its complexity. To begin with, 
the starting point for each region was different; Japan was surrounded by diverse principles 
that enabled (or limited) inter-regional contacts. At one extreme there were places like 
Ryukyu, where there existed a delicately calibrated system of interaction created by the 
people who reconciled the opposing worldviews of China and Japan. Tsushima shared many 
features with Ryukyu and functioned as a buffer between Korea and Japan. On the other side 
of the spectrum were the Bonins and eastern Taiwan, where the settlers or indigenous peoples 
had no connection with modern political institutions. People from the surrounding regimes, 
including Japan, had had only a weak involvement with these ‘frontiers’, due to their relative 
commercial insignificance, small local population, and climatic difficulty. Hokkaido falls into 
this category to an extent, though it was unique in that the Tokugawa shogunate and the Meiji 
government had dominated the lives of the indigenous Ainu for a longer time. This was the 
Japanese effort to defend its realm by defining its nationhood – first by emphasising the 
difference between the Ainu and the Japanese; then later assimilating them into the Japanese 
nation.169 But by the late-nineteenth century the political leaders such as Ōkubo, Parkes and 
Li who took up the task of bringing the modern state system into the region regarded these 
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areas as potential sources of insecurity for their respective countries, where the vacuum of 
sovereignty could tip the balance of favour and trigger a territorial scramble.  
These diverse places took equally varied paths to fall within or out of the Japanese 
boundary. It is impossible to reduce them to a sanguine narrative of Japan’s successful 
defence of its territorial integrity and independence in the face of Western imperialism, or the 
result of Japan’s mimetic imperialism. For the formation of Japan’s boundary was also a story 
of the death of these small polities and the political systems that they embodied. It is the story 
of the confusion and adjustment that resulted from the interactions between different systems 
and principles for governance, which ultimately led to the convergence into territorial 
sovereign states and their dependencies.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has been an attempt to describe the pivotal decade and a half which saw the 
emergence of territorial boundaries around the Japanese archipelago in the late-nineteenth 
century and to investigate the regional mechanism as well as local environment that 
conditioned it. With the case studies of three border zones, it has introduced a two-layered 
argument: that the conditions for the transformation had local origins in each border zone, and 
that the establishment of Japanese sovereignty in these border zones was enabled by the 
balance of favour that deterred territorial acquisition by the Western powers.  
 At the peripheral level, most of the border zones experienced a fundamental 
reconfiguration of their existing political institutions. In Sakhalin, following the establishment 
of local settlements both by the Russians and the Japanese, the southern tip of the island 
turned into an ethnic mosaic. In addition to the few thousand indigenous peoples who had 
lived there, Russian convict exiles and soldiers in fact came from various parts of the tsarist 
empire, and so too did Japanese settlers. The result was racially diverse communities with an 
uneasy power balance, uncertain economic prospects and a tenuous rule of law. In the Kuril 
Islands, the Aleut and the Ainu hunters experienced only a nominal shift of rule from the 
Russian merchants to the Kaitakushi in the course of the 1870s and the 1880s. The island of 
Tsushima, once an integral piece of the intricate relationship between Korea and Japan, ran 
into a financial dead-end and became part of Nagasaki prefecture with no special status 
attached. Ryukyu followed a similar path in 1879, although royalists continued to yearn for 
the restoration of the kingdom well into the 1890s. Eastern Taiwan was confirmed to be part 
of the Qing Empire in the agreement between Beijing and Tokyo in 1874, though this would 
have meant little to the aboriginal population there. The Bonin Islanders, following a series of 
acts of violence by the crews of vessels that called on the islands, sought to have some legal 
order under Japanese sovereignty. 
 At the metropole level, what underpinned the international relations around the 
Japanese archipelago was the Western diplomats’ fear of over-commitment and the potential 
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that they could ignite a territorial scramble against Japan, which was neither financially 
feasible nor strategically desirable to them. With that precondition, Britain’s preferred method 
– free trade under the treaties that protected its merchants’ rights – set the tone for the 
interactions between the Japanese and the Westerners. The key component of this scheme was 
the MFN status, because it gave the Western treaty powers an opportunity to push their 
interests in a coordinated manner. As seen in the 1864 shelling of Shimonoseki, the Western 
powers (barring Russia) saw the benefit of united action in pursuit of the fullest 
implementation of the treaty terms.  
 Yet the imperialists’ pressure on Japan based on the treaty system had limitations in 
two ways. The MFN clause did not allow them to cooperate over territorial acquisition, and 
anything more than a few treaty ports did not seem to meet the cost. The acquisition of 
overseas territories in East Asia came with the costs of trade administration, provision of 
security, and the maintenance of a consular service. Few places around Japan were worth 
such trouble. If one indeed had striven for territorial concession from Japan, the inevitable 
consequence would have been demands by other treaty signatories for equivalents. The best 
scenario for the treaty powers in the border zones, therefore, was the Meiji government’s 
exercise of sovereignty with all the treaty powers having equal access to Japanese ports.  
 By the early 1870s the Meiji government officers in various parts of the country began 
to notice the existence of this balance. The fear of a Russian invasion of Hokkaido, which had 
dominated the thinking of the top leaders in the summer of 1869 gradually faded away, 
though it had a much longer life among the psyche of the general public. Ōkubo, who wrote 
in 1869 that the Russian threat to Hokkaido kept him up in the night, no longer spoke of the 
risk of Russian advance beyond Sakhalin in November 1873, following the clash in 
Kushunkotan earlier that year.1 Perhaps most tellingly, the Meiji government felt comfortable 
enough to send half of the top leadership overseas to negotiate treaty revision for an initially 
planned period of ten months (which ended up close to two years) by 1871.   
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 That said, the Meiji government never freed itself from the fear that if the balance 
tipped in one place the dominoes might start to fall. The negotiators for the Meiji government 
knew that negotiations in one border zone would always have an impact on the others. In 
1870 the Kaitakushi officers negotiating with the Prussian merchant Reinhold Gaertner over 
his ninety-nine-year land lease near Hakodate defended the government’s demand for 
reclamation on the grounds that similar and escalated demands from other parties could 
ensue.2 In 1872 in Tokyo, Soejima and Terashima refused a request from a Dutch consul 
general to hire Japanese soldiers for military service in Dutch East Indies, citing the fear of 
other countries bandwagoning.3 In 1875 the finance ministry opposed the land purchase in the 
Bonins based on the observation that it could harm the Japanese position in the negotiations 
over Sakhalin. The Japanese boundary negotiators could not back down anywhere unless, as 
in Sakhalin, the maintenance of their claim itself was impossible; but at the same time they 
observed that the Western diplomats did not have the capability or desire to barge in either.  
 Against the backdrop of this precarious balance in the 1870s, the Meiji officials 
confronted in the border zones a diverse group of people with varying motives, ranging from 
profit to protection to preservation of old practices. Not all of them were government 
officials. They were sailors, former sailors, soldiers, convict exiles, settler colonists, 
merchants, marine animal hunters, and indigenous peoples. The interests and the goals of the 
Meiji government were diverse from one border zone to another, but underlying those diverse 
interests was the shared recognition among the negotiators that they were all connected. If the 
balance tipped in one place, others may well follow.  
 All told, the balance of favour gave Meiji Japan a breathing space in which its 
confidence and ambition grew. Enomoto Takeaki, having negotiated the Treaty of St. 
Petersburg in May 1875, stayed on in the Russian capital and served as Japanese minister 
until 1878. He was proud of his achievements on the northern boundary. On 29 October he 
was honoured by Tsar Alexander II, with the First Class Order of Saint Stanislaus, Russia’s 
                                                           
2 ‘Garutoneru Jisho Ikken Shorui’, HULNC Dōshiryō 148.  
3 Dialogue between Soejima Taneomi, Terashima Munenori and F.P. van der Hoeven (Dutch minister), 
1 April 1872. DAJP B1.1.1.41 ‘Meiji Gonen Taiwasho’.  
 227 
highest order for military officers, for his role in the boundary negotiations.4 The Japanese 
reciprocated by giving the tsar and a few high-ranking officials their decorations, as the result 
of which Enomoto thought things were ‘in good order (kōtsugō) both officially and privately, 
and [I am] filled with joy’.5  
 Enomoto, however, did not dwell on the memory of his achievements for long. Shortly 
after celebrating the Russian new year of 1876, his attention turned from Japan’s northern 
border to the south. He asked his colleague in Sapporo to report on any developments about 
the Bonin Islands because he had ‘written to Iwakura about the Ogasawara Islands and I am 
very interesutetto [interested]’.6 Having removed the potential source of tensions in the 
northern edge, Enomoto by this point was confident about the standing of the Meiji state and 
began to draw a wild, but eerily prescient, picture of Japan’s southward expansion:  
 
If we think about the future of our country we cannot but adopt a somewhat akkureshifu 
[aggressive] policy. In fact [we] want to possess the area around the Pusan harbour, 
[we] want to possess from Ladoron [Mariana] Islands to parts of the New Guinea, [we] 
want in the future the Luzon Island as our possession too… [We] want to place 
Japanese residents from Annam to East Indies and conduct trade.7  
 
Enomoto firmly believed in and advocated ‘expanding our territory by raking up islets in the 
southern ocean and by expanding our maritime transportation to India and Australia’, because 
that was the path to build a strong nation.8 For Enomoto, getting bogged down with 
arguments about morality or rights would hinder the nation’s spirit of enterprise.9 Having 
fought in the Boshin War for the legacy of Tokugawa rule in Hakodate less than a decade 
ago, Enomoto by the late 1870s had transformed himself into an unwavering Japanese 
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imperialist.  
Not only did he draw wild plans about expanding Japanese territory but also he 
worked for their realisation. At his request Ueno Kagenori, who was then Japanese minister to 
Britain, visited Madrid and informally inquired about the possibility of purchasing the 
Spanish-controlled islands in the Pacific. On 13 April 1876 Ueno met with the Spanish 
minister of state, Fernando Calderón Collantes, and asked if Spain would sell the Mariana 
Islands, if the Japanese government offered to purchase them. The Spanish minister gave a 
positive answer.10 Enomoto thus proposed to Iwakura that Japan should purchase the Mariana 
Islands and the Peleliu Islands in Palau.11 There is no evidence to suggest that the plan went 
any further, but it is indicative of the consequences of Japan’s emergence as a latecomer 
territorial sovereign in the Pacific. 
 The quick transformation of Enomoto indicates that the balance of favour in East Asia 
was short-lived. Because it was predicated on the treaty system with unilateral MFN status, 
the treaty revision of 1894 may well be seen as its official end point. But even before that, the 
balance that had kept the imperialist powers at bay had begun to wane. One example is British 
occupation of Port Hamilton in 1885. Although it did not lead to a permanent lease or 
anything long-term, it is an illustrative example because the same idea had been promoted by 
Parkes and Ryder in 1875, but then London had rejected it. Ten years later, the instruction to 
occupy the island came from London – though not all of the Cabinet members might have 
approved the move.12 As the Western countries fought to expand their commercial interests 
and geopolitical gains, Meiji Japan also began to embark upon expansion of its own. It was 
possible for Japan to do so because until the mid-1870s the competition had been relatively 
restrained, and the Japanese had taken advantage of this window of opportunity. The arrival 
of Japan as a modern state filled up a power vacuum in the Pacific and East Asia, intensifying 
the drive for what was still left untouched by imperialism.  
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Applicability of the balance of favour 
 
If it was the balance of favour that underpinned the rise of Japan as a sovereign state 
what about China? Why did China’s experience differ from that of Japan, if the same treaty-
port system and MFN clauses existed?  
This comparative question on the Japanese and Chinese experience with imperialism 
in the nineteenth-century has received attention from various scholars. Even if we focus on 
the first two decades of each country’s experience with the treaty port system, there is no 
question that the treaties brought about different outcomes in the two cases. For China, the 
encounter with Western imperialism resulted in a more substantial curtailment of territorial 
integrity than that seen in Japan. The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 already saw Hong Kong go to 
the British; in 1860 Russia acquired China’s north-eastern area north of the Amur as well as 
the Maritime Region with the signing of the Treaty of Beijing.  
In an attempt to account for this divergence, Katō and Auslin claim that military 
defeat made the terms of the treaty harsher for the Chinese. For Stephen Krasner, the 
divergence resulted from the existence of the Confucian ideology that buttressed the tributary 
trade.13 Tulan Kayaoglu has argued that whereas Japan achieved treaty revision through quick 
introduction of modern legal codes, China found it difficult to do so due to the lack of any 
tradition of positive law.14 These explanations, however, do not fully take into account the 
local origins of the transformation into a territorialised world. 
The reason for this varying degree of compromise to Japanese and Chinese 
sovereignty seems to lie not in the treaty system itself, as many of the above-mentioned works 
seem to imply, but the domestic situation that existed in parallel to the foreigners’ increasing 
                                                           
13 Krasner, ‘Organized hypocrisy in nineteenth-century East Asia’. 
14 Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism, 98, 162. 
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presence in East Asia. As John Fairbank emphasised, the Qing negotiators had to give up 
many privileges to the foreigners in order to raise money for fighting the Taiping and other 
rebellious groups within its realm. For this purpose, it had to condone international trade 
because, if effectively administered by the hands of foreign officers, this could garner 
precious tax revenue.15 The situation was alarming. As the Qing signed the Treaty of Tianjin 
and the Treaty of Beijing, the Taiping Rebellion held Nanjing (which was renamed Tianjing), 
and went on to snatch Ningpo and Hangzhou the next year.16 In the southwest, in 1856 
Muslims rebelled against years of misrule by the Manchus in Kunming in Yunnan province 
and were not completely put down by the Qing until 1873. In the northwestern province of 
Xinjiang, the autonomous regime led by Ya’qub Beg went so far as to sign its own treaty with 
Britain and Russia and survived until 1877. The operation to crush this movement cost the 
Qing one-sixth of its total annual expenditure in the late 1870s.17 Because the root cause of 
this plethora of domestic rebellions can be traced back to the devastation of the Chinese 
economy caused by the opium trade, it is not entirely fair to consider China’s troubles to the 
home-grown. Still, it is apparent that in the 1860s and the 1870s it was the Qing’s domestic 
situation which demanded the empire’s keenest attention.  
Japan in the 1860s and the 1870s went through a different experience. Most notably, 
the rebel forces against the Tokugawa regime led by Satsuma and Chōshū took power and 
formed a sovereign state. They were the ones who, after a military clash with the Western 
fleets, realised that the opening of free trade with Western merchants could strengthen their 
standing within the Japanese archipelago. Whereas it did not take long before foreign 
ministers in China realised that the pseudo-Christian Taiping could not be an alternative to the 
Qing and all they were prepared to do was to stay neutral and tacitly support the Qing, the 
                                                           
15 Fairbank, ‘The Creation of the Treaty Port System’, 251-4, 261.  
16 Kindai Nicchū Kankeishi Nenpyō Henshu Iinkai (ed.), Kindai Nicchū Kankeishi Nenpyō (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 2005). 
17 William Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 209. 
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Western diplomats in Japan soon understood that the Japanese rebel forces were worthy of 
interest.18 
What was the consequence of this divergent domestic situation? Aside from the 
territorial losses discussed above, the Western merchants in China in the mid-1870s had more 
privileges than their peers did in Japan. This meant, in turn, that Japan’s position was less 
precarious when it tried to renegotiate the treaty terms as it had kept more cards in its hand. 
For Japan, allowing foreign merchants to travel to the interior and conduct business freely 
was the biggest quid pro quo it could offer in order to get the Western negotiators to agree to 
treaty revision. China on the other hand had already given this up in 1860. 
In sum, although the encounter with Western imperialism needs to be part of the story 
when one tries to account for the emergence of territorialised Japanese state in the late-
nineteenth century, how these treaty relations played out depended heavily on the country’s 
internal situation. It would be too simplistic to argue that the territorial boundaries around 
modern Japan were the result of a Western threat and the Japanese response, however 
effective the latter might have been, when no one could tell that Japan would emerge in the 
shape it did. One needs to construct the narrative from the local level, including those of the 
border zones that became a part of a sovereign state but had previously operated as separate 
entities from Japan or other neighbouring states.  
 
 
Implications for the historiography 
 
 As argued in the introduction, the current historiography on the bakumatsu and early 
Meiji Japan has tended to take for granted the analytical unit of territorial sovereign states that 
survived to this day, while largely overlooking the agency of such places and peoples as 
Ryukyu, Ainu, Taiwan, the Bonin Islands, Aleuts, and Tsushima. As historians begin to place 
                                                           
18 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, sixth ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 236-8; Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, 152. 
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an increasing emphasis on international and transnational contexts, however, alternative 
frameworks for the understanding of these places/peoples should be of their interest. Local 
historians, too, will find it useful to further understand the connections between a specific 
geographic area and the broader international relations of the nineteenth century. 
 Another thing to add to the current historiography is that this thesis emphasises the 
wide range of geostrategic perceptions that existed among the residents in and around the 
Japanese archipelago in the late-nineteenth century. More specifically, at least two sets of two 
opposing views existed throughout the period under consideration. They were not mutually 
exclusive, and one person may have moved from one category to another over time. Yet it is 
vital that we recognise the differences among them in order to avoid selectively emphasising 
certain ideological inclinations as though they represented the entire country.  
 Cautious pragmatism with long-term calculations. This was primarily observed among 
elite officials in the Meiji government, including Enomoto Takeaki, Kuroda Kiyotaka, and 
Ōkubo Toshimichi. Opinions expressed by Oguri Tadamasa and Nonoyama Kanehiro during 
the Tsushima Incident fall into this category too. Agents with this view had decision-making 
power on Japan's foreign policy at various points in the 1860s and the 1870s, and more 
importantly access to information unavailable to the rest of the population through their 
contacts with foreigners or travels. This privileged position made them pragmatists with 
regards to the survival of the Japanese state. The prime example of that is that by the 1870s 
they realised that Russia's threat to the northern border was not immediate. This allowed 
Enomoto during the boundary negotiations in St. Petersburg to agree to the Russian 
possession of the whole island of Sakhalin, while pursuing compensation elsewhere.  
 Japan-centred jingoism. This attitude makes a pair with the first position. It was a 
continuation of the Japan-centric worldview during the Tokugawa period and was espoused 
by both officials and non-officials, most notably the former samurai class in the early 1870s.19 
Examples are the hard-liners in Sakhalin such as Okamoto Kansuke and Maruyama Sakura, 
the advocates of gunboat diplomacy against Korea, and Kabayama Sukenori and his peers 
                                                           
19 Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan, 24-5.  
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who led the colonisation project from Kagoshima to eastern Taiwan. Top officials such as 
Soejima and Yanagihara presented this perspective, too. By projecting themselves as a 
civiliser, they found a new way to push forward their vision of constructing a strong and 
dignified Japanese state. They were the most alarmist about the Western imperialists’ policies 
towards Japan, in particular that of Russia’s. it gave them an additional reason to support 
aggressive foreign policies towards the Asian neighbours. 
 Acceptance and promotion of reform. The latter two contrasting positions that make 
another pair were found primarily in the border zones. The first example of this liberal view 
within this thesis was the advocates of domain transfer in Tsushima in 1862. Those who 
worked with the Japanese foreign ministry in the early 1870s in an attempt to reform the 
communication with Korea, such as Oku Gisei and Ōshima Tomonojō, also belong here. The 
Bonin Islanders who accepted Japanese sovereignty may be included in this category as well.  
 Unwillingness for and resistance against reform. The prime example of this category is 
the dasshinjin group in the Ryukyu Kingdom, who wanted to restore the kingdom with the 
support from the Qing. Some members of the waegwan who collaborated with the Korean 
officials also meet the criteria. These are the people who tried to save their communities’ 
status quo in the face of global transformation in the nineteenth century by appealing for 
external support. Some of them tried to play Japan against another neighbouring polity in 
order to stay independent, but their effort did not materialise in the end, as discussed in the 
main chapters. 
 Overall, the diversity of views presented about the geostrategic position of Japan and 
the border zones suggests that one should not rely only on the metropole-based narratives for 
the explanation of the emergence of borders around the Japanese archipelago. Multiple 
opinions co-existed and collided. Some sought realistic solutions; others believed that they 
could find a way to stay where they were. Territorial boundaries emerged in the midst of this 
amalgam of perspectives. 
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